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SENATOR ALFRED ALQUIST:

This is the second joint public hearing pursuant to

Section 3523.1 of the Elections Code on the so-called Taxpayer Protection Act of
'92 (Proposition 165), which is before the voters on the November 3rd ballot.
Joining the Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee is the Senate Health
and Human Services Committee, chaired by Senator Diane Watson, and members of
the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, chaired by Assemblyman John Vasconcellos,
who was unable to be with us today.
I have a few comments of my own to make before I ask others to do so.
In seven of the last ten years the Legislature has failed to send a budget
to the Governor by the constitutionally required June 15th deadline.
One major reason, of course, is the lack of revenues to fund the increasing
demand for public services to meet California's diverse and expanding population
growth.
The second reason is the two-thirds vote requirement that allows a small
minority of legislators to block passage of a budget.

California is one of only

three states out of the 50 that has such a requirement.
The third reason involves initiatives, not like the one before us today,
that allows special interest groups to establish major constraints that limit
the Governor and the Legislature in enacting a balanced budget.

The Governor

and the Legislature are currently faced with federal requirements, state
mandates, court-ordered mandates, statutory requirements, and constitutional
provisions that mandate 92 percent of the spending in our state budget.
While Proposition 13 resolved the skyrocketing property tax increases in the
late '70s, it also contributed to a $250 billion loss in revenue and a shift in
education funding from the local level to the state.
Proposition 98 established in the State Constitution mandates that require
K through 14 education to be funded at the minimum guarantee of approximately 40
percent of the state's budget, regardless of any other fiscal priorities.
And Proposition 99 requires the cigarette tax revenue to be spent on
specific health related programs, and many changes must be made with a
four-fifths vote of the Legislature.
Proposition 165 will be appealing to those voters who want to cut the
Governor's and the Legislature's pay when a budget isn't enacted by June 15th.
And this measure will also be appealing to voters who want to reduce AFDC
benefits by 25 percent.
-1-
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Yet a closer review of this initiative reveals that public testimony and
participation in the budget process is reduced by the Prop. 165 provisions that
shorten the Legislature's review of the Governor's budget.
A closer review will demonstrate that this Governor and future governors in
California will have powers that no other state affords their chief executive.
A still closer review will indicate that the provisions of this initiative
will eliminate the Legislature's ability to override a Governor's veto action if
a fiscal emergency is declared.
This point cannot be emphasized enough:

If by unanimous vote the

Legislature sent to the Governor a budget and the Governor refused to sign the
bill, the Governor can then declare a fiscal emergency, enact his or her own
budget without regard to legislative or public budget priorities.

And this is

not the vision needed to ensure the success of california's future.
In today's hearing we will examine the fine-print provisions of Proposition
165.

This morning's testimony will be focused on the constitutional role of the

Legislature and the executive branch that's contained in the Governor's
initiative.
Testimony will also be heard on the potential impact this initiative would
have to the state support of our children's education.

And after lunch we will

hear from health services and children's advocates on the potential loss of
funding under the passage of Proposition 165.
The Governor's own campaign on behalf of Proposition 165 raises several
questions:
Is the Governor really asking California voters to approve a constitutional
amendment that his own staff admits is constitutionally flawed?

After all, if

the Legislature passed a bill and asked the Governor to sign it, acknowledging
it was unconstitutional, the Governor would never do so.
Who drafted Proposition 165, and if this is a technical error, how come it
took nearly a year for the Administration to discover the error of these five
repeated questions on this very same subject?

And I don't think that that is

something we want to have decided by the court.
With me so far this morning, although we are expecting any number of other
Members, is the Vice Chairman of Budget and Fiscal Review Committee, Senator
Frank Hill.

Senator Hill, any comments?

SENATOR FRANK HILL:
here.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate being

I think the concern that I have this morning is focusing on, really, the

balance of power issues.

While we would disagree on the two-thirds vote

requirement of passing a budget, I would think that we would share as

-2-
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legislators what this is going to impact, the balance of power in our three
branches of government.

I'm especially concerned about this new issue that was

raised at the hearing that we had up in Sacramento last Monday about whether or
not the Legislature is going to maintain its authority for legislative override.
And so, I would ask any of those witnesses that are coming forward, at least
for my benefit, if they could focus on that issue, because that, to me, is the
Republicans' very disturbing concern whether or not there is indeed going to be
the possibility of a legislative override; and the reality is there is no
guarantee that any one party is going to control the Governor's office in the
foreseeable future and I think we need to look at it in that context.

And I

look forward to participating in the hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ALQUIST:

We'll call first this morning as our first witness, Ms.

Elizabeth Hill, who is our Legislative Analyst.
Good morning, Ms. Hill.

You may speak from there or from here.

I think you

might be more comfortable here.
MS. ELIZABETH HILL:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Members.

pleasure to be here today.

It's a

The hat that I'm wearing today is a little bit

different than our traditional legislative hat.

We do have in the Legislative

Analyst's office a statutory mandate to produce impartial analyses of state
ballot measures, and it's in that role that I appear before you today.
Proposition 165 makes significant changes to the state's budget process and
calendar as well as public assistance programs.

With me today is Mr. David

Illig, who you also heard from on Monday in Sacramento.

And if it meets with

the committee's pleasure, I would suggest that I cover the state budget process
issues this morning and then Mr. Illig could set the agenda overview for you
before you get into the public assistance issues this afternoon because I see
that you have a fairly full agenda.
So if that meets with your pleasure, I'd like to focus on the six major
budget process provisions in Proposition 165, and I'd be happy to answer any
questions that you may have.
The first issue is the budget submittal date.

Proposition 165 delays the

date for submittal of the Governor's budget to the Legislature from January lOth
to March 1st of each year.

The effect of this change would be to reduce the

amount of time by about seven weeks that the Legislature has both to analyze and
review the Governor's budget estimates and proposals, to compress the time
available to the Legislature to seek public input, to conduct your budget
hearings, and the budget conference committee processes.
-3-
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The second budget change is that a late budget forfeits legislative salaries
and expenses.

Under Proposition 165, if the Legislature fails to pass a budget

bill by the existing constitutional deadline of June 15th, which remains
unchanged in the Proposition, then the Governor and the Members of the
Legislature would forfeit their salaries and expenses, travel, and per diem from
that day forward until the budget is passed and signed by the Governor.
The third budget provision is the late budget which allows the Governor to
continue the prior year budget of the State of California.

If a budget bill is

not signed by the Governor by July 1st, Proposition 165 allows the Governor to
declare a fiscal emergency.

If the Governor does so, then the prior year's

state budget becomes the state's operating budget for the new fiscal year with
the following adjustments for four constitutionally protected spending programs.
First, funding for K-12 schools and community colleges, which would be
increased to the level required by Proposition 98.
other elements protected by the Constitution:

And then finally the three

state debt service costs, the

homeowners' exemption reimbursement to counties, and state mandated local
program reimbursement which are required by the Constitution.
The Governor would be allowed to reduce funding for all other categories of
expenditures, including entitlement programs, as needed to balance state
revenues and expenditures.

These spending cuts would become effective 30 days

after the Legislature is notified unless the Legislature passes and the Governor
signs a budget bill prior to the time the cuts would become effective.
It should be noted that this declaration of a fiscal emergency and the
resulting operating budget are not sufficient to end the forfeiture of salaries
and expenses that we mentioned a moment ago.

The Legislature must pass and the

Governor must sign a budget bill in order for the forfeit period to end.
These provisions could result in either costs or savings to the state.
impact in any year could be very large, depending on the circumstances.

The

Savings

would result to the extent that the cuts proposed by the Governor to the working
budget take effect.

Increased costs, however, could result to the extent that

state agencies continue to spend at the prior year level and that that level
would be higher than the Legislature would have approved in a new budget.
The fourth budget provision is the post-budget spending cuts which are
allowed.

Proposition 165 grants the Governor increased authority to reduce

expenditures after a budget bill becomes law, again by declaring a state of
fiscal emergency.

At present, as you know, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hill, the

Governor may issue an Executive Order requiring agencies to curtail spending for
state operations, but spending for entitlements and local assistance programs
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basically are not affected.
This measure provides that the Governor may reduce any category of
expenditure, except for the constitutionally protected categories that I
mentioned a moment ago.
I note on your agenda that you're hearing from several education witnesses
later in today's hearing, and clearly there is some open -- the education
portion is open to some interpretation, because particularly in this post-budget
fiscal emergency, the way the wording of the measure is constructed, it says,
" ••• except for expenditures protected by Article 16, Section 8", which is the
Prop. 98 section of the Constitution.

But as you know, there is also an

inclusion on test(?) 3(?) in that if revenues of the state have declined, then
you have a situation where the guarantee would then be lower.

And what would

actually happen under that circumstance, in our view, is open to interpretation.
Now, when could a fiscal emergency be declared?

First, if cumulative state

revenues are below budget projections by 3 percent or more; if cumulative state
expenditures are exceeding projections by 3 percent or more; or finally, if
cumulative state revenues and expenditures are each more than 1.5 percent, then
you would be in that circumstance.
As with the case of a delayed budget, spending cuts proposed by the Governor
would take effect 30 days after notification of the Legislature, unless the
Legislature passes and the Governor signs alternative budget balancing
legislation.

These provisions could result in substantial savings in any year

in which the Governor makes cuts to enact a budget.
The fifth provision is that cuts can be made without changes in existing
law.

Proposition 165 allows the Governor, whenever a state fiscal emergency has

been declared, to make spending cuts that would currently require a statutory
change in order to be effective.

These cuts could include reductions in public

assistance grants and health benefits.

In addition, the governor could reduce

state employee salaries or work time by up to 5 percent unless collective
bargaining agreements allow such reductions -- excuse me, if collective
bargaining agreements allow such reductions.
And finally, the Governor's approval is required, in our view, for budget
related legislation.

The plain language of the measure appears to revise the

Constitution's existing provisions governing how a bill becomes a law.
Currently, a bill may become a law without the Governor's signature in two ways:
the Legislature may override a Governor's veto, or the Governor may allow a
measure to become law by taking no action on the bill.

proposition 165

specifically requires certain budget related legislation to be signed by the

-5-
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Governor in order to become law.
As noted earlier, if a fiscal emergency has been declared by the Governor, a
budget bill passed by the Legislature after July 1 would require the Governor's
signature in order to become law.

Also, if a fiscal emergency has been declared

after the enactment of a budget measure, measures passed by the Legislature as
alternatives to the budget cuts proposed by the Governor would need the
Governor's signature in order to take effect.

Thus, in both of these cases it

would appear that the Governor's authority to determine the state's response to
a fiscal emergency would be greatly enhanced.
This issue of the signature required, I know has been a point of dispute in
Monday's hearing and will probably be subject to testimony today.

I can tell

you that by statute a readability committee is an advisory body to me as we
decide how to write our analyses of the propositions.

This was one issue that

we had the readability committee focus on in particular, and their advice to me
at that time was that the plain language of the measure needs to be brought to
the voters' attention as we had both when the initiative was circulating for
signature when we did our initial analysis and then in the final analysis we
prepared for the voter's pamphlet.
I'd be happy to answer any questions that you may have, Mr. Chairman.
SENATOR ALQUIST:

Senator Watson.

CHAIRPERSON DIANE WATSON:

I just want to say welcome to all of you, and

sorry that I'm late, and I have one question for Ms. Hill.
I hear the success of the hearing on Monday was very successful, Senator
Alquist, and I thank you for that, and I thank you for bringing this issue right
out into the public.

There's an article in the Sacramento Bee that talks about

the Governor's office stating that the proposition is constitutionally flawed.
As I understand it, there's a provision in there that prohibits the Legislature
from overriding the veto.
Is there any way, prior to the vote, to get an injunction against that
particular proposition on the ballot?

Is there any way to stop it before it

goes to the people?
MS. HILL:

Senator Watson, I'm not an attorney.

I know that a suit was

brought under the single subject provisions related to Proposition 165 and the
measure was upheld on those grounds.

To the best of my knowledge, there wou19

be no way at this point to do what you have suggested.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
that issue?

Is there any attorney here with us that can address

Can we invalidate a provision before it goes to the vote of the

people?
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SENATOR ALQUIST:

I would think, Senator Watson, that the "No on 165

Committee" would almost certainly explore that option.
And Senator Watson, I started the meeting in order -- because we do have a
long schedule, but you are scheduled to handle the gavel today and perhaps you
have a statement of your own.
Ms. Hill, apparently that's all of the questions.
SENATOR HILL:
CHAIRMAN

Mr. Chairman, I have some questions.

ALQUIS~:

SENATOR HILL:
SENATOR WATSON:

Senator Hill.

Senator Watson, do you want to do your ••. ?
Well, let me just very quickly again welcome everyone here.

And of course, I'm highly concerned about the impact of the initiative on the
people of California, particularly the people of Los Angeles County since this
is the largest county and the most diversified county, and the provisions will
hurt the effort of the County Board of Supervisors as well as the people in the
city to deliver their services.

I am concerned about the health care,

particularly clinics, mental health, social services, that will be severely
affected under the provisions of this bill.
I am hoping that we, through these hearings and also through the kind of
press that we hope to have between now and November 3rd, highlight the flaws in
this proposal.

What we need to do is educate the public so they will know.

I

am hearing in my office now from welfare recipients that didn't know that the
budget last year cut them and that the budget this year also cut their grants
and the impact of 165 will be devastating.

People just have not tuned in and I

guess we haven't done the job of getting the message out.
So with the press here I'm hoping that this will be a major step in trying
to educate the public as to how flawed this proposition is.
Taxpayers' Protection and Fiscal Responsibility Act."

It's called "The

That name in itself

deludes people into thinking it's going to protect them in some way when it
really will hurt people that we need to help and we're committed to help.
With that, I appreciate those who are coming to make presentations, and I
hope that the press will follow 165 all the way into the polls so that we can
get it defeated and then we can start on really a reform.
I want to thank Ms. Hill for, again, her very articulate and cogent remarks
relative to 165, and I hope the remainder of the day that we can continue to
have such relevant information that will help people make the right decision.
Senator Hill.
SENATOR HILL:

I've got a couple of questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair, for

Liz.

-7-
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Liz, it's your opinion that the provision requiring a signature indeed does
not allow for a legislative override of a veto after that June 15 deadline is
past?
MS. HILL:

Senator Hill, what we indicated is that it appears to change

that, and clearly this is an issue of judicial interpretation, but just looking
at the plain language of the measure, the word "sign" is repeated numerous times
in both Sections 4 and 5, which are the budget sections of the measure.
SENATOR HILL:

Okay.

A couple more technical issues.

You talked about

whether or not Proposition 98 was guaranteed, and if you're in the circumstance
the Governor declares a fiscal emergency, we have revenue drop by at least 3
percent, is the issue that we adopted a budget based on some projection,
revenues are off by 3 percent, is the issue that you're talking about then
whether or not the Governor would have the authority to reduce the 98 guarantee
because we have fallen below those 3 percent projections?
MS. HILL:

You have several competing issues at once.

You have the

situation that you've just outlined which, depending on also what was happening
with local property taxes and average daily attendance, which are also factors
in the Proposition 98 guarantee calculation along with state general fund
revenues, if that were to affect the then Proposition 98 guarantee amount with
the wording of the measure, which says "except expenditures protected by the
article that applies to Proposition 98", there would be some interpretation
because the guarantee may have at that point in time changed.
However, as you know, the Legislature also, usually in a control section of
the budget act, specifies what the Proposition 98 guarantee will be for the
upcoming fiscal year.

So you could also have a situation where the budget act

expresses a guarantee level which now would be higher than the new one.

Well

then, does the wording of this measure apply, for example, to the budget act
guarantee amount in the control section, or what the new Proposition 98
guarantee would be, given changes in the factors with the proposition?
The other factor you have, of course, is now you have a situation with both
some retroactive recapture and loan payments that now are in the Proposition 98
equation.

How would those be interpreted by the courts?

SENATOR HILL:

And so your conclusion is it's just not clear.

You don't

know whether or not the Governor would unilaterally have the authority to say we
no longer

the 98 guarantee has fallen and so I unilaterally have the

authority to reduce those expenditures.
MS. HILL:

We're saying it's open to interpretation.

SENATOR HILL:

Last question, Madam Chair, if I could, deals with the 3
-8-

percent trigger, that fiscal emergency.

How much is 3 percent?

How many times

in the last 4 or 5 years have we been off in terms of the finance projections by
3 percent?

How many times would you attribute that fiscal emergency?

MS. HILL:

Well, certainly in the last 3 years, Senator Hill, our revenues

have declined relative to the initial budget estimate by that amount.

Generally

on the expenditure side, it has not swung as much as our recent experience with
revenues, particularly because of the recession.

But in the last 3 years you

would have that situation.
SENATOR HILL:

So the last Deukmejian budget and the last two budgets the

revenues have been off by that 3 percent amount.

And so if this had been in

effect the Governor would have the authority to declare a fiscal emergency and
all the additional powers.
MS. HILL:

To the best of my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

A couple of questions before you leave.

Number one, if

Proposition 165 is to pass, does it supersede any other provision in any other
statute that has to do with these budgetary provisions relative to the 98 and
maybe Proposition 99 that raises revenues?

What would be the impact of

provisions in -- particularly, the fiscal provisions in 165 have?
MS. HILL:

To the best of my knowledge, Senator Watson, I mean this would be

the latest expression of the people's intent and be placed in the Constitution.
I think one of the issues you may be getting at is also, say, the interaction
with the education issues and in that case the measure does not amend that
provision, it references it.

So it would not change the Proposition 98

guarantee but I think what you would have, in effect, is some uncertainty as to
how the two measures interact together under different scenarios.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

So, to the extent that there are provisions under

certain code sections, it would amend those code sections, the ones that are
named here.
MS. HILL:

Those only.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Okay.

My next question is, we get fiscal information from the Finance Department
(the Governor's department), from your department, Leg Counsel, from the
Controller, from Ways and Means, and our Budget and Fiscal Committee
different sources.

five

Often, those numbers don't jive, and I think that's been the

problem over the years.

I remember a letter from Ways and Means six years ago

saying that we're in a deficit posture(?).

It wasn't IOU to A-OK-- we were not

A-OK -- and I think Pete Wilson realized that after taking over from the
Deukmejian Administration.

Is there any way in 165 that we can be able to know
-9-

what the real and actual figures are?

How do we collaborate across all those

different sources of information to know the real figures?
MS. HILL:

Senator Watson, my reading of the proposition rests that

determination in the Department of Finance.

It's the Department of Finance's

estimate of the cumulative 3 percent revenues, expenditures, or some combination
of the two, that would dictate the fiscal emergency provisions in Proposition

165.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Well, that's what I think is feeding a lot of the

problem, because as I said, the figures are different from each one of those
sources usually, and some way we've got to know what -- and, you know, the May
revise always hits us upside the head with reality and it seems to me we ought
to do a better job of becoming projected and accounting.
I listen to the Controller a lot because he knows what's in the bank
accounts, and that has a lot of meaning to me.

You know, what money we really

have on hand and what money we owe out and who we have to pay.

So some way

we're going to have to have more accurate reporting of what our fiscal picture
is, and I don't know if the Finance Department has that level of accuracy.

It

hasn't in the last few years.
That's a comment more than a question.
We want to thank you so very much for coming here to Los Angeles and for
bringing us this information relative to 165.
MS. HILL:

Thank you very much.

As I mentioned, I covered only the

budgetary portion.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
SENATOR HILL:

Senator, do you have another question?

I do, Liz, before you go.

interesting thought in my mind.

Senator Watson just raised an

Would it be possible for a governor to use

over-optimistic revenue projections from the Department of Finance, or maybe use
the most optimistic --we've got 5 different projections about what's going to
happen to the economy -- we will choose the UCLA School of forecasts if that
happens to be the most optimistic one -- get a budget passed, and then to
obviate or to eliminate the contentiousness of making some of the budget cuts
while we're trying to get a budget adopted?

At what point then could you say

we're off our 3 percent, we used over-optimistic revenue forecasts and now I can
make these cuts unilaterally because I've declared a fiscal emergency?

Is that

scenario plausible or possible?
MS. HILL:

In my judgment it is possible.

Of course, it would depend what

the Legislature and the Governor did in terms of appropriating those revenues,
then what sort of effect it may have on the spending reductions that the
-10-

Governor would be authorized to make.
SENATOR HILL:

It just seems to me the legislative reality is that we

would -- nobody wants to make the tough decisions about the tough cuts and if
somebody's willing to go along, and the Department of Finance is willing to go
along with an optimistic revenue projection that gives us more money to spend,
more than likely most of the Legislature is going to jump at that.

At what

point then does the 3 percent analysis come in that allows the Governor to
trigger a fiscal emergency?
MS. HILL:

That determination has to be made on a quarterly basis.

So at

the end of each of the quarters of the fiscal year-- September •••
SENATOR HILL:

So at the end of that first quarter, theoretically he could

come back and say we're off by 3 percent, doesn't look as good as we thought,
and I'm going to declare a fiscal emergency.
MS. HILL:

It's theoretically possible.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair and Members, and Mr. Illig will be
available later on the health and welfare provisions.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Thank you.

We appreciate it.

Steve Gold, Director, Center for the Study of States, Rockefeller Institute.
MR. STEVE GOLD:

Thank you very much.

I would like to say first of all that my Center studies state budget
problems and solutions all over the country.

We probably spend more time

looking at California than any other state because it's the biggest and the
problems here are some ways worse than other places.
I've been asked to provide some perspective about how the California budget
problems compare to those in other states and also how the policies in
California, and particularly those in this proposition, compare to those in
other states.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Mr. Gold, too, would you direct some of your comments

toward the initiative process, which is unique to very few states, and which
appears to be the way we are making policy in California through initiatives.
So you might want to give us the national perspective on the initiative process
as you go through.
MR. GOLD:

Sure.

And, also, I've prepared some written comments.

I'm going to go beyond it

in some ways and just summarize it in others.
Basically, first I'll talk about the causes of the fiscal problems, then how
taxes and services in California compare to other states, and finally talk about
policies in other states, both adopted so far and the ones that I think need to
-11-
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be looked at in the future.
Now as is well known, all states are having fiscal difficulties, and the
most important reasons are the recession and burgeoning Medicaid costs.

Also,

the enrollment increases in the schools and corrections increases and inadequate
tax systems are also major reasons why states are having budget problems.

There

are any list of reasons why states are having budget problems -- increases in
AFDC are not as important as the factors I've just mentioned.

Although most

states who've had big increases in AFDC in the past two years, it is such a
small percentage of the budget that it's not as important as the recession and
Medicaid and school increases.
It's interesting to note that although California has had big increases in
AFDC caseloads, they're not particularly large by national standards.

Clearly,

the most recent information available from the American Public Welfare
Association Journal in February of 1989 and January of 1992, the increase in
AFDC caseloads in California was only the 21st highest in the country.

So it

was not far above average.
And it's interesting to note that Arizona, which has much lower benefits
than California, had the second biggest increase.
So no other state has targeted AFDC as an area for cuts in the way that
California has, and in fact, the cuts that were enacted last year and this year
are bigger than the reductions that have been adopted in the last year, two
years, than any other state.
Now, even though most states are having budget problems, the problems in
California are much worse than most other states, if not much worse than any
other state.

And there are three factors I want to mention in regard to why

these problems are so big in California.
(NOTE:

Mr. Gold's testimony was inaudible due to technical difficulties.

Refer to Mr. Gold's written testimony for content.)
MR. RICHARD SYBERT:

... (beginning of his testimony is inaudible) ... I'm here

at your request to testify regarding the proposed budget cutting mechanisms
under Proposition 165, the Taxpayer Protection Act on this November's ballot.
I understand that a representative of the Office of Child Development and
Education may testify on other aspects of the act later today, so I'll confine
my own comments to a comparison of the budget cutting mechanisms in the
initiative with those of other states.
As you know, the Act would provide California's Governor with the ability to
reduce spending to meet revenues when there's a deficit and the Legislature
cannot or has not acted to close it.

In certain defined circumstances, the
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Governor would then be empowered to close the deficit through cuts in
approximately 50 percent of budget categories.
Several months ago my office, the Office of Planning and Research, conducted
a comprehensive survey of the 50 states -- I have a copy here with me and I'd be
happy to provide the Members with a copy afterwards

to compare the mechanisms

available to other state governors to reduce a budget.
What we found, in a nutshell, was that California was almost alone in
ham-stringing its chief executive in the budget arena.

At least 44 other states

give their governors more authority than California currently does to bring
spending into line with revenues.

There are only five other states -- Florida,

Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire -- which deny their governor such
authority, and at least one of these -- Florida -- is currently working on
legislation to correct this.
Moreover, we found that the powers proposed under the Act fall about in the
middle of the range of such authority granted other state governors.

In other

words, Prop. 165 is a fairly moderate version of what is fairly standard
gubernatorial authority.

One may argue whether or not on the merits a governor

should have this authority, but it's simply inaccurate to claim that it is
unusual or extreme.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

On that issue, the budgetary process is described in

the Constitution of California.

Are there similar provisions in these other

states, or in other states, that compare to ours?

Are we that far out of line

in terms of our constitutional provisions relative to the budget process?
MR. SYBERT:

Senator, forgive me, can you try to rephrase it?

I'm not sure

I understand and I want to answer correctly.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
to work the budget.
present a budget.

Our Constitution gives the authority to the Legislature

The Governor proposes and then we analyze and work and
In other states, is the constitutional authority similar,

comparable?
MR. SYBERT:

Yes.

That is the basic structure.

In addition, what most

other states have done is they have recognized a potential gridlock situation
when the governor and the legislature can't agree on a budget.
in other states as well.

That's happened

And the rationale is that all right, while the debate

continues, meanwhile we have spending programs and we have revenue coming in,
and since deficit spending is forbidden under most state constitutions,
including California's, there's got to be a mechanism to make sure a state
doesn't go into deficit spending while that debate is going on.

And most other

states have resolved this by giving the executive branch, the governor, limited
-13-

authority, under guidelines, under prescribed limitations, to cut spending while
that debate is going on, to bring it into line with revenues, and that, it's my
understanding, is also the intent of Prop. 165.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MR. SYBERT:

Thank you.

Thank you.

Naturally, the extent of independent gubernatorial budget authority varies
among these 44 other states.

I've blown up a chart here, and copies attached to

my written comments that you have, to demonstrate the different categories.

At

the lower end -- I don't know if you can see this, this is at the bottom of the
chart -- at the lower end a governor is permitted to achieve minor savings by
reorganizing executive branch departments, by consolidating them and impounding
some of their budgetary funds.

There are five states -- Kentucky, Montana,

Nebraska, Illinois, and Bill Clinton's Arkansas -- that grant this kind of
limited authority.
At the upper end -- this is at the top of the chart here -- there are 20
states that permit their governors to reduce any expenditures necessary to bring
them into line with revenues with few or no limits as to the budget categories
that may be cut, and in addition, to reorganize the executive branch.

These 20

states include some of our neighbors -- Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon.
Now, in between these two ends of the spectrum, the remaining 19 states give
their governors a variety of limited mechanisms.

There are relatively crude

ones such as requiring that cuts be made pro rata across the board.
that are Alabama and Georgia.
priorities, as in Arkansas.

Examples of

Or that cuts be made under an agreed set of
And then there are other states, such as

Connecticut, where the governor has discretion to make cuts up to a certain
percentage.

Or, as another example, Missouri, where the governor can make cuts

only in certain nonexempt categories of the budget.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
of Assemblyman Bob Epple.
MR. SYBERT:

Excuse me.

I just would like to announce the presence

Thank you for joining us.

Continue, please.

Thank you, Senator.

In this middle group of 19 states, the executive branch cannot be
unilaterally reorganized.
Again, Prop. 165 is in this middle ground of mechanisms.

It does not, or

would not provide the governor with unlimited discretion as to where to make
cuts, but instead would allow him to make spending reductions in about 50
percent of the budget categories.

The other half of the budget, including debt

service, education -- and I know Secretary DiMarco will speak to this later
today -- local subventions, and 95 percent of state employees' salaries would be
-14-
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exempt from any cuts.
Now, this may be contrasted, for example.

Let me show you a second chart

here.
What we've done on this second chart -- what the second chart shows,
Members, it's a list of states, some of the states that provide their governors
with independent budget cutting authority, and it shows the percentage of their
budget expenditures that may not be cut.

It shows the exempt percentages.

And

you can see that at the top Minnesota and North Carolina say everything's open
to being cut; they exempt nothing.
percent of its budget.

At the bottom, Massachusetts exempts over 80

California, under Prop. 165, again would be about

two-thirds of the way down.

Fifty percent of the budget would be protected and

50 percent would be open to cuts.

This may be contrasted, for example, with

some of the larger industrial states perhaps more analogous to California:
Pennsylvania, where none of the budget is exempted from cuts; New York, where
only 6.8 percent may be exempted; or smaller states such as Arizona and Colorado
where only education is exempted.
As I said, we present data on this chart as to 21 states that exercised this
kind of budget authority in 1991, and two-thirds of them were more generous to
their governors and their ability than Prop. 165 would permit the California
governor.
I believe that it is inaccurate to claim, as some have, that Prop. 165 would
give the governor unlimited budget power.

Instead, Prop. 165 would give the

governor the ability, if he or she and the Legislature cannot agree on a budget,
and only if their is a projected deficit, to make cuts based on the then-current
or most recent budget baseline in about half the budget categories and then only
enough to close the projected deficit.
a budget.

Prop. 165 does not let a governor write

It lets him close a deficit according to set criteria and an

established budget baseline, either while the budget debate goes on or with the
current budget still in place.

Those are two very different things.

I heard testimony earlier this morning about the fear, and I believe Senator
Alquist referenced this in his opening remarks, that somehow Prop. 165 repeals
the standard constitutional provision of a legislative override; that the
Legislature on a two-thirds vote could override a governor's veto.
The Attorney General, yesterday, came down with an opinion, which I
understand is now public, that that is not the case; that there is no repeal of
the legislative override in Prop. 165 and that simply is not an issue.

You

cannot repeal, according to the Attorney General, a constitutional provision by
implication; and therefore, Prop. 165 does not remove the legislative override.
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The Legislature would still be able, by a two-thirds vote, to pass a budget and
have it be law.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
article, September 29

Let me draw your attention to the Sacramento Bee
"Error Makes Proposition 165 Constitutionally Flawed."

Judge Gordon, Director of the

Gove~nor's

campaign for 165 ... that there is a

small, minute technical error ... so that could be corrected by the courts, and
that is the flaw that we are referring to.

There is an admission to the fact

that it is an error.
MR. SYBERT:

Madam Chair, I want to be careful.

I am a lawyer.

I'm not

here to testify on behalf of the initiative or the initiative campaign.
here to testify as to what we found referencing other states.

I'm

But I do know

that the Attorney General has found and issued an opinion that that is not the
case.

He has issued an opinion that there is no such error.

I have an extra

copy of that and I'd be happy to give it to you if you'd like to take a look at
it.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Well, Mr. Gordon, who was responsible for putting it on

the ballot, said it was an error.

So you have some conflict with the people who

developed Proposition 165, is what you're saying.
MR. SYBERT:

My own personal opinion, not speaking on behalf of the Governor

or anyone else, speaking on behalf of me, is that I don't believe there is an
error, and apparently the Attorney General believes also that there is no error.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

All right.

My next question to you would be this:

Now, in current law the government must submit -- the governor must submit a
balanced budget, and it gives a time certain.

And in current

l~w,

the

Legislature is required to pass a budget and there's a requirement of
two-thirds.

Do you feel that the new authority in 165, and I'm going to read

directly from it, "would allow the Governor to declare a fiscal emergency and
reinstate the prior budget adjusted for constitutionally required increases and
any reductions needed to balance anticipated revenues and expenditures when a
new budget has not been passed."

Does that language not give the governor the

authority to declare a budget or to write a budget?
MR. SYBERT:

I do not believe so.

My reading of the Act is that if there is

no budget, for whatever reason, if there is no budget, and if there is a
projected deficit, because remember, if there is no projected deficit none of
this kicks in in the first place, if there's no budget, number one, number two,
if there's a projected deficit, then number three, the governor is required to
take the prior year's budget as a baseline and he is permitted to make cuts in
about 50 percent of those categories only to the extent required to close that
-16-

030

projected deficit.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MR. SYBERT:

But this allows the governor to rewrite the budget.

Well, I think strictly speaking it allows the governor, under

very strict circumstances, to rewrite a very small portion of the budget, but it
certainly doesn't even come close to allowing him to ...
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Small, large, it really doesn't make any difference.

The rewrite is the trigger word there.

What I see, this very clearly gives the

governor the authority to rewrite a budget in a fiscal emergency.
The concern I have is that there is a two-thirds requirement, for obvious
reasons, to pass a budget.

That makes it more difficult or brings more people

into the decision on a budget that impacts over 30 million people for the State
of California.

I feel that it flies in the face of representative policymaking.

The 120 people write that budget and the governor can lower figures, can't
increase them but can lower figures.

It gives the 120 people and their

constituents the representation on that budget.

Now, Proposition 165 changes

that and puts it into the hands of one person to then rewrite, and that flaw
does not allow us to go back and correct it through an override.
MR. SYBERT:

Madam Chair, I have great respect for you and I'm going to have

to •.•
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

It doesn't have anything to do with respect.

Just

answer the question.
MR. SYBERT:

I'm going to respectfully disagree with almost everything you

said.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

It's all right to disagree with me because I'm

disagreeing with you, so it's okay.
MR. SYBERT:

Let me just very briefly go down the laundry list of

disagreements.
Number one, I think there is an enormous difference between being able to
affect one, two, three percent of the budget and being able to affect 100
percent of it.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

We're not talking about size.

authority, and the authority says the governor can ...

We're talking about the
One provision or 100,

does the governor have that authority under 165 or not?
MR. SYBERT:

But I am talking about size and I don't think you ..•

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

No. No, no.

Answer my question.

Does 165 give the

authority to the governor to rewrite one provision?
MR. SYBERT:

One provision?

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

One provision, or more.
-17-
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MR. SYBERT:

Under certain specified circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MR. SYBERT:

Or more.

Yes/no?

Under certain specified circumstances.

Unfortunately, it's not

a yes or no question.
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

Madam Chair?

Perhaps I can rephrase this.

Does the Act

give authority to the governor to spend money when an appropriation has been
made by the Legislature?
MR. SYBERT:

Forgive me, sir.

Could you -- I didn't catch a couple of words

there.
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

Does the initiative give the authority to the governor

to spend money without an appropriation having been made by the Legislature?
MR. SYBERT:

Again, I'm speaking after my own personal reading of it.

I

don't represent the initiative and I'm not here to give formal legal advice.

My

reading of the initiative is it doesn't -- no, I don't think so, because the
governor has to take the existing budget baseline.
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

Okay, But, if there is no appropriation that's been made

by the Legislature, no budget approved, and he acts to spend after that date
under the authority granted in this, and he is doing it without an appropriation
of the Legislature.
MR. SYBERT:

I think you would want to get an expert legal answer to that,

but I suppose there is an implication that there's a continuing appropriation
from the current or just prior year's budget baseline.
Madam Chair, may I continue?
I'm sorry, I got a little distracted and I was in the middle of disagreeing
with you on everything and I forgot the last ...
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
disagreeing with me on?
MR. SYBERT:

You think I'm going to remind you what you were
(Laughter.)

The last four or five points.

Oh, I know, you made reference

again to the assertion that the Legislature would be unable to have any
opportunity to redress the governor's action, and again, I don't believe that's
the case.

Apparently, the Attorney General doesn't believe that's the case.

Under current law, without Prop. 165, you need two-thirds to pass a budget and
you need two-thirds to override a governor's veto.

As I understand the Attorney

General's Opinion, with Prop. 165, if the governor vetoes a budget and the
Legislature then overrides by two-thirds, that budget becomes law.

That's the

way I understand the Attorney General's Opinion, and again, I have an extra copy
of it if the committee would like it.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

As I understand, there's a provision in 165 that
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requires the governor's signature and what it does on that budget by a certain
deadline.

What that does is to eliminate the possibility of a veto override by

the Legislature.
MR. SYBERT:

My understanding, Senator Watson, is that that is not the case

and the Attorney General has apparently opined that that is not the case.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
not been in there.
MR .. SYBERT:

Well, Mr. Gordon says it was an error and should have

That's the person who put the proposition on the ballot.

I read the same article in the Sacramento Bee and all I can

tell you is since my arrival in Sacramento about 20 months ago I have been
stunned at how often the newspapers get it wrong.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
months ago.

Oh, maybe that's the reason, you just got here 20

Okay, all right.

MR. SYBERT:

Let me briefly finish up my prepared remarks and then if there

are any additional questions I'd be happy to respond to them.
Again, this OPR survey that looked at the other 49 states, we found that
there is a correlation between greater gubernatorial authority and smaller
deficits.

The states whose governors have significant or full budget cutting

authority this year faced average budget shortfalls of 2.5 percent of planned
expenditures.

That is less than half the average 5.7 percent shortfall of

states like California whose governor has little or no authority.

Putting that

another way, states whose governors can reduce spending when the Legislature
cannot tend to run substantially smaller deficits.
We also looked at the court cases which have challenged some of these
powers, and as you might imagine, there are a number of those.

These kinds of

budget cutting powers are sometimes challenges of violation of the separation of
powers.

According to the court cases, most of these budget cutting powers are

upheld.

The general rule is that such authority is constitutional and it

doesn't violate the separation of powers if it is constrained within broad
policy limits that are set in statute.

It looks to me like the Taxpayer

Protection Act appears to meet this test because it sets which budget categories
may be cut and which not.
In conclusion, Madam Chair, and Members, the breath of the governor's
authority to cut the budget that is established in the Taxpayer Protection Act
is common and it is normal in many other states and it generally passes legal
muster.

Prop. 165 is a fairly mild version of such authority ... it falls about

in the middle.

Again, the alternative is deficit spending which is

constitutionally forbidden.
I appreciate the opportunity to comment and I'd be happy to respond to any
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further questions or comments that Members may have.
SENATOR HILL:

Madam Chair, if I could, I've got some questions.

The first

one, Mr. Sybert, deals with your original chart talking about California being
in the group of four or five
terms of budget reductions.

I guess six states that had no authority in
My question is, as you look at that authority

this is under the proposed authority -- the Governor declares a fiscal
emergency -- how many of those other states does the governor have the blue
pencil authority?
MR. SYBERT:

You mean the line item veto?

SENATOR HILL:
MR. SYBERT:

Line item veto.
Senator, we did not look at that but I would be happy to try to

get that information and get it back to you.
SENATOR HILL:

It just seems to me that if you make the argument that really

California has a very weak governor, that there are only five other states that
have the -- that don't have this kind of new budget authority that part of
part of the tremendous leverage that the Governor has in our budget

that

process is his ability to blue pencil, and it seems to me somehow that has to be
adjusted in there in terms of being a fair comparison of other states and other
governors' authority.

I know that not all other states does the governor have

that blue pencil authority.
MR. SYBERT:

I think that is a fair comment and I will get that information

to you, but I also suspect the answer is going to be that most of them have the
line item veto.

I know that they have it in Arkansas, because Bill Clinton has

said that if he's President he wants it as the national President.

So I suspect

Democrat, Republican, across the board, most governors have that authority.
SENATOR HILL:

But again, that would be a-- it seems to me that's just an

additional power that the governor has that somehow isn't reflected in terms
of ...
MR. SYBERT:

Sure.

That is a fair comment and I will get that information

to you.
SENATOR HILL:

You know, this issue about whether we get or need to have a

signature or not is a great concern to me.
General's Opinion.
that.

I'd like to see that Attorney

You could just send it to me.

I'd like to get a copy of

It seems to me that's a very critical piece of this whole budget

authority is whether or not indeed after you get past that June 15 deadline
whether or not there's an ability to override a veto of whatever governor, and I
know there's a difference of opinions but I think that's a real critical part.
That's just a comment, not really asking a question.
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MR. SYBERT:

Senator, we had our budget cuts, so rather than spend 29 cents

on a stamp, I'm just going to give it to you.
SENATOR HILL:

Okay.

Two other questions that I'd like to get your response to.
chart, I think the issue was California

On the second

if Prop. 165 passes, the governor

would have the authority to reduce half of the state budget.
mid-range, or actually two-thirds or so of the way down.

Put him right in

That implies that the

governor would have no authority in terms of -- I assume -- maybe this is not a
correct assumption -- my assumption is that includes the governor would have no
authority to reduce K-14 appropriations.
that she had.

That that's part of the 40 percent

I assume the other things add up to 10 percent.

MR. SYBERT:

I believe that's the case.

I know there has been some dispute

as to whether that exemption is limited to the Prop. 98 guarantee or whether it
extends to an education appropriation greater than the Prop. 98 guarantee.
may be an academic question.

It

I don't know how soon we're going to get an

appropriation greater than the guarantee.

I believe that Secretary DiMarco is

prepared to address that a little later.
SENATOR HILL:

But my comment is not, you know, what happens if we end up

with an expenditure over the 98 guarantee, but what about the real world exempt
we've had the last couple of years.

If we pass a budget, make an assumption on

what the 98 guarantee is going to be, we found out the last couple of years our
assumptions were overly optimistic.
there's a fiscal emergency.
overpayment.

That triggers the governor declaring

This year we had a $2.3 billion recapture in

So my question is, if Prop. 165 is successful, does the governor

have the authority to reduce the K-14, the Prop. 98 guarantee under this year's
scenario by that $2.3 billion?
MR. SYBERT:
DiMarco.

I'm really going to ask you to hold that question for Secretary

She simply is more qualified than I am.

SENATOR HILL:

Okay.

It's an open-ended issue:

I guess -- the Analyst testified:
I'm not sure.

we're not sure.

If indeed it turns out that the

governor would have that authority to reduce the 98 guarantee by the 2.3 -- I
assume just by the $2.3 billion, then the percentage of authority the cut that
the governor would have in terms of your chart would not be 50 percent but
indeed somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 percent, because if you take out the
40 percent, the K-14 suffer.
MR. SYBERT:

Senator, again, please ask Secretary DiMarco, but my

understanding is that nobody has suggested that the minimum guarantee itself,
which is some 41 percent, would not be exempt.
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SENATOR HILL:

No, no.

I understand that.

But it seems that the way that

you come up with the 50 percent figure, in terms of half the budget would be
protected, is assuming that all 40 percent of the K-12 expenditures would also
be protected.
MR. SYBERT:
SENATOR HILL:

Yeah.
If indeed it turns out, as the Analyst says it's an

open-ended question, and we'll find out-- I see Secretary DiMarco here-- that
the governor has the authority to reduce that $2.3 billion under this year's
real world scenario, then the reality is the governor's authority here, in terms
of his authority to cut spending, you would have to-- actually, what you'd have
to do in terms of the chart that you would have would be to add that to the 50
percent.

You'd have to add additional 40 percent to the budget which would give

him the authority to reduce, indeed, a total 90 percent of the state budget.
MR. SYBERT:

I don't read the numbers the same way.

If -- and we would need

to crunch the numbers ...
SENATOR HILL:
MR. SYBERT:
respond.

Let me put it this way.
No, I understand what you're asking and I would like to

If you assume that the governor would have the ability to cut what in

retrospect is an overpayment to the schools above what turns out to be their
actual Prop. 98 guarantee, then at most, I suspect, that would push the 50
percent figure, exempt figure, down to 40/45 percent.

The major -- a major

portion of the budget would still be protected and would still put California
right in the middle.
SENATOR HILL:

But when you calculate up that figure, you're totaling in --

you're assuming that K-14 expenditures are exempt from the governor's ability to
reduce.

That's what I'm trying to get at.

MR. SYBERT:

I believe that's correct.

We did make that assumption.

In

most cases, even if there is a -- with 20/20 hindsight or 20/20 accounting, even
if it turns out that there is a Prop. 98 overpayment, the vast bulk of education
funding will still be within that Prop. 98 minimum guarantee and will be exempt.
SENATOR HILL:

But I assume that in terms -- when you put this chart

together you're not talking --when you exempt programs, when you say, for
instance, Mississippi Medicaid is exempt, you can't take credit for the portion
of programs which could be cut, if only, like you say, if $2.3 billion and we're
still spending $17 billion on K-14 education, you're putting the entire program
into that exempted category.
MR. SYBERT:

Well, my understanding, and again, I don't want to punt too

often but Secretary DiMarco will respond to this, my understanding is that K-14
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education is exempt under the proposition.
SENATOR HILL:
MR. SYBERT:

Completely.
That's my understanding.

SENATOR HILL:

And even under the overpayment scenario there's no authority

to go back and retroactively blue pencil that?
MR. SYBERT:

That is my understanding, but again, I want to be very careful

not to overstate my brief.

I'm here to testify what the budget cutting

mechanisms are in other states.

I can't represent either the Administration or

even a thorough legal analysis in answering those kinds of questions.
SENATOR HILL:

I guess to get back to my scenario, the way it appears that

this chart is put together since you're having entire programs not portions of
programs, whether or not you're exempted, I assume to get to Massachusetts 80
percent of all programs have been exempted, you're totaling all of them up, that
if indeed the governor has the authority to reduce that Prop. 98 guarantee by
the $2.3 billion, then your 50 percent figure would had to have that additional
40 percent added to it?
MR. SYBERT:
$2.3 billion?

Well, what percentage of total K-14 funding was the
I mean, we can figure this out real quick.

SENATOR HILL:

But I don't believe -- I'm trying to get back to that

point -- I don't believe that's how the rest of the chart was pieced together by
only saying the $2.3 billion piece of K-14 was factored in there.

I assume that

you'd exempt the entire program.
MR. SYBERT:

Yes.

Because my understanding, again, is that K-14 education

is exempt, so we put the whole program in there.
SENATOR HILL:

The last question gets back to a concern that I've had, and

Mr. Epple talked about that, given the

the argument has been this only gives

the governor authority, because again, I'm trying to analyze this from the
perspective of not this Governor but who's the next governor and what if it's of
a party that I don't like, just like some of my colleagues here are concerned to
that on the opposite, what about giving -- the argument is, well, it only gives
the governor authority to cut, and so as fiscal conservative, Senator Hill, you
shouldn't be worried about that because even if it's the most liberal Democrat
governor who gets elected, their only authority is going to be in terms of
reducing programs, that shouldn't make you nervous.

My question is, if indeed

you have the fiscal deadlock, we don't have a budget in place, isn't it fair to
argue that by giving the authority to the governor to continue expenditures,
using last year's budget as a baseline indeed gives the governor authority to
spend money because it's based on last year's programs?
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MR. SYBERT:

Again, I think that we need to separate out two issues here.

One is the interim ability of the governor while the budget debate is going on,
if it lasts past the constitutional deadline, is the interim ability of the
governor to cut expenditures, authorized expenditures?

The other issue is

whether an expired budget, whether the appropriation legally carries on.
suspect the person who has to answer that is the Controller.

And I

You may have a

situation where there is no legal authority for the state to actually spend
money and the state has to issue IOU's if there is no budget, just as occurred
this year, and perhaps the IOU'S have to be a reduced rate according to what the
governor cuts.

But again, that is something that I haven't taken a look at,

wasn't asked to, and I really think you would need to talk to the Controller
about the legal authority, because, of course, he is the one who pays the bills.
SENATOR HILL:

I don't think it's a Controller issue at all.

real world is this:

I mean, the

As we go through the budget process into the budget

committee we know the governor does not have authority to spend money, that the
Legislature doesn't put the funding in for the Office of Planning and Research
or we reduce that by a certain amount, there is no way the governor can spend
above that amount.

And that really is the balance-of-power trade-off.

We know

at any time we can pass a budget and the governor has the ability to blue
pencil.

You know, I got a park blue pencil by the Governor two weeks ago in

terms of the budget that he had -- that's his authority to do that.

But the

trade-off is while he has the ability to make those cuts he also does not have
the ability to expend any money.

And so my question is, under this scenario,

and it isn't a Controller's issue, it's an issue that says if you're going to
use last year's budget as a baseline, we've got a fiscal emergency, does the
Legislature have the authority, under that declaration of a fiscal emergency, to
eliminate the Office of Planning and Research?

It doesn't appear that it does.

It appears that you start with whatever last year's baseline is in terms of an
assumption, and the reality is, hasn't that changed that balance of power
because the governor now has authority to expend, albeit only to that level of
last year's budget?
MR. SYBERT:

Well, there's no question-- I don't know if the scenario you

outlined is correct or not.

If it is, if there's no legal authority to spend

without an appropriation and if there's deemed to be no appropriation, then I
imagine you can't spend anything, and instead of having a 2 or 3 percent cut in
the budget you have an effective 100 percent cut. I don't know if that's correct
or not.
SENATOR HILL:

But isn't Prop. 165 giving him that authority?

Isn't it
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allowing that money for the first time to be spent ...
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
SENATOR HILL:

Absolutely.

..• when he declares that fiscal emergency?

We're deadlocked.

We have no budget, it's July 1, the governor has no authority, nobody has any
authority to spend out those monies.
kids or state employees.
send out IOU's.

We're not paying nursing homes or school

We don't have that authority to spend, we've got to

Isn't under the Prop. 165 authority now the governor has the

ability to spend all that money from last year's budget?
MR. SYBERT:

Again, Senator, my response is that I see there to be two

separate issues here.
expenditures.

One is the governor's ability to reduce planned

The other is the ability to actually issue payment.

those are two separate issues.

And I think

I was going to say there is no question that

Prop. 165 does shift, to some degree, the balance of power between the branches
of government.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

But doesn't he have the unilateral ability under this

to then expend money?
MR. SYBERT:

My reading is, I'm not sure that's the case and I haven't

looked at that question.
SENATOR HILL:
all.

I don't think that there's any legal question about that at

I don't think there's any disagreement about that issue at all.
MR. SYBERT:

Well, again, this is the first time that I've heard that point

raised by anyone, which may be a tribute to your insight, but I don't know the
answer to that one way or the other, yesjno, up or down.
SENATOR HILL:

Richard, I wonder if you could do me a favor,

in addition to

looking at the Governor's blue pencil authority and how does that compare to
other states.

How many other states would the governor have the authority to

spend last year's budget if we were in a deadlock, in terms of comparing, you
know, your analyses that this will put California in the middle of governors'
budget authority.
MR. SYBERT:

To answer that really requires a legal conclusion that I'm not

sure my office is authorized to make.

So what I'm going to promise you is that

I will look into whether we can respond to that or whether someone else should.
SENATOR HILL:

But let's make this assumption, and I don't believe that

there's any disagreement by anybody anywhere that if we have a fiscal -- the
governor declares a fiscal emergency, July 1 we have no budget -- just like this
year -- that the governor has the authority to spend last year's budget.
don't think there's any dispute about that.

I

I think everybody concludes that.

My question is, in terms of your chart to show us where we rank at the bottom of
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the six states right now, in addition to showing the blue pencil and factoring
that in terms of how many other governors have that authority, how many other
states would the governor unilaterally have the authority to spend money up to
last year's budget once he declares a fiscal emergency?

It seems to me that

ought to be part of that adjustment in terms of whether or not this is more
power or the middle of the road power that other governors can utilize.
MR. SYBERT:

Senator, I have to respectfully disagree with your assumption

that everybody assumes, everybody knows that this gives the governor the power
to spend.

As I said, that's a separate issue, and that goes to what we had this

year, whether certain programs have to go on being paid, whether through IOU's
or through something else.

As I read the initiative, Prop. 165 gives the

governor the ability to cut planned expenditures.

I have not looked at all at

the issue that you've raised, and frankly, I haven't heard it raised before
today.
SENATOR HILL:

But I'm talking-- you're talking, and I hate to beat this

point, let me just close with this, you're talking about after the first
quarter, as I learned today, the Governor has the authority to reduce by up to
3 -- if expenditures fall off by 3 percent he can blue pencil, come down to that
amount.

I'm talking about a different scenario.

1 budget, we don't have a budget.

This year's scenario, the July

My understanding of the initiative was -- you

know, in fact, we have a handout here

it says that if we do not have the

budget that a governor declares a fiscal emergency, has the authority to use
last year's budget as a spending plan.
MR. SYBERT:

Yeah.

And so that's my ...

I understand your observation very well, and again, my

response is, I'm not sure whether it's a spending plan or a planned expenditure
plan.
SENATOR HILL:

Let me just read here on the second point from governor's

authority under Prop. 165, "would allow the governor to declare a fiscal
emergency and reinstate the prior year budget, adjusted for any constitutionally
required increases."

Okay, "reinstate the prior year budget".

I mean, I think

that -- it seems to me very clear.
So my question is, in terms of looking at the blue pencil authority and how
does that factor in in terms of your chart, how many other states, if you have
no budget, does the governor have the authority to reinstitute the prior year
budget?

Because it seems to me that's also what you're -- a tremendous amount

of leverage.

I'm looking at it and saying, hey, Kathleen Brown's the next

governor and by god, I want some program cut and I'm going to hold out in the
two-thirds vote, we're going to hold up that budget because we want something
-26-
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cut, and that new governor says, hey, too bad, we don't have a budget on time,
July 1, fiscal emergency is going to be declared, we're going to spend last
year's budget, tough luck, you guys.
MR. SYBERT:
office.

Senator, I will look into that.

But again, we're not a legal

I can't promise you that we can give you a comprehensive answer to

that.
SENATOR HILL:

But you ought to be able to very easily tell me how many

other states would the governor unilaterally on his own declare a fiscal
emergency, have the ability to spend last year's budget.
MR. SYBERT:

I will look into that, but again, I'm not sure that everybody

would agree with that distinction.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Senator Hill, it is my understanding that the authority

in 165, for the governor to impose a budget unilaterally, is unprecedented.
Do you have any information to the contrary, Mr. Sybert?

I understand it's

unprecedented.
MR. SYBERT:

I disagree with that statement.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

I do not believe •••

Is there another state where the governor unilaterally

can impose a budget?
MR. SYBERT:

There are 44 other states where the governor can unilaterally

make changes in the budget.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

No, no.

I'm going to get real specific in my language.

Are there any other states that allow the governor the authority to impose -now, these are the key words -- to impose a budget unilaterally?
MR. SYBERT:

Just like 44 other states, Prop. 165 would give California's

governor the authority to unilaterally make certain changes in the budget.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

That was not my direct question and I'm going to

you latch on to impose a budget?
this Governor to impose a budget?

Can you speak to?

can

Do you feel that 165 allows

You know, it kind of gets to the question

Senator Hill was raising, because, you see, we're talking about last year's
budget.
MR. SYBERT:
does not.

This is my personal opinion.

My personal opinion is no, it

My personal opinion is that 165 gives the governor the power to make

certain changes at the margin on an existing budget.

It does not give him the

power to write or ..•
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Is there any other state -- now, maybe you can answer

this -- is there any other state that allows the governor unilateral authority
to impose a budget?
MR. SYBERT:

There is no state, including California under Prop. 165, that
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gives the governor the power to impose an entire budget, nor would Prop. 165.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

But the Governor can impose the same kind of

expenditures that were in the budget the prior fiscal year.
MR. SYBERT:

The governor can impose roughly the same kind of cuts that 44

other governors can.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
Mr. Sybert.

That's not the point.

And I think you get the point,

The point is that Prop. 165 allows the governor unilaterally to

implement a prior year's budget figures.

Is that a true statement, Ms. Hill?

Okay.
Thank you very much, Mr. Sybert.
MR. SYBERT:

We appreciate your testimony.

Madam Chair, I sincerely appreciate your courtesy.

It is not

always thus.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Moving right on along, and we're going to try to make

up for the time that we're behind.
has to run real quick.

I've got to make one adjustment.

Dr. Caiden

She's Chair of the Department of Public Administration,

Cal State University, San Bernardino.

And I would like her to come up now and

then we'll call up Janice Nielsen of the California League of Voters.
Before you get started I'd like to also announce the presence of
Assemblywoman Barbara Friedman, just joined us.
DR. NAOMI CAIDEN:

Thank you for coming, Barbara.

Madam Chair and the committee, I'd like to thank you very

much for -- I very much appreciate the opportunity of testifying today.

I do

have to get out to San Bernardino this afternoon to the students, so I'd like to
talk a little earlier.
I'd like to start off by saying that I am not an expert on California
politics or on California budgeting.

One may ask who is, but I have researched,

written, and taught public budgeting in a number of contexts, including the
historical, also relating to poor countries and to the federal government for a
number of years.
I'd also like to mention that I am editor of Public Budgeting of Finance, a
quarterly journal.
the committee.

I already gave Senator Alquist a copy and this one is for

It's all I could rustle up on short notice.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
DR. CAIDEN:

Thank you very much, Doctor.

In which there is an article on "California's Structural Budget

Crisis" by Jane Savage, which may be of some interest.
I have also circulated a statement for the committee and I could get more
statements to anybody later on if they wanted.
You're familiar with the proposition as it stands.

It seeks to amend the

Constitution to augment the power of the governor in the budget process and to
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allow the declaration of fiscal emergencies.
I'm not going to go over the provisions, we've done that for long enough
this morning.

I would like to say that I believe that as it stands, on the face

of it, this would contravene the separation of powers and would substitute, in
my opinion, dictatorial power without contributing to the democratic resolution
of conflict, to informed and realistic budget debate, and to the resolution of
the current crisis, which there presently is in California.
First, the Governor has discretion when to call an emergency.
budget has been duly passed he can refuse to sign it.

Even when a

Secondly, whenever his

office shows more than a certain divergence from forecasts, and this, of course,
is something that is easily manipulable, forecasts are estimates.

The

forecasting record in California has not been very accurate, and this is
something that can very easily happen.
During the emergency, unless the opinion that we heard in the last testimony
stands, it's my reading that the Legislature cannot override the governor even
by two-thirds majority and therefore the governor has the discretion and
opportunity to substitute his or her own priorities.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Dr. Caiden, on that issue.

Is there any other state in

the Union that allows the governor that kind of unilateral authority?
DR. CAIDEN:

I do not know.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

I am not an expert on state government.

Okay.

My other comment is that if politics is entering into this, when Jerry Brown
was Governor, we overrode him seven times, and most of those times were on
fiscal issues where we disagreed with the large cut.

The governor can never

increase a line item but the governor can cut or eliminate a line item.

And

when he did that, our own majority in the Legislature, by two-thirds, overrode
his veto and it protected many programs that would have caused great impacts on
the life and safety of people.

But my question really went to do other states

give this authority.
DR. CAIDEN:

As far as I can see, the cards are stacked and the governor

simply cannot lose.

He will win the budget debate.

What I have looked at is in other countries with different systems of
government.

Where similar unlimited powers over the budget are granted to the

executive in other democratic countries, they are usually checked through the
cabinet system of government.

The executive depends on retaining a legislative

majority, and if it loses a vote on the budget it has to resign.

There's no

similar provision in a separation of power system where the executive and the
legislature share power and are expected to check each other.
-29-

In my opinion, Proposition 165 would embody the worst of both the systems.
It would allow, on the one hand, the executive unlimited power without a
reciprocal power by the Legislature to vote him or her out of office, and this
to me is the critical point, that it tries to get the best of both worlds.

The

executive is not responsible to the Legislature and is not checked by the
Legislature.
Other aspects of the proposition have been touched on.
clumsy and possibly counterproductive.
a kind of collective punishment.

I believe they're

The suspension of salaries provision is

It's more redolent of a colonial type

relationship than a democratic institution, and it allows more leverage for an
irresponsible minority, a one-third minority or something more than a one-third
minority in the Legislature to hold things up with the threat of that punishment
on their side.
The furlough and salary cuts provision, they single out non-contract
employees, they may affect program performance and morale considerably in the
state public service.

In any cases, they are not a reasoned kind of approach to

budget cutting.
What are the problems that Proposition 165 ostensibly seeks to remedy?
may briefly be inferred as four:

They

budgetry irresponsibility, automatic spending,

failure to reach agreement, and budget imbalance.

And I'd like briefly to go

through those four.
The first one is budget irresponsibility.

I would maintain that this

proposition would increase, not decrease, budget irresponsibility.
would have a unilateral power.

This is not a responsible position.

The governor
The

Legislature may be ignored and therefore also has no incentive to behave in a
responsible way.

Neither side has an incentive to behave responsibly.

Second, automatic spending, or what the proposition calls "auto pilot
spending".

The proposition excludes earmarked areas under the Constitution.

There are four areas that are apparently excluded; therefore, those are major
areas of automatic spending.

There is one, of course, that is not and that is

the welfare area which is part of a different part of the proposition.

The way

this works necessarily, as Steve Gold earlier on pointed out, would be to
provide an incentive to get more areas exempted.

We would simply have a greater

incentive to the kind of government by initiative that we have now.

Everybody

would simply try to get their areas exempted.
The problem of failure to reach agreement, which is a very big problem in
California, as Elizabeth Hill pointed out, the debate period would be shortened,
which would make it more difficult to expose the budget to public comment, more
-30-

difficult for compromises and agreements to be reached, and the governor himself
or herself would have no incentive to gain agreement at all.
reason if you can always win.

There's simply no

Why should you bother to try to gain agreement?

Finally, budget imbalance cannot be resolved by gimmicks.

The budget

imbalance is related to substantive economical and political issues which,
again, the committee has heard about from Mr. Gold's testimony.

The failure,

and I believe it is a failure, of Graham-Rudman at the federal level should be
warning enough.

This was a gimmick.

It simply complicated processes and it did

not contribute, it did not do what it said it would do, which would be to reduce
the federal deficit to zero in a given number of years.

It couldn't do it.

What is needed is reasoned analysis, and a debate with understanding and
resolution of problems.
My testimony is very brief because I think this is what I can contribute.
In conclusion, I do not think that Proposition 165 would achieve its
ostensible aims, those four points.

It would result, in my opinion, in a

dangerous transfer of power to the governor who already may veto a budget and
has line item veto, and in addition, there is a trigger mechanism available
which was not apparently used this year.

It would allow the substitution of

executive priorities, and more than this, it would contribute to a worsening of
the budgetary climate which appears to be poisonous already, making agreement,
compromise, cooperation, and responsibility, which is what budgeting is about,
more difficult not less.
In my opinion, it would be better, if this were possible, to remove the
two-thirds majority requirement, which I have not checked how many budgets would
have been passed by the Legislature without that two-thirds requirement, but it
does seem to me that this is something exceptional in the United States and that
it does make agreement more difficult.

The important point is, as again Dr.

Gold mentioned, to craft packages, to come to compromises that would make
budgets possible.

It would be better to remove that requirement than to submit

to these vagaries of arbitrary power and the uncertainties that this proposition
would bring.
In concluding, I'd like to quote something that A. Allen Post, the previous
legislative analyst, once said to me when I interviewed him.

And he said that

he saw his role as "trying to make politics work at their best and not at their
worst".

I would submit that this proposition would tend to make politics work

at their worst and not at their best.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Thank you so much, Dr. Caiden.

Are there any questions
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from committee members?

We appreciate those very cogent remarks, and we hope we

can get you back to your students on time.
I'd like to go back now and ask for Janice Nielsen with the California
League of Women Voters.
MS. JANICE NIELSEN:

Come forward, please.
Good morning.

My name is Janice Nielsen and I'm here

today representing the League of Women Voters of California.
The League has made the defeat of Proposition 165 its highest priority this
fall.

The League and its members throughout California are working as hard as

we can to educate the citizens of California about the dangerous changes in our
system that the enactment of Proposition 165 would bring.
The League is adamantly non-partisan:
take strong stands on issues.

we never support candidates but we do

We have taken the strongest possible stand in

opposition to Proposition 165.
Based on the latest Field poll data, it appears that California voters are
inclined to agree.

After hearing of the proposition, 50 percent indicate

opposition while only 37 percent support the measure.
Proposition 165 merely says it all:

The ballot label on

"Grants governor constitutional power to

reduce certain expenditures to balance the budget during fiscal emergencies."
Proposition 165 upsets the balance of power between the executive and the
legislative branch.

It destroys our system of checks and balances and puts

unprecedented, unilateral control of the state budget in the hands of one
person.

How does this happen?

Currently, the Governor submits his proposed budget to the Legislature by
January lOth.

Proposition 165 would delay that submission until March 1st,

allowing seven fewer weeks for legislative and public scrutiny.

If the budget

is not passed and signed by July 1st, the governor can declare a fiscal
emergency and make cuts in any area not constitutionally protected:

health

care, law enforcement, transportation, family planning, environmental
protection, and yes, education, a point to which I will return in a few moments.
To understand the real magnitude of this constitutional shift of power you
have to read Section 12.2 (b) in the initiative.

That section clearly indicates

that no one can stop the governor's cuts because the legislative override
provision is effectively eliminated.

12.2 (b) reads, "Any reductions proposed

under subdivision (a) shall become effective 30 days after the proposal is
transmitted to the Legislature unless prior to the end of the 30-day calendar
period the Legislature passes the budget bill and the bill is signed by the
governor."
The League of Women Voters believes that any override of a governor's
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actions requiring the governor's approval is no override at all.

Indeed, Steve

Olson, of the Department of Finance, testified Monday at the legislative
oversight hearings in Sacramento, and I quote, "The plain language is in
conflict with existing constitutional provisions."

Two weeks ago the League of

Women Voters and the PTA unveiled the coalition's radio campaign opposing
Proposition 165.

The radio spots point out the unprecedented and unchecked

powers that 165 would give this and all future governors.

th~

In response,

proponents of 165 issued a press release saying our spots "blatantly lie to the
voters of California."

Furthermore, the release stated that "The Legislature

can override the governor at any time."

This past week, on Monday, after

several hours of questioning by both Republicans and Democrats, the proponents
of 165 were forced to admit the initiative is flawed.

Proponents claim that the

wording that would enable the governor to virtually control the entire budget
process was the result of a "technical error".
Campaign manager George Gordon said, "It was an error.
been there."

They further stated that, and I quote, "The court can disregard

the literal meaning of the language of a law."
"can".

It should haven't

The operative word here is

Maybe the court can disregard the language.

Can we be sure they will?

Can we take that risk?
Initiatives often have a great deal of fine print and this initiative is
certainly no exception.

The League encourages people to read the fine print.

The proponents of this initiative ask us to take a giant step backwards.

They

ask the voters to ignore the fine print and trust that the issue will be settled
after the election.
I can imagine how most legislators must feel about this.

Throughout

California's history you and the public have had one real weapon against the
dictatorial powers of any executive:
tell a governor "no".

By two-thirds vote of both Houses, you can

Proposition 165 changes that rule.

When its provisions

are triggered you could override the governor's spending decisions by a hundred
percent of both Houses and the governor could still ignore your vote simply by
refusing to sign the override.

I would think the Legislature would be very

hesitant to give up their veto override; certainly the League of Women Voters
has grave concerns about it.
We do not single out one governor on this matter.

We do not believe that

this or any future governor should have such immunity from checks and balances.
Even after the budget is passed and enacted the danger continues.

Section

12.5 gives the governor the power to declare a fiscal emergency any time the
budget is out of balance by 3 percent or more.
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Simple miscalculations by the

Department of Finance could trigger a so-called emergency.
it is to make fiscal projections.

We all know how hard

In seven out of the last ten years the

Department of Finance has made these miscalculations, and since the director of
Finance is appointed by and works for the governor, the chances of simple
miscalculations might increase as soon 165 becomes law.
Once again, any override would have to be approved by the governor.

Section

12.5 (b) reads, "Any reduction proposed under subdivision (a) shall become
effective 30 days after the proposal is transmitted to the Legislature unless
prior to the end of the 30-day calendar period the Legislature enacts in each
House, by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership
concurring, alternate legislation to bring anticipated revenues and expenditures
for the fiscal year end to balance and that legislation is signed by the
governor."
The proponents of Proposition 165 state that governors in 44 other states
have similar authority to keep their budget balanced.

This is simply not true.

Despite any claims to the contrary, Proposition 165 would give the governor of
California more power over the enactment of our state budget than any other
governor in the country.

In no other state has the public's ability to

participate in the budget process been so limited and the legislative override
provision been eliminated.
Returning to education funding for a moment.

Assertions that Proposition

165 does not affect the level of school funding are misleading.

Proposition 165

does not expressly exempt school funding from spending reductions, as stated by
the proponents.

All of the discretionary money above the Proposition 98

guarantee could be cut by one person alone.

It allows the governor to

unilaterally reduce funding while still complying with the provisions of 98.
This past year the Governor proposed to cut education by 2.3 billion, an action
he could have taken unilaterally had 165 been the law.

And, of course, higher

education is not protected at all.
The Governor claims that this initiative would give him and all future
governors a powerful incentive to improve legislative action.

In truth, this

initiative would give the Governor's own party an incentive to delay the process
so that their own leader could ultimately define the budget, perhaps ignoring
public priorities.

Why compromise when you can have it all?

Although he proposed the initiative, the issue here is not Governor Wilson.
This constitutional amendment will give this and all future governors virtually
unchecked power.
beginning to end.

The governor remains in control of the budget process from
The League fears the chilling effect on regulatory agencies
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and independent boards and commissions whose budgets depend on the whim of the
governor alone.
We are familiar with our current Governor and past governors, but what about
governors in the future?

What would happen if a particular governor disagreed

with strict oversight of the nursing homes that care for our elderly?
tight enforcement of our environmental protection laws?

Or for

Or for our worker

safety laws?
The proponents of 165 like to focus the discussion of the initiative on the
welfare aspects.

165 does nothing to strengthen the already worn safety net for

California's 1.5 million poor children and their families.

It provides no

additional job training, no child care services or health care for the working
poor, and does not address the inadequate supply of jobs in California.

But

talking about welfare just gets us off the main subject of this initiative:
consolidation of power in one person.
The League of Women Voters fully recognizes the disenchantment and
frustration Californians feel with the budget and legislative process.

We share

that frustration and constantly work to enact legislation that will make the
process more efficient.

We are confident that when the public learns the true

content of this initiative that they will not be seduced by the welfare
provisions and will vigorously reject the unprecedented and dangerous new powers
165 would put in the hands of one person.
In conclusion, I would like to state emphatically that this is a
constitutional amendment.

It gives the governor virtually unchecked power in

the whole entire budget process.

Californians will take a great risk of losing

our checks and balances if they support this initiative and gamble on a court
decision.

If this initiative wins and goes to court, it will be the taxpayers

who foot the bill for a change in wording that never should have been there in
the first place.

If it wins and doesn't go to court, we will have sacrificed

public and legislative participation for unchecked gubernatorial power.

The

only way for Californians to win is to oppose 165.
Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

I want to thank you for a very fine presentation which

I wish would find its way into the press.
MS. NIELSEN:

We're doing our best.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Just sign your name at the bottom, your organization,

and send it into the L.A. Times and all the other papers because I think you
said it all -- very logical, very rational, and it makes tremendous sense to me.
Thank you for the research that the League of Women Voters always does.
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And

what we need to do is take your work and educate the public between now and
November the 3rd.
Any questions?
MS. NIELSEN:

All right.

You said it all.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Members, what I'd like to do is to take up the next

three presenters, and I don't know how your time is allotted.

If you feel you

can sit long enough we could go through and finish our program without
for lunch, or we could take up the next three and break for lunch.

Since this

is a democratic process, would you like us to continue on or would you want to
break?

Senator, would you like us to continue on rather than breaking for

lunch?

And, you know, that doesn't preclude you getting up, going out if you

need to.

I think maybe the economy of time would, you know, if we'd just go on.

It's running late.
What I'd like to do is ask the educational presenters to come up now, and
then if you want to break for lunch we'll do that.
Diane Brahams is here, representing the State PTA.

And if I can ask Denise

Rockwell Woods, President of the National Education Association Chapter, United
Teachers of Los Angeles, to come up at the same time.

And then we'll have

Maureen DiMarco.

Maureen, we'll have you

If you'll come up to the first row.

up as soon as they finish.
My name sake ..• and one of my fine volunteers and interns in my office who
knows how to use the airwaves.
MS. DIANE BRAHAMS:

Thank you.

That's nice.

My name is Diane Brahams and I'm the Community Concerns Advocate for the
California State PTA, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today.
The California State PTA is strongly opposed to Proposition 165.

No single

issue on the ballot could be more devastating to education as well as other
services to children and families than Prop. 165, and no single issue could be
more devastating to our traditional American system of checks and balances in
government.
While the proponents of this measure want the public to believe education is
protected from cuts, this is simply not true.

As you've heard many times today,

Prop. 98 provides only the minimum guarantee of funding for schools.

Because of

a strong commitment to public education, the state has provided, until this
year, funding above the Prop. 98 minimum.
If Prop. 165 becomes law during a governor-declared fiscal emergency, the
governor would be able to cut education down to the Proposition 98 level.
learned this year, Prop. 98 does not truly protect education.
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If Prop. 165

As we

becomes part of our Constitution, the governor will have new unilateral power
over the budget to further erode Prop. 98 funding by cutting the base on which
i t is predicated.
What does all this mean?

Well, earlier this summer Governor Wilson proposed

a 2.3 billion in education cuts.
made those cuts.

Under Prop. 165 he could have single-handedly

He also could have prevented 110,000 little children from

starting kindergarten this year.

All of that could have happened without any

provision for legislative override and without violating or manipulating
Prop. 98.
As you've already heard many times again today, the way the PTA sees it,
budget funding levels are always based on, as you've heard, General Fund
revenues, personal income, school enrollment, and property taxes.

As part of

the fiscal emergency language in the initiative, the Department of Finance,
appointed by the governor, and the determinates of the revenue calculations,
could recalculate the Prop. 98 funding level at any quarter to lower than when
the budget was adopted.

Nothing in Prop. 165 prevents the Department of Finance

from declaring, as part of the fiscal emergency, that their earlier estimate of
the Prop. 98 guarantee was an error.

Therefore, the Department over-estimated

budget calculations will have caused an apparent over-funding of public schools.
The governor would then be free to cut school funding to the Department's newly
calculated Prop. 98 minimum level and still stay within the constitutional
language of Prop. 98.
This means that the initiative empowers the governor to act only on his
priorities, not the will of the people.

It can have the same effect as

suspending Proposition 98 without a two-thirds vote of the Legislature, not the
protection the people voted for in Prop. 98.
Funding the budget will be dependent on the honesty, integrity, and good
will of the governor, whoever he or she may be, and the Department of Finance,
not necessarily in the best interest of our children's education.
Another way that education funding could be hurt under Prop. 165, if, during
the budget deliberations, the Legislature casts a two-thirds vote to suspend
Prop. 98, there is then no limit to what the governor can cut from the education
portion of the budget in a fiscal emergency because the education funding would
no longer be protected, or at least for one year.
Although budget cuts are always harsh, these cuts would be particularly
devastating.

They could probably and really would come in the middle of a year.

Classes would be eliminated and teachers would be laid off, and children's lives
would be painfully disrupted.
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I'm a member of the PTA because children are my first concern, but as a
citizen of California I am also concerned about good government, and simply put,
Prop. 165 is bad government; it violates American constitutional principles.
Although this year's budget battle was the worst ever, there was eventually
a negotiated solution between the Legislature and the Governor, and the
Legislature stood firm behind education.

PTA was allowed to get out there and

advocate for the Hill-Isenberg budget proposal.
electing a Legislature?

Under Prop. 165 why bother

Their ability to override the governor is eliminated

because the language of the initiative clearly states the governor must sign the
budget.
Earlier this week proponents of 165 asked the citizens of California to
ignore this exact language in the initiative, assuring us the courts would
straighten this, and I quote, "technical error".

This is not just a technical

error; it is a major revision in the Constitution.
We are asking the Governor to withdraw his support of Proposition 165.

The

citizens of California should not have to rely on the courts to pay for an
expensive legal proceeding to restore our system of constitutional separation of
balance of powers.
budget.

And Prop. 165 gives one person too much power over the state

No one governor, Democrat or Republican, should have that much power to

hurt education or place his or her priorities above the will of the people.
public schools are too important, our children are too important.

Our

That's why

the California State PTA strongly opposes Prop. 165.
I represent the rank and file PTA parent, and I can't imagine them walking
in with the language that's in the ballot books and trying to understand exactly
what this is doing to their rights.

PTA will be out there educating people,

though, on the facts of this initiative.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Are there any questions of the presenter?

thank you also for bringing to us the point of view of PTA.
good job.

I want to

You always do a

And we're going to depend a lot on you and the League of Women Voters

to do that education that is not necessarily available to our citizens.

And I

think that once the word gets out we can defeat 165 but we certainly are
depending on your help.
Thank you.
All right, Denise Rockwell Woods.
MS. DENISE ROCKWELL WOODS:

Good morning.

I'm Denise Rockwell Woods.

I'm

the Vice President of United Teachers, Los Angeles representing 34,000 teachers
and certificated support personnel in Los Angeles, as well as the President of
the NEA local of 20,000 members.
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In America, every eight seconds of every school day a child drops out of
school.

In America, every twenty-six seconds of every day a child runs away

from home.

In America, every sixty-seven seconds a teenager has a baby.

seven minutes a child is arrested for drug abuse.

Every

And in America, every day

100,000 children are homeless, every year 300,000 are in foster care, and
500,000 are in over-crowded juvenile detention centers.
Our children are the casualties of a government that sadly has forgotten
that it is the trustee for all of the children of the nation, not just the rich
and the well-to-do.

Our children are the casualties of a Governor who has

forgotten the sage words that remind us that those of us who are strong must
help those who are weak.
Children should not be punished because their parents are poor or on welfare
or live in a state where unemployment is on the rise and where corporations
would rather leave this state and country to gain higher profits than pay decent
wages.

Children should not have to dig through school trash cans after the

breakfast and lunch programs to find good food to take home to supplement or
simply be the evening meal.

Children should not have to stay away from school

because they are ashamed because they have no clothing or no permanent shelter.
Children should not have to drop out of school to earn substandard or minimum
wages to help support or be the sole support of their families.
Welfare recipients and their children must not be used by the Governor as
Willie Horton was used by President Bush to ensure a political victory.

In this

case, a victory that would give the Governor complete budgetary control, render
the Legislature, you who are our local representatives, unnecessary and thereby
destroy the system of checks and balances.

This system of checks and balances

was the only thing that kept this school district from being in greater debt
this fiscal year.
We are concerned that the citizens of California not be fooled by this power
grab proposition.

We must not allow the Governor, who has no term limitation,

to use the welfare issue to further a personal agenda of dictatorial control
over the budget.

The teachers and certificated support personnel that I

represent have a vision of California which sees government as the initiators of
policies that ensure that every family has the right to live in a decent home,
in a decent neighborhood, offers programs to educate every child to the fullest
extent of his or her potential, creates through its economic policies a job for
every individual who wants to work, a job which pays at least a living wage.
envision a society where the hungry are fed, the homeless are housed, and the
sick are treated.
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We

There's a bold and simmering resentment of poor people in this state and
this sinister proposition feeds on it.
mean-spiritedness.

We feel we must challenge this

I don't know about you, but I agree with Congressman Clay

that I am ashamed every time I see a person sleeping on a public sidewalk or
eating out of a garbage can.
or ex-drug addicts.

Most of our street people aren't really disturbed

More than 50 percent of the homeless are members of

families where at last one person works 40 hours a week.
Hungry, homeless, poor people are not responsible for their plight.
Government policy, legislative indifference, and gubernatorial callousness cause
homeless families and hungry people.

Something is seriously wrong in our state

when it's easier to get crack cocaine than it is to get a good job or access to
higher education.
We came here today to express our distress and concern about how this
proposition will impact the children that we teach.

We think that this

proposition is negative for the poor children of California and we are going to
do everything in our power and use all our resources to defeat it.
Thank you for listening.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
any questions?

Thank you.

I appreciate your point of view.

Are there

Thank you so much for coming.

Ms. DiMarco, Secretary of Child Development and Education.
SECRETARY MAUREEN DiMARCO:
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Good morning, Senator.

Morning.
Thank you for the invitation to address the joint

committees.
You've asked me to testify on "what impact increasing the governor's current
budgetary authority would have on public education."

I will give you brief

testimony because it can be stated rather briefly.
The impact on public education can be found in the exclusions of the
initiative.

The initiative categorically excludes four programs from the fiscal

emergency powers of the governor under both scenarios contained in Proposition
165, in our opinion, and that one section that is most appropriate, to which
you've asked me to testify about, is that funding for public education as
provided in Article 16, Section 8 is explicitly excluded.
In my view, the governor would have no power to propose reductions in
support of public schools, period.

This would be the case even if the

Legislature had appropriated more than the minimum funding guarantee provided in
Proposition 98, or if it could be reasonably estimated that the guarantee would
drop below the level of appropriations in the budget act.
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This is because the

exemption for the public schools is categorical.

It is not explicitly limited

to the minimum amount of the guarantee but, instead, funding for education is
provided in the Constitution which sets out a general principle of funding
priority for the public school system.
The assertions that have been made that schools could be cut under this
initiative, in my opinion and from my analysis, are absolutely incorrect.
Schools cannot be touched under this initiative.
Secondly, there is a significant positive impact, in my opinion, for schools
from the provisions of this initiative related to the governor's budgetary
authority.
As you painfully know, Senator, and have experienced, I know with enormous
grief over the economic state of the state itself and the consequences that that
has wrought for all of us, most particularly the issues that you and I share,
concern for the great economic hit on the State of California has caused us all
to have to pass budgets, or participate in their process, that do not fund as
fully as we would very much like all of the issues related to children, most
particularly public schools.

That certainly was the case with the budget most

recently passed.
Part of the problem with the budgets that we have had to confront,
particularly in the last two years, has been that as the economy declined and
the revenues fell off, even far lower than the dismal projections that we
started out each January with, there was no way to stem, staunch, or slow the
size of that deficit.

And so, all of us had to helplessly watch as those holes

grew bigger, knowing that the remedies were going to be more draconian; the
larger those measure became, the larger the deficit became.
The budgetary authority granted to the governor under Proposition 165, in my
opinion, would help slow that, would help limit the size of the deficits
ultimately confronted with a final budget, and would keep from -- keep those
deficits from accruing at an even higher rate than necessary due to severely
declining revenues, and thus, by doing that, would eliminate the threat to
public education that might occur and has occurred in past budget processes.
In essence, it is my opinion, in a very short form, the budgetary authority
that would be granted to the governor under Proposition 165, as it relates to
public schools, the short answer is, on the face there is absolutely no impact
at all, public schools cannot be touched; and in the indirect, on the broader
budgetary authority, it would help protect schools from being threatened by
ever-gaping deficits that run uncontrolled before the Legislature has the
ability to deliberate and find a solution.
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Let me ask a question on this point, Ms. DiMarco.

In

Section 12.2, subsection (a) of 165 it says, "When a fiscal emergency has been
declared the prior year budget adjusted for," and it gives some articles.

In

those articles, is there language that protects the amount of funding that 98
would have required in that fiscal year we're in, in the current fiscal year, as
opposed to the prior year?

My question is this.

Suppose the prior year's

funding was less than what would be required under Prop. 98 in the current year
that we're dealing with the budget.

The language here says that a prior year's

budget could be used.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

It is our opinion, Senator, that whatever the prior year

budget is that you are now in the position of having to continue, as
appropriations continue in the absence of a budget, that you cannot touch the
level of school funding even if it should be determined that it is an
over-appropriation either intentionally, by the Legislature choosing to invest
above the minimum guarantee, or by operation of revenue decline causing
recalculation of Proposition 98 to be lower than the actual spending level.
For instance, in this past year, which we are both so painfully aware of, it
was determined that there was an over-appropriation in existence on the K-14
budget, the Prop. 98 guarantee, due solely not to an intentional
over-appropriation but to a decline in revenues from the original estimates.

It

is our opinion under that exact scenario that the governor's budgetary authority
under Prop. 165 would not, I repeat, not enable the governor to reduce in any
way, shape, or form that appropriation absent legislative action.

It is our

opinion, to be even more clear, that the only reductions that may be made to the
K-14 appropriation, regardless of its relationship to the final calculation of
the guarantee, must be made by legislative action.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Let's say that we don't have an over-funding situation.

Let me give you a scenario.
The Governor asked for a $2.3 billion cut this year.

Under 65, would he

have been able to make that cut?
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

No.

If 165 had been in place and there had been --

let's take the two parts of it, Senator, if I may.

During the spring, as we

knew that revenues had declined far further than the projections and the
over-appropriation became apparent -- the dispute of the amount I won't go into
now, I think we did enough of that this summer -- the Governor would not have
been able to touch that money.

He would not have been able to reduce K-14

spending even though the guarantee calculations had changed.
Then let's move to the second part of 165's budgetary authority which is, it
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is now July 1, a budget is not in place, and we know that the school budget is
(quote/unquote) "over-appropriated".

Again, I will tell you, it is my opinion

the Governor still may not reduce that appropriation even as he moves into the
next year on emergency powers, that that would require an action by the
Legislature.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Let me put it this way.

Right now it's $4,185 is the

amount of money per child that drives the appropriation.

Now, in my scenario

there's no over-appropriations in the prior year, and like L.A. Unified it grows
by thousands per year, as you know.

A given year, year 1998, L.A. Unified and

some other districts in Southern California have grown by, let's see, 20,000.
If we run over the budgetary deadline and 165 kicks in, the governor calls a
fiscal emergency and can institute the prior year's budget -- let's say it's
$4,185 -- but the demand and the situation has changed where we now go to $5,000
or $5,185, do you not see this as a reduction if the governor adopts the prior
year's budget?
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Senator, what you're asking me is could the governor

increase spending in reflection for enrollment growth in the summer months prior
to school beginning, assuming that no budget is passed prior to the traditional
beginning of the school dates.

Certainly for L.A. Unified, some schools begin

and did this year under the prior year budget.
occurs.

That is actually what currently

It is not possible under Proposition 165, in my opinion, for the

governor to increase the level total dollar amount of spending for any category.
He may not spend, under this initiative, in my opinion, and I believe that that
is upheld by enough analysis to be clear.
If you are asking, in addition, can the amount be increased by the amount of
enrollment growth, the only way that would be able to occur is if the
Constitution was written differently and it actually caused an increased factor
on the basis of enrollment.
total dollar amount.

As it is, the budget act, as you well know, has a

The calculation factors include enrollment growth.

It

would be my opinion that more than likely the governor could not make that
adjustment for enrollment growth.

It could not ensure that there was more money

to accommodate enrollment growth because, again, that would be increased
spending and the governor .•.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

But, Maureen, in essence, would that not be a violation

of 98?
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

No, Senator, I don't believe it's a violation of 98,

because in the absence of the budget you would be suggesting that the governor
should usurp legislative authority to make those appropriations.
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And again,

some of those factors might include whether or not you are above or below the
minimum guarantee.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

But you see, in 165 it always leaves it up to questions

because 98 sets out a specific mechanism -- you know it better than I do -- in
government, and it says, when we collect the revenues and after we pay all of
our indebtedness, then a certain percentage of the revenues goes to education;
that's 98.
Now, if the governor takes over and has the authority to use a prior year's
budget and there's been growth but we haven't had a decision on how we
appropriate the monies, the governor can use the prior year which is thousands
of dollars below collectively where it should be.

Is that not a violation of

98, in essence, fundamentally?
SECRETARY DiMARCO:
into the scenario.

Senator, there are too many factors that I can't factor

No, I don't believe so because, again, Proposition 98 is a

final -- the actual 98 guarantee is a final dollar calculation.

Under the

assumption that we are in a fiscal emergency because we have reduced revenues,
the Proposition 98 guarantee, as you know, goes down.

Now it also interacts

with a variety of other factors and I certainly don't want to torture any of you
by going through all of the possible permutations of test one, test two and test
three and its impact on that final calculation.

But there are scenarios

certainly where you could by remaining at the prior year level because of the
reduced revenues that are impliedly assumed in your scenario, I think, and by
the fact that we may have a fiscal crisis that's even deeper than that, you
could actually be exceeding the Proposition 98 guarantee for that year even
including enrollment growth.

Again, there's a variety of factors that go into

it and enrollment growth is one of them.

But again, it depends, as you well

know, on the economic status of the state, the collection of revenues, what
prior year spending was as well as enrollment growth.

It's an extremely complex

initiative in and of itself.
This was crafted, I am told, to be very clear not to adjust those factors
and tinker with Proposition 98, but the intent of the drafters of this measure
and the explicit language, I believe, of the measure states very clearly that
education funding is to be exempt, not to be touched, not to be tinkered with.
Proposition 98 is absolutely not to be in any way eroded by this measure.

Quite

the contrary, the intent is to get state spending under control under those dire
circumstances that would trigger the provisions of the budgetary authority for
the governor in order to protect education.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Speaking conceptually, we know how 98 got to the ballot
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and we know what the intent of 98 was; it was to give education its proper
constitutional guaranteed, its proper share.

We fought for 64 days; you were

intimately involved in it because the Governor wanted $2.3 billion cut from the
budget.

That was the sole issue that really held up a budget decision; that was

the sole issue.
I look at the language of 65 and there are just gray areas.
it sounds real good to say 98 is not going to be touched.

And, you know,

But the governor, and

as I understand this proposition, he or she would have the authority then to
call a case of emergency based on the information that comes from the Department
of Finance -- and I listed five different divisions that give us figures and
they never jibe -- based on the sole information from the Department of Finance,
the governor then unilaterally can call a fiscal emergency.

And if we're over

the deadline date, can then use the prior year's budget which might or might not
be adequate for funding the schools.
Now, conceptually, we wanted to guarantee above all other programs that
education was funded properly.

I am still concerned because we're using the

prior year as one tool and one factor and so regardless of 98, by applying the
funding level for prior year could indeed, in my interpretation, violate 98.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

I respectfully have to disagree with you, Senator.

And

I need to •••
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Put a pen right there.

Ms. Hill, am I way off?

And

then I'm going to let you respond, Ms. DiMarco, but I want to hear from the Leg.
Analyst.
MS. HILL:

Senator watson, our reading of the measure under the scenario

that you're discussing where a prior year budget goes into effect because the
budget for the new fiscal year has not been passed by the Legislature and signed
by the governor, for the constitutional required programs, in our view there
would be -- if the minimum funding guarantee then in that new fiscal year that
had been created was higher than the higher year, there would have to be an
increase in the budget.

So our view of that is different than what Ms. DiMarco

has testified to you on that point.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Thank you.

Go ahead.

I interrupted you, I'm sorry.

There's been so much disagreement this morning before you came into the room and
these were questions that we wanted to raise and we decided to wait until you
came.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

I agree.

And clearly, the Legislative Analyst's

scenario, which is even more generous than the one that I gave, would then
ensure that Proposition 165's provisions are even more of a protection than I
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have even categorically stated here.

Under either of those statements, either

the Analyst's, which would require the automatic adjustment of the guarantee
upwards, or under mine, which is a level that remains from the prior year,
clearly public education is not able to be cut by the governor under Proposition
165 Budgetary Authority Rules.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

My colleagues, if you need to jump in, please do.

Ms.

Friedman?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN BARBARA FRIEDMAN:
Hill's face.

I just see a puzzled look, I think, on Ms.

Do you agree with Ms. DiMarco's summary of the contrasts between

your positions?
MS. HILL:

Ms. Friedman, I was the lead-off witness this morning, I think

before Ms. DiMarco was here and also before you arrived.
of the measure is unclear on the reverse scenario.
if the minimum

g~arantee

has been declared.

We think the wording

What I just testified to was

goes up between fiscal years and the fiscal emergency

But then in taking the other scenario, let's say that more

like this situation the revenues have gone down, the prior year amount is over
appropriated; we think it's unclear because of the wording of the measure that
references Article 16, Section 8, which just says, "expenditures required by".
Now, to us, there are a couple things that could be read there.
"Expenditures required by" under test three could potentially go down under that
type of a scenario.

However, you also have a situation where the Budget Act in

a control section outlines the Proposition 98 guarantee.

So there would also be

an articulation of legislative intent in the control section.

How then legal

folks would look at that, and I'm not a legal expert, we think at this time is
uncertain.

I think there's the issue of what the intent of the measure is

versus the actual wording of the measure.

And in looking at the wording of the

measure, which is the only thing in our capacity as an elections office, in this
particular case analyzing the measure, our reading is that it's unclear in that
scenario.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:

So are you saying that there may be a possibility

that if this passes and what occurred in this recent year occurs again where
there was an over-appropriation based on the revenues that were generated, that
if the governor declared a fiscal emergency, then he could then basically cut
the money that was over-appropriated from the schools?
MS. HILL:

I think part of what is confusing to the committee is that fiscal

emergency is under two scenarios and the one you're talking about here is not
under the 3 percent scenario but rather, as you mentioned, the budget having not
been enacted by the Legislature and signed.
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As you outlined it, we think that

there is some question about that if you are in an over-appropriation situation
from the prior year.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:

And the result of that would be then, I guess,

there would be a further cut in schools and conceivably the ADA amount could be
reduced from the previous year.
MS. HILL:

Well, I think you've also hit on another complication, as Ms.

DiMarco also indicated.

You have a number of factors that determine the

Proposition 98 guarantee:

average daily attendance, local property tax

revenues, and State General Fund revenues; and the interaction of those three
would also have to be taken into account in arriving at your decision.

You also

have a complicating factor from the 1992 Budget Act with the loan repayment
provisions now that were enacted as part of this year's budget solution and how
that would be interpreted in view of the constitutional issue of "expenditures
required by", and that's a quote out of the Section 12.2 of the measure, Article
16, Section 8, and that would be the relevant section that would have to be
interpreted.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

On this point, who does the calculation of all these

different factors, Ms. Hill, under 165?
MS. HILL:

In terms of these four constitutional exemptions, it would be my

reading that it's the Department of Finance that makes those determinations.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
calculating business.

We, under a fiscal emergency, are out of the
Right?

If there is a fiscal emergency and the governor

can assume the authority and the powers given to that person in 165, the
calculations can be done without the legislative committees:

Ways and Means,

fiscal committees, on the Senate side Budget and Fiscal Review.

We then would

not be able to put our factors into the equation for consideration.

Is that

correct?
MS. HILL:

Again, there's two fiscal emergencies:

one fiscal emergency

where the Department of Finance would make the determination is at the end of
the first, second, or third quarter, if there had been the three percent.

Now,

the measure also uses the term "fiscal emergency" which can be declared if, on
July 1st of the year, the budget bill has not been passed by the Legislature and
signed by the governor.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MS. HILL:
governor.

Okay.

It's July 7th now.

Take your scenario from July 7th.

So the budget has not been passed or signed by the

Then the prior year budget would be in effect from the prior year

with adjustments for the constitutional issues that are mentioned.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Made by whom?
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MS. HILL:

It's my understanding, and I believe Deputy Director Olson

testified to the committee on monday, that in part it would depend if the
Legislature, if 165 passed, clarified through legislation as to how that portion
would be implemented.

Absent a clarification by the Legislature for that

period, then the Department of Finance would make that determination.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Would be the only body to make that determination.

If

we made a clarification in the Legislature that the Ways and Means and the
Budget and Fiscal Review committees along with the figures coming from other
sources would have to be calculated in, the governor could veto that bill,
right?
MS. HILL:

That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

It could be vetoed.

so, then in conclusion, it could be the Finance

Department alone making these determinations.
MS. HILL:

It could be, Senator Watson.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Whether it will be would depend ...

But it could under 165.

I'm just trying to understand

165 from the funding mechanism and, Ms. DiMarco, I'm just trying to get some
clarification in my own mind as to whether we place education at risk under 165.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Senator, I appreciate that because you and I share the

greatest concern that public education be placed in any risk at any time.

The

Department of Finance's calculations, as Mr. Olson testified on Monday, I quote
from his testimony if I may, which should help reinforce to you that they share
the same opinion I've testified to.

Mr. Olson said, and I quote directly from

his written testimony submitted at the same time as his oral, "In the Department
of Finance's view the governor would have no power to propose reductions in
support of public schools.

This would be the case even if the Legislature had

appropriated more than the minimum funding guarantee provided in Proposition 98
or if it could be reasonably estimated that the guarantee would drop below the
level of appropriations in the Budget Act.
the public schools is categorical."

This is because the exemption for

Again, I'm quoting from Finance.

"It is

not explicitly limited to the minimum amount of the guarantee, but instead to
funding for education as provided in the Constitution which sets out the general
principle of funding priority for the public school system."

Finance does share

the same view and Mr. Olson did testify to that.
In the case of gubernatorial veto, all the override authority of the
Legislature is in place under this initiative and it's been confirmed.

I think

you had testimony this morning as to the Attorney General's Opinion confirming
that again.

At any time should the governor veto anything ...

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Prior to your arrival there was a great bit of doubt
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about whether or whether or not the Legislature could move to override a
governor's veto.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Correct.

And because of that doubt, as you know, an

Attorney General Opinion was sought and has been released in it's full text and
I ...

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Yeah.

But the Attorney General has just one opinion

and I would like •••
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Well, the Attorney General's Opinion is, for a lawyer in

particular, the short answer is "no", period.

I've never seen an attorney write

a sentence that said "no", period or "yes", period.

And then goes on to

explain, and I'll quote from this, "Under well-established rules of statutory
and constitutional construction, Section 5 of Proposition 165 should not be
interpreted to impliedly repeal the Legislature's power to override a
gubernatorial veto.

Failure of the governor to sign a budget bill cannot

prevent the bill from becoming law under other constitutional provisions
including by Legislative override.

The budget bill becoming law is not

contingent upon the provisions of Proposition 165; rather, the emergency powers
in Proposition 165 are contingent upon the budget bill.

Thus, once a budget

bill becomes law, including by means of a Legislative override, the fiscal
emergency provisions under Proposition 165 are of no effect."
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

The Attorney General is the attorney for the governor,

for the executive branch.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

I would submit for the State of California, Senator, I

think that's what he thinks he got elected to do.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

And one of the proponents of the bill, very clear.

So

I would expect his opinion to be written that way.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

I would ALSO suggest, Senator, that if this is passed

that it would be litigated and I don't know who wants to go and suggest that the
Legislature's override authority has been impaired by this measure.
certainly will not be us.

It

But the Attorney General Opinion and the testimony

that you've sought in these two hearings certainly should give you a very thick
legislative intent and proponents .••
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Well, there was some admission on the part of one of

the sponsors of the bill, as reported in the Bee ••.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Mr. Gordon wasn't correct.
Yeah, Director of the Governor's campaign for 165.
I believe if you call Mr. Gordon, he will tell you that

he misunderstood the question, that he was referring to something else.
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I can

tell you that I checked after having read that because it certainly was not my
interpretation based on my understanding of the provisions, and knowing full
well that I was coming here today.

That in fact, I believe, also is why the

Attorney General Opinion is quite important.

The press release released by the

campaign which was handed to me this morning is also very declarative of the
same point; it makes it very clear.

I think whether Mr. Gordon's answer was

correctly reported by the press or he misunderstood the question, that article
certainly is incorrect and it is very clear to me, and I assume the Attorney
General's Opinion will show that to you as well, that the override authority of
the Legislature in no way, shape, or form has been impeded, eroded, or changed
by the provisions of Proposition 165.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Mr. Gordon-- I'll just finish up here-- said it was

an error, so I guess Mr. Gordon is in error saying it was an error.

But what it

spells out to me is that there are some flaws in this 165 and I think 165
we've been talking all morning and afternoon on just the fiscal aspect of the
budget and not even just barely touching on the welfare aspects of it and it
seems like there's two distinctly different issues in 165 which to me would fall
on its face and should be thrown out because it deals with two major
constitutional policies.

And so, so much for flaws.

Mr. Epple.
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

I wanted to add one additional thing dealing with the

flaws, since you're referring to the Attorney General's Opinion.

The Attorney

General's Opinion seems to hold that there is an implied repealing of a section
of the Constitution, when, in fact, 165 doesn't attempt to do it; it adds a new
section that sets a separate category of budget and that's those passed after
July 1st.

I don't believe it, in fact a court's going to find that this

attempts to repeal any portion of the budget or the power to appeal -- or to
veto.

My problem is is how can we depend upon an Attorney General's Opinion

that doesn't deal with the question of whether or not this deals with a special
case requirement in the Constitution of a budget arising after a specific date
as opposed to repealing the right of the Legislature to act.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Again, my reading of the Attorney General's Opinion, I

think it's fairly clear, and perhaps I misunderstood your opening statement, is
that you may not impliedly repeal and you do not.
I

ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

That's correct.

SECRETARY DiMARCO:

And this does not.

ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

And 165 does not do that.

It, in fact, establishes a

separate case where a budget has not been passed by a certain date and specific
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new actions that will be taken under that consideration.

That doesn't repeal

another section of the Constitution.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Again, I can only say to you, Mr. Epple, that the

Attorney General has opined that it does not, the proponents have made it very
clear that they do not believe it does, the legal advisors for the
Administration have examined that question and Mr. Olson testified again on this
Monday at the Sacramento hearing, and again I'll say categorically it does not
override.

As the Attorney General said, Proposition 165 does not drive the

budget bill; the budget bill authority and powers of the Legislature are intact
and still would hold.

I don't know how to be any more clear than that.

Case

law certainly supports that; I could cite you the cases, but I don't think we
want to do a legal brief.
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

I think the Supreme Court of the State of California has

to look at that initiative as in the most liberal construction to uphold it.
And in order to uphold it, I think they'd have to find that it was clear, that
it established a separate and different criteria for a new circumstance and that
it was no longer after that date in the old circumstance of the budget bill.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

If I may, Mr. Epple, let me quote from Kennedy

Wholesale, Inc. vs. State Board of Equalization.

It's a 1991 case; it is the

holding Supreme Court case on this issue and I quote from the opinion, "In order
for the second law to repeal or supersede the first, the former must constitute
a revision of the entire subject so that the court may say that it was intended
to be a substitute for the first".

Board of Supervisors vs. Lonnigan(?) from

the same year and Hensner vs. West American Finance Company also support that
opinion of the court, and clearly, nowhere is there any intent as to that issue
evident at all.

In fact, the proponents have formally declared that the intent

is to allow to affirm legislative overrides.

I could go on and give you a lot

more legal cites, Mr. Epple, but I believe it's very clear that that issue is
absolutely not present here.
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE:

Well, okay.

I want to point out that I believe that

when it goes before a Supreme Court that, in fact, all of those nice opinions
probably will never be gotten to because the court's going to find that it's
clear on the face and they'll never get to the opinions that all these people
are giving, because in order for there to be any opinion evidence given, whether
the legislative opinion or the opinion of the makers of the initiative, you have
to have an ambiguity.
at all.

And unfortunately, I don't believe that this is ambiguous

It says clearly that after July 1st, this is the process.

And that is

a new process that does not repeal any other process; it sets aside and sets
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apart a new process.

That's where we're going to find the danger in this and

we're going to end up with a process that cannot be overridden.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Well clearly, Mr. Epple, we disagree, but I can assure

you, if we get to court on the issue of whether or not legislative overrides
have been repealed by this measure, you and I will weigh in on the same side.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Ms. Friedman.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:

If it's appropriate, I'd like to change the subject

from Prop. 165's effect on public education to Prop. 165's effect on school-age
children, directly.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

I'm going to have to say that my specific charge, and I

checked with the committee staff, was on public education.

As far as outside of

the school setting, Secretary Gould and Director Anderson testified in
Sacramento to that and I believe you have their written testimony as well as
their others.

Within the purview of the education request I am prepared to

respond to your questions, but beyond that, for programs that I'm not
responsible for, I'll have to defer to Secretary Gould.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:

Well, I'd like to ask the question.

If you don't

feel prepared to answer it, I would certainly respect that.
As I understand it, the Governor had articulated his approach to many issues
but especially dealing with children as prevention.

And I wanted to direct

myself to the portion of Prop. 165 that cuts Aid to Families with Dependent
Children by 10 percent.

And I believe the Legislature just cut Aid to Families

with Dependent Children by, I believe, 5.4 percent.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

5.8.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:

5.8 percent.

And as I understand it, about 70

percent of AFDC recipients are children under 10.

I've spent a lot of time

visiting the schools in the district that I currently represent, which includes
MacArthur Park, Pico Union, Silver Lake, Koreatown and other areas, and one of
the things that teachers have talked with me about is children coming to school
hungry, children coming to school not ready to learn, children coming to school
even in kindergarten, below grade level, even in kindergarten.
So my question is

my concern is that this is the exact opposite of

prevention and that this is going to increase the number of children that come
to school hungry.

I believe that right now, or before the 5.8 percent cut, that

the average grant to a single parent with two children was somewhere around
$630/$640, around that area.

So if we were to add 5.8 -- I'm hoping someone is

going to help me with the arithmetic on this -- but a 10 percent cut on $630 is
about $63.
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

$663 is the maximum grant for three.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:

$663.

A 10 percent cut of that -- and is that

right now with the ..•
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

And then with the budget cut, 1992 grant level would be

$425, and then the Governor's 165 budget cut will take it down to $597.

And

just to give you a comparison, the average rent is $811/$818 in the state, in
the high-rent areas -- San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:
on children.

My concern is the fact that this is going to have

As I mentioned, I spent a lot of time in schools in my district.

During the interim I spent some time at the California Youth Authority at
Ventura.

So we see the results of when kids do not get what they need

educationally, emotionally, nutritionally.

How can this possibly fit into any

notion of prevention?
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Again, I am not the expert on the provisions of welfare

nor do I feel comfortable testifying on them, but I can respond to your question
in a broader sense.
Anyone who has gone through the pain of these last two budgets is clearly
aware that the State of California has far greater needs than we are able to
meet, and, clearly, that when that occurs that we are ending up with enormous
needs without the revenue there in place.
I am greatly concerned that when you look at the trends that have been
projected even by the most conservative, or the most optimistic perhaps is the
better word -- which doesn't usually go together

people in the state and in

the economic community, I have to tell you, that we are on an absolute collision
course; that we already saw that this year and the collision course has already
met -- the front part of the engines have been damaged on both education and
children's health issues as well as all kinds of other issues that I think all
of us believe are human investment issues.

The reality is is that you're going

to have to take that question in a broader context.
If the State of California continues to have the kinds of deficits that
we've experienced in the last two years or, frankly, any kind, given the
tightness of the state's fiscal picture, I'm concerned that we are going to have
a state's economy that cannot support our children anywhere, anytime, in any
issue area.
On that broader context I have to say to you that the State of California
must be able to have a solid economic base.

That first priority, I could tell

you, means that you must be able to live within the amount of money that you
have in place.

I am not going to certainly pretend to open up a discussion on
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the relative merits of tax increases versus cuts versus something else, but I
will tell you that the reality for every Californian is that when your income
goes down, you have to make choices, you have to make priority choices and you
have to live within your income.

And I will give you a very painful personal

example.
My husband is a senior research engineer in the aerospace industry.
should say "was".

I

My husband has been laid off from his job at Douglas Aircraft

because of this recession, and as a result, functionally our household account
was just cut in half a month ago, diminishing our family budget.

Now, that

doesn't mean that I'm going to do all the things I'd like to do, including
setting aside monies, a responsible person for retirement, or setting aside
money in a savings account for an emergency, and I could go on and on with the
analogy.

The reality is, I cannot, we cannot continue to spend at a level for

which we have no resources.

Neither can I, at this point, certainly see that I

should run up my credit cards and hope for better days around the corner.
don't see them coming nor is that responsible fiscal management.

I

I don't like

the outcomes; clearly, there are choices that are going to be made in our
household account that are not going to be the best prevention.

They're going

to be holding on while we re-establish a new economic base, and that new
economic base, obviously I'm hoping means my husband's re-employed and that I
remain employed, and that way we can continue on with the plans that we've made
for our economic well-being and our future.
The State of California is in a much more acute version of that personal
scenario I've just shared with you.
met, the debate is not over.

In order for our children's needs to be

The provisions of the initiative as it relates to

welfare, they are over the economic principles that are governing

or not

governing California's fiscal structure and the actions of all of us
collectively in making sure that we have not only a solid balanced budget but
also ...
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Maureen, that sounds goods, but the bottom line ...
... but also, Senator, but also we do establish a revenue

base that will support those growing needs of our children.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Okay.

But the bottom line should not drive the policy

where it comes to child growth and development.
The thing that really hurts me, Ms. Friedman, is that the vision of this
department that Ms. DiMarco's heading up was there with a lot of us way long
before a lot of people in this room were in the Legislature or associated with
it.

And what we wanted to do was to have an advocacy department for children
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and for families, and when I hear you spout that line, Ms. DiMarco, I am very
disheartened because it's the same thing the Governor was saying to us when we
spent 64 days saying no to him.

Under any conditions, any conditions, I would

never approve of a $2.3 billion cut to education.

If that's all we had, better

we put it into education and close the prisons, close CYA, and I argued with my
caucus.

I said if we close a universityl we close CYA -- one for one.

I am very disheartened to hear you go through all of that rhetoric.
budgeting; we have the responsibility for doing it.
for education for children?

We know

But where's the advocacy

You ought to be fighting to get every single dollar

out of the revenues for children, and I think your question was a very cogent
one.

Let's look at the school-age children across education lines, the social

service lines.

What is our commitment to them?

Should we not fight for them?

I could give a care less about the figures that come out of the Department of
Finance.

What I care about is our children and how we find in this budget a way

to support children, and I just don't hear that coming from you and I'm so
disappointed.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Senator, I'm sorry that you don't hear it in my comments

because my advocacy is no less intense than it has ever been, and
I can assure you that my advocacy is for children not just for this week but it
is for the long haul.

Our children have, no question at all, diminished in

their economic and social well-being over more than a decade.
submit it's been two decades.

In fact, I would

Someone declared victory in the war on poverty in

the '60s and went home, and it was as premature declaration, in my opinion.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Agreed.
Children's agenda will never be served without the

resources they are to serve it, and that requires, in my opinion, it requires
some solid responsible action by all of us as adults to ensure that it will be.
Yes, I wish with you, Senator -- I think you and I could probably construct
a budget, given unlimited resources, that would address every issue and you and
I would be in total unanimity.

The reality, however, is that we have lost

$25 billion, as you well know, over the last two years.

In order for us to

accommodate that and make sure that our children are taken care of as best we
possibly can through this time and build a base for the future, we do have to
face those hard realities.
The $2.3 billion cut to schools I have to object to.
about it.

I've been very quiet

I wish not to replay the budget battle but I beg your indulgence

while I explain.
The $2 billion budget cut that's been alleged was a cut from a budget that
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Governor Wilson submitted in January that had a $2 billion increase in it for
schools.

We fought hard to try and hold on to that increase.

Ultimately, year

over year, we were able to carve a budget, working together with the
Legislature, yourself included, that increases school funding for this school
year over the prior one by $1 billion.

If you ask me next was it enough, I will

tell you categorically, Senator, it was not.
was the best we could do?

Absolutely.

It is not.

Am

I telling you it

The projections that we have for next

year based on the commitments that we have made in this budget for this year and
next year for schools show that we will have the grand total of new revenues,
after we pay for our commitments to schools, for every other service in this
state, of $155 million, which is not enough for health and welfare, not enough
for public safety, not enough for higher education.

But we did, painfully, with

great agony, make decisions together this summer, none of which did we feel were
fully adequate at all, to try to do the best we could within the realities that
we have gained.
Together, I would hope, Senator, I know your commitment to this, I know your
long history to this.

We must not only debate as advocates for our children

over how best to spend the money in the budget, but we must join together to
build the economy back in this state so that we do not dig ourselves into these
economic holes; again, otherwise we will never meet our children's needs.

And I

submit to you that the time for that disaster is not very far away, measured in
months, in my opinion, not years.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Ms. Friedman, I'm sorry to have just cut you off.

just couldn't resist the opportunity to say those things.

I

That's all right, Ms.

DiMarco and I go round about like this a lot but we're coming from the same
place about children.
I just wanted to point up that I just am disappointed to hear that line of
argument and to hear you spread over into other areas when you just got through
saying, "I'm only here to speak to education."

Now you're talking about

economic development and raising revenues and so on.

I'm just really

disappointed but we'll talk about that one on one.
Sorry.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN:

You real

represented how I would have responded

to that.
There is one thing I do want to say.

I appreciate, and while I have

sympathy for your personal situation -- you talked about the fact that you and
your family will now have to make choices on things you want to cut.
that we are talking about do not have choices.
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They have no choices.

The people
It's to

buy food or not to buy food.
SECRETARY DiMARCO:

Again, Ms. Friedman, I am not at all -- and I think if

you look at my history you'll know that I am probably even more sympathetic to
that than some people that you work with.
where to get it.

My concern is is I just don't know

I know what I would like to do in my personal situation.

don't have the resources and I have to make adjustments so that I can.

I

I don't

like the outcomes but the reality for California is we are running out of
taxpayers that will be able to support at any level the people who are needy and
people who are in need of the services that you and I do agree that we want to
provide.
I think that the issue for us is not to attack each other's solutions as
wrong and then go on and say we won or we lost, but the issue is is that we need
to join more people in the discussion, that you and I probably agree on at least
95 percent.

You may not like the approach that I've taken, you may not like the

approach that the Governor has taken, but I think that our goals may be the
same.

The sooner we'll be able to pursue that the better our children will be

served in the future.
Secretary Gould has certainly given you a long testimony, including the
offsets that there are to the reductions as far as the specifics in welfare, and
again, I'm not the person who should testify to that.

But I can tell you this,

that my advocacy, as Senator Watson wishes to see continue -- I thank you,
Senator; my portfolio is strengthened -- I can assure you that in those
discussions both within the budget context and within our analysis of this
measure have included my pushing very hard and Secretary Gould's support for
ensuring that everything that we can possibly do to offset the cash grant in
services to ensure children's health and welfare and well-being has been done
and will continue to be done.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Let me just say -- and thank you so much, Ms. DiMarco,

for coming here and getting on the hot seat
everyone in this room to know my position.
gain us anything.

165 is not a solution, and I want
It is not a solution, it does not

we lose so much and we put our children at risk.

There are two issues, and I have to keep harping on that.

There's a

reduction in the welfare grant and the possibility of a reduction in educational
financing.

It also sets the governor up to be a dictator and to be able to run

government single-handedly because there's a process that is in the Constitution
that is a reserve for the Legislature, and that is to appropriate funding.

And

the way I read 165, with its warts and all, is that it throws all of that into
court, it throws it all into a great amount of disagreement.
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You know, you read

an Attorney General's Opinion, and we've had any number of opinions here.

But

what it does it sets up a situation where we must question everything that we
thought we had the authority to do under 165.

It's a terrible proposition.

It's a grab of authority.

It disregards the lives of a lot of people under the

color of budget concerns.

And the information is even narrower now than it was.

So I think this is a threat to the balance and the economy and the welfare of
the people of California.
And with that, we're going to move on.
presentation here.

I thank you, Ms. DiMarco, for your

I would like to ask the committee members now, we have The

Most Reverend Phillip Straling who is the Bishop of San Bernardino/Riverside
Catholic Diocese and I'd like to pay him the courtesy and let him go on now, and
then after that we can take a quick break to get a bite to eat or whatever.
Would that be agreeable?

If so, let me ask The Most Reverend Straling to come

forth now.
Father, thank you for being here.
BISHOP PHILLIP F. STRALING:

Good afternoon.

My name is Phillip F. Straling

and I am the Catholic Bishop with jurisdiction over the counties of San
Bernardino and Riverside.

This makes up the Catholic diocese of San Bernardino.

I also serve as the Vice President of the California Catholic Conference, and I
might just make a note on that.

The California Catholic Conference is a

combination of all twelve Catholic dioceses of California, the Metropolitan
Archdiocese of Los Angeles and San Francisco.

So it represents all twelve of us

and I am the Vice President of that Conference.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and to discuss
the concerns of the California Catholic Conference with Proposition 165, the
Welfare and Budget Reform Act.
As I begin my testimony, I'd like to context my remarks against the
realities of our current economic and social scene in California.

I feel it is

essential to do so for too frequently in today•s world we rush off to solve
major problems, lacking both knowledge and understanding.

The result of our

ill-conceived action then compounds our problems and further jeopardizes our
well-being.
The major problem that we see with Proposition 165 is that it presents a
series of ill-conceived solutions to the major social and economic problems of
our day.

It appears that those who developed the Proposition 165 did so based

on myths and stereotypes that ill-serve the seriousness of the issues to be
addressed.
Further, lacking both knowledge and understanding of the real issues,
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Proposition 165 would, if passed, produce immeasurable suffering in the lives of
the most vulnerable members of our society:

poor children.

At the same time,

i t would deliver a mortal blow to effective government in our state.
Permit me to share with you my concerns in the first area mentioned.

The

premise of Proposition 165 is that California's budget problems are being
created, in part, by an uncontrolled growth in welfare triggered by a benefit
that is making California the

u.s.

Mecca for people who don't want to work.

I

wonder if those who developed Proposition 165 have been following the news
recently or have any memory of recent history.

News headlines daily give us

information of the worst economic recession to hit Southern California since the
Great Depression.

Perhaps they've been quick to forget the devastation of the

industrial base of the early '80s that turned cities and towns in Ohio and
Pennsylvania into ghost towns and produced one of the largest in-country
migrations from the northeast to the west and southwest.

Or perhaps they don't

remember the unprecedented foreclosures and land sales that dislocated thousands
of farm families in the mid-'80s.

Obviously, they remember nothing of the

savings and loan collapse coupled with one of the worst banking crises in our
history, a collapse that is continuing to have a particularly adverse effect on
the building industry throughout California.

Perhaps they choose to forget the

great tax giveaways of the '80s that have created the worst income gap between
the rich and the poor in our country since records began to be kept in this
area.

And finally, perhaps they fail to realize that the Cold War ended and

approximately 20+ percent of California's thriving economy of the '80s is fast
disappearing.
I wonder if they ever read the newspapers:

The story of September 3, 1992

of the San Bernardino Sun that the Commerce Department reporting that income
growth adjusted for inflation declined by 1.9 percent in 1991, the worst decline
on record going back to 1970.
The story of August 12, 1992, Los Angeles Times that reported that in cities
with populations over 100,000+, more than one-fourth of the children are living
in poverty, that approximately 10,000 American children die of poverty each
year.

In the county in which I live, San Bernardino, the figure is 34.4 percent

of the children are living in poverty.

The story concluded that "Children are

the poorest citizens in California and are suffering the consequences."
Or the headlines of September 26, San Bernardino Sun that read, "Job Picture
The Worst In 10 Years."
Yes, California has some serious economic problems contributing to some very
serious social problems, and yes, these problems are placing severe strains on
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the fiscal well-being of the state.

But I think based on the evidence available

to us that it's safe to say that the major causes of the state's fiscal problems
are a changed world economy coupled with a changed world political reality.
These factors, coupled with the short-sighted, greed-oriented and failed
economic policies of the '80s need to be addressed if we are to rebuild our
national and state economy.

I fail to see how any responsible person could

blame the economic tragedy of the '90s on helpless children.

Seventy percent of

the recipients of AFDC in California are children -- 1.6 million children.
this number, 200,000 are infants.

Of

Or blame it on unemployed workers, trying to

hold their family together, or the aged, the blind, or the disabled.
Yet, that in fact is what Proposition 165 would do -- to punish these groups
as though they were the cause of our problems.

Proposition 165 would, if

passed, immediately reduce welfare benefits by 10 percent and in six months, if
the adult member of the family did not find work, benefits would be reduced by
an additional 15 percent.

This would be in addition to the benefit cuts that

will be experienced by most beneficiaries within the next month as a result of
this year's budget resolution.

A family of three would have a combined

benefit -- AFDC and food stamps -- reduced to $751 a month, or $9,012 a year.
Using today•s poverty line of $11,570 for a family of three, that family would
be made to live at 79 percent of that which is established by federal government
barely sufficient for a family's survival.
at that level for seven years.

Further, the benefit would be frozen

If the present economic crisis continues for

another two or three years, that family, in 1995, would be living with an income
level equivalent to 65 percent of the established poverty line.
In a state where many AFDC families are already spending in excess of 50
percent, some as high as 70 or 80 percent, of their income for shelter,
reductions of this nature would serve only to increase the already unacceptable
number of homeless families as well as ensure the destruction of many more
innocent young lives.

Further, these cuts would make the quality of our lives

unbearable and surely hamper any real possibility of any economic revival in our
state.
I could go on in this area for much longer, but I honestly feel that we all,
at least those of us in touch with human faces of poverty in our streets, are
sufficiently pained by the present circumstances without imagining the horrors
to come if the short-sighted and mean-spirited Proposition 165 is adopted.
Proposition 165 is not satisfied with wreaking havoc in the lives of poor
children, families, aged, and disabled.

Proposition 165 would reconstruct our

state government by effectively destroying the balance of powers between the
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legislative and executive branches of government.

It would, if passed, vest the

equivalent of absolute fiscal power in whoever sits in the governor's chair.
This would essentially destroy the systems of checks and balances designed by
our forefathers and mothers as a safeguard for our democracy.

Short-sighted and

myopic thinking on the part of the proponents of 165 would jeopardize the
established process of good government designed to ensure that the common
welfare of all people is served by a balanced representative government.
Recently, we Catholic bishops of the United States published a statement,
titled, "Putting Children and Families First - A Challenge For Our Church,
Nation, and World."

Our motivation in issuing this statement is captured in the

opening paragraph:
"Our nation is failing many of our children.
dangerous place for millions of children.

Our world is a hostile and

As pastors in a community deeply

committed to serving children and their families, and as teachers of a faith
that celebrates the gift of children, we seek to call attention to this crisis
and fashion a response that builds on the values of our faith, the experience of
our community, and the love and the compassion of our people."
Further, in the statement, we advance a criteria for a national policy.
think this criteria could serve us well here in California.

I

And I will conclude

my remarks this afternoon by applying this criteria to our state.
Our great State of California must move beyond partisan and ideological
rhetoric to help shape a new consensus that supports families in their essential
roles and insist that public policy support families, especially the poor and
vulnerable children.

In pursuing this goal, we, as a state, should advocate for

policies and programs that
- Put children and families first
- Help but don't hurt families and children
- Ensure that those with the greatest need get the most help
- Support policies and programs that empower families to meet their
responsibilities to their children
- Fight economic and social forces that threaten children and family life
- Build on the strengths of families, reward responsibility, and sacrifice
that people make for children.
While I find myself unable to see any real value in 165 by way of fashioning
a response that will enhance the well-being of the poor children and their
families, or, for that matter, any segment of our society, let me state
categorically, the defeat of Proposition 165 is not our exclusive goal.
not our goal to embarrass any political personage or party.

It's

Our goal, looking
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beyond the defeat of 165, is to impel all to build with one another a society, a
state, and a nation, a world with a clear priority for all families and children
in need.
And I sincerely thank you.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Thank you, Bishop.

Are there questions or comments?

We thank you for this compassionate view of 165.

I just wish we had proponents

in the room that could hear you, but we are recording this session and we will
see that your printed words are distributed.
BISHOP STRALING:

Thank you so very much.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Members, let's take a break until 2:00.

There are

cafeterias in the building, and for those of you who have not been able to
present -- Michael Wald, Wendy Lazarus, Genevieve Heron, Claire Deffense, and
Dr. Lewis King -- we will be back in the room for your testimony at 2:00.
Thank you so very much.

(BREAK)

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

We're going to try to finish up by 3:30.

We will

follow the order on the file, and we'll start with Michael Wald, Jackson Eli
Reynolds Professor of Law at Stanford Center for the Study of Families, Children
and Youth, who's done extensive research in this area.
DR. MICHAEL WALD:

I'm Michael Wald.

School, where I have taught since 1967.

Is Dr. Wald here?

I am a Professor at Stanford Law
I teach courses dealing with public

policy toward children, courses on child abuse and neglect, general development
of public policy, child custody, and a number of other courses.

I'm also

formerly the director of the Stanford Center for the Study of Families, Children
and Youth, which is an inter-disciplinary research center at Stanford which has
been funded by private grants to do research on public policy issues as they
affect children.
In addition to my research work over the years, I've been actively involved
in the child welfare system.

I was, last year, appointed by Chief Justice

Malcolm Lucas to a committee, 40-person task force,

looking at the future of the

state courts and, particularly, I'm on the task force looking at the future of
courts dealing with children.

I've been the primary draftsman of most of the

child abuse and neglect laws in California, and I'm a former chairman of the
State Advisory Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect and various other government
groups.
I guess I was invited to testify because I did this report which all of you
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have here and which you've also, I think, received in your offices and in the
mail because I mailed it out to all current legislators and candidates.
I want to start off by just saying something about why I did this report,
when I decided to do it, and how I proceeded in terms of it.
I decided to do the report last February, late January/early February, when
there was a large article in the New York Times.

It was talking about welfare

reform all around the country, and that the most extensive proposal with regard
to welfare reform was the one being proposed in California, at that point as an
initiative to qualify for the ballot, and that California might set a trend for
the rest of the country.

I then looked at a lot of the literature about welfare

reform and saw that virtually all of the research that had been done focused on
welfare reform purely as a question around work incentive and whether different
proposals create more or less work incentive.

And none of the studies that had

been done looked at what was the impact of different kinds of proposals and
systems on the well-being of the children.

Since the AFDC (Aid for Families

with Dependent Children) program is a children's program -- and as you all know,
of the slightly over 2 million recipients, a million and a half are children -it seemed appropriate to look at what would be the effect of various kinds of
welfare proposals on the children.
This was done, it was funded by the Stanford Center for the Study of
Children and Youth, by no outside sources.
involved was the publication costs.

Actually, the only funding that was

And as normally with academic work, in

draft form it was widely distributed to a very large range of people of
different perspectives including people in the current Governor's Administration
for comments and went through revisions by comments all the way through.

But it

was something that I did on my own without being involved with any other groups.
To summarize briefly the main conclusions, in looking at each of the
provisions of 165, there is no question that anybody looking objectively at the
data would have to conclude that if 165 became law, it would be extremely
harmful to a large number of children.

Moreover, it would be extremely harmful

to that group of children who are already the most at risk in our society:

of

having health, academic, emotional and other developmental problems; children
living below the poverty line; children who already have multiple risk factors
affecting their lives as a result not only of the low income on which their
families have to live, but because many have experienced family disruption; many
live in dangerous

neighborhoods~

they have schools and other resources that are

often inferior to what are generally available to children.

Hitting on top of

that, further reductions in their well-being cannot help but make them worse
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off.
Basically, to break it down, why will children be worse off; and not every
child will, but I'm talking about the great majority; certainly 70 percent of
the million and a half children.

They will be worse off for one of two reasons:

As a result of 165, either their parents will have substantially less income
available and these are parents who already have inadequate income to be able to
provide for the day-to-day needs of their children; or for those parents who are
able to find jobs to replace the lost income.

The great majority of them will

not be able to find adequate child care for their children at the points when
they are working.

The proposal does not provide for any child care and these

children will be put, many, many of the children will be put in inadequate child
care.

At particular risk, in terms of these factors, are the 200,000 infants;

children one year or under who constitute the largest proportion of any age
group that are receiving benefits at this point.

So essentially one out of six

or one out of seven children is under the age of one, a time when if there's
going to be child care at all, it has to be extraordinarily high quality child
care with a great deal of continuity, and this is not available and will not be
available for the children.
well-being?

How will this play out in terms of these children's

There'll be two different factors that will have an effect.

for the group whose parents lose the income.

One is

Essentially right now, families in

terms of cash income, as you all know, are receiving approximately $22 a day in
cash income under the AFDC program.

They will be reduced to $17 a day for all

of their non-food needs; their rent and everything else.
a mother and two children.

This is a family with

More than half of all recipient families at this

point pay 50 percent or more of their income to housing.

In Los Angeles County

over 70 percent pay more than half of their income for housing.

The only way

that the families who lose the income will be able to make up for this income is
by moving into more crowded housing conditions; some will become homeless,
certainly; others will move into more crowded housing conditions, more housing
that is older, that has lead-based paint, that is dangerous.
Moreover, they will be less able to get children to medical care; there will
be much greater stress.

There is substantial evidence, I've documented all of

this in this volume so I won't go into a great deal of detail, there will be
much greater stress on the parents, and the biggest single predictor of whether
a parent physically abuses a child, and particularly seriously physically abuses
a child, is a low-income parent under a lot of stress.
physical abuse.

We are going to see more

We are going to see more children doing poorly in school

because in overcrowded housing conditions they are going to be sick more often;
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they are not going to be able to study as well.

Despite which for many of these

children are heroic efforts by their parents and other relatives to try and care
for their well-being, they face very great problems.
For those whose parents are able to work, and unlike some of what has been
said by the proponents, in order to make up for the cuts for the great bulk of
the parents, they would have to work 20 hours a week in order to make up for the
cuts.

This notion that you can do it in six to ten hours a week, assuming there

are any six to ten hour a week jobs in the world of which there are very few,
assumes no child care costs whatsoever.

As soon as you take into account any

child care costs for when the time that the parent works, the parent has to work
20 hours a week just to break even.

Half of all of the parents have children

5 -- half of all of the children are 5 years or under.

It's not that the

parents can go to work while their children are in school for a period of time,
they are going to have to find child care.

For very young children the child

care situation in our state and in our country, and California is better than
most places in the country, is really very gruesome, it's very grim.

Kids are

exposed to multiple caretakers when what the basic thing kids need is stability.
I will not go through the large body of research on the impact of unstable child
care on children, particularly very young children, but it is highly associated
with delinquency, with dropping out of school, with troubles in peer
relationships and falling behind in school.

This is an overwhelming body of

research that relates inadequate caring in the first year or two years and
inadequate child care to these kinds of developmental problems.
Okay.

Unfortunately, very few of the parents will even be able to respond

to this in terms of finding work because they won't have the child care.
will and they'll leave kids in dangerous situations.

Some

Next year it is certainly

going to be the case if 165 passes that we're going to read in the L.A. Times a
story that says, "Fire Kills Four Children" and it's going to turn out that a
seven-year-old was left in charge of four-year-old, three-year-old in a house in
which there was a wiring problem, a fire started, and then the paper's going to
focus on why did mother leave children alone, why is a seven-year-old caring
for-- and then there'll be blame of mother.

Nobody's going to write the story

that says, "As a result of Proposition 165 four children died in a fire", but
that will be the result;it will be directly because the mother was trying to get
employment at points when she had no child care available, that accidents occur,
that injuries occur, illnesses and death.
In essence, all of this is somewhat detailed in developmental things.

I

would like to end by pointing out a fundamental moral question that's involved
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in this.

This whole structure of 165, and I believe strongly that we need

reform of the welfare system, that there are real problems with it

recipients

think there are problems, everybody thinks there are problems -- but this whole
structure is being justified as saying we're going to create a bunch of
penalties and hope parents respond to this, to these penalties and work more by
these penalties.

But if the parents are unable to respond to it, if the parents

don't respond to it, it isn't the parents that are harmed by this, it's the
children that are harmed by this.

So what we're carrying out is a grand

experiment trying to alter parental behavior in which the consequences of a
failed experiment will be substantial harm to children.

If such an experiment

were proposed to a university human subjects committee, it would not pass, we
would not be allowed to do it because it is unethical to conduct such an
experiment where children might be harmed.
That's what's happening with Proposition 165.
reform could help parents and children.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Alternative ways of welfare

This is just not going to do it.

Any questions?

Dr. Wald, I want to say probably your report is the only and probably the
finest empirical study on the effects, the consequences of it.

I think the

points that you make that the punishment goes to children ought to be the one
single factor to defeat this proposition.

If you were in here when we heard

those who were from the Governor's office speak, they seemed to be more
concerned about the budget and how we arrive at the final budgetary line than
the impact on the people that these budgetary categories serve.
depend on you and some of the others too to get this word out.
a lot of educating between now and November.

We're going to
We've got to do

Right now, you know, when you say

"welfare" it's the favorite whipping boy or girl for the taxpayers and I think
that's why the Governor called it the "Taxpayers Protection Act".
DR. WALD:

And if I may say something in .•.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
DR. WALD:

Please .

... two things in response to that.

One is that it also seems

enormously troubling from an ethical perspective that to tie the two parts of
this together, essentially to take a budget thing and make children's welfare
the victim of a budget thing ..•
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
DR. WALD:

Right.

•.. you just don't hold them hostage; you do a budget thing and

let that be faced by voters directly.

There is something wrong with that.

The other part is that it really plays on what are enormous misconceptions
about the system, some of which I try, many of which I try and point out in the
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report, which really came home to me clearly when I would talk to my friends in
a law school or social acquaintances about what I was working on and I would say
to them, "Tell me the percentage of welfare mothers who are teenagers" because
lots of the publicity is this is going to deal with teenage issues.
"Tell me the percentage."

I say,

Of my friends who keep up with the newspapers to some

degree-- they're academics, they do other things, some of them look at this -the lowest estimate I got was 20 percent, most estimates were around 40 percent
and lots of them were 60 percent of the parents were mothers.

When I would tell

them that only 7 percent were teenagers they'd fall off of a chair and when I'd
say only 1.8 percent of all of the parents were below 18, 9,000 out of 500,000
mothers are below 18 and that's what this is saying we're going to deal with the
teenage thing, it really makes it look differently.
Moreover, you get the family unity argument:
unity.

we're going to do family

The family unity which is in the -- it's actually in the ballot

arguments and in the pro-165 literature, basically says that the provision that
requires teenage mothers under 18 to live with their parents promotes family
unity.

Well, as I say, to begin with there are only 9,000 such mothers, the

overwhelming bulk of whom already live with their families.

We're talking about

one or two thousand teenagers, many of whom were abused and neglected, and we're
going to cut benefits for 500,000 mothers, a million and a half kids, to deal
with 1,000 families.

Anybody who would think about this in a serious way could

not come to the conclusion that this is sensibly thought out.

And the fact that

the Administration never developed -- when I started this I wrote to people and
said, "Send me your background papers that have done the analysis on children",
I was never able to get a background paper looking at the impact on children.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
to thank you, Dr. Wald.

It's not surprising.

If there are no questions, I want

If you can stay around for a few more minutes in case

we need you as a resource person.
DR. WALD:

And I do have some extra copies if any people here would like

one.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Great.

If you will give them to the Sergeants there,

then they can see that they get distributed to anyone who wants them.

Thank you

so very much.
DR. WALD:

Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

David Illig is from the Legislative Analyst's office

and if you can come up real quickly and just give us a quick overview, we'd
appreciate it.
MR. DAVID ILLIG:

I've been asked to just provide brief comments on a few of
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the provisions of Prop. 165 that haven't already been discussed, and among those
are the fact that the proposition also allows for grant adjustments based on the
actual budget act appropriation and caseload growth as projected by the
Department of Finance.

This, in effect, means that either the Legislature could

choose any given appropriation and then the grants would be adjusted, or the
governor could, through a line item veto, reduce the appropriation, and that
could also affect AFDC grants.
Further, the initiative would repeal the language that limits trigger
reductions to the AFDC and SSI/SSP COLAs.

Thus, the trigger provisions

elsewhere in statute could affect the actual grant base through the combination
of the trigger cuts themselves and the map adjustment procedure.
In addition, the proposition would exclude from the grant any children
conceived while the parents are on aid as long as the parents are in the
caseload.

In other words, if the parents are not on the caseload but the

children are, then additional children would not be excluded.
And finally, the proposition makes a number of changes to the General
Assistance program, and among these, it limits the General Assistance grants.
It does not allow them to be higher than AFDC grants regardless of what a county
would choose to provide.

It allows in-kind aid to be counted as part of the

General Assistance grants and it provides the counties discretion to reduce
grants below AFDC grants should they decide to do so for budgetary or caseload
reasons.
There are a number of other components
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

So are you saying

let me be sure I understand you.

The grants can be cut deeper than 25 percent?
MR. ILLIG:

In the General Assistance program?

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MR. ILLIG:

In the GA.

In the GA program.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MR. ILLIG:

Oh, okay.

Now what about AFDC?

Well, in AFDC, yes.

The 10 percent reduction applies to

everyone, the additional 15 for anyone on aid more than six months.

But if the

budget act appropriation itself is too small to support an AFDC grant at that
level, then yes, it would be further reduced.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Now, it says in those first six months you'll have a 10

percent cut and the second.

If the governor declared a fiscal emergency within

the second six months, he could cut the grant to any level that he would choose?
MR. ILLIG:

That would certainly be possible, yes.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Wow!

We've got to get that out.
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Okay.

Excuse me.

MR. ILLIG:
earlier.

Those were the major provisions that haven't been discussed

If there are further questions.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Mr. Epple?

This is the kind of information that doesn't appear obvious in the
beginning.

Number one, I think it's unconstitutional because of the two

separate issues in this one proposition and the prohibition against that.

But

when you go down and there's even more power in the hands of the governor,
because the governor can reduce down to almost zero -- am I to understand that
that • s the case?
MR. ILLIG:

Conceivably that could be the case.

Whether that would actually

occur is •••
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MR. ILLIG:

Well, I mean, but the possibility is there.

The possibility would be there.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

All right.

Well, thank you for that information.

I'm

sure we got that recorded because I want to be able to point out the loopholes
in this.
MR. ILLIG:

And I might point out one possible limit to that and that is

maintenance of effort requirement in Chapter 19 of the Social Security Act which
would potentially put our Medi-Cal dollars at risk, but beyond that, then the
possibility for waivers presumably the grants could be further reduced.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
comments?

Yeah.

Right.

Senator Alquist, do you have any

All right, thank you very much.

Okay, going back to the agenda we'll call Wendy Lazarus, Children Now.
Wendy's not here.

Oh, I'm sorry.

MS. WENDY LAZARUS:

Good afternoon.

Thank you.

I am the Vice President for

Policy with Children Now, which is a statewide policy and advocacy organization.
I've devoted the last 20 years of my life to being a policy analyst for children
and families and being an advocate and I bring that experience to looking at
this question of Prop. 165.
I want to try to speak to you just very briefly on behalf of all of the
children of California, the 7.8 million children who won't have a chance to vote
on November 3rd, but whose futures are probably more affected by what is in the
fine print of this initiative than any of us in the State of California.

These

kids, as you know, are 26 percent of our population and we've just got to be
very, very careful about how it will affect each and every one of them.
In doing our own analysis -- let me just say that Children Now is privately
funded.

To ensure that our analysis of things can be objective, we take no

government money, we're funded by private foundations, corporations, and
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interested individuals.

And our board of directors includes a really wide

spectrum of leaders from across the state representing every stripe on the
political spectrum from business leaders like George Roberts and Richard Atlas
to community leaders like Anita DeFrance from down here and the Honorable Cruz
Reynoso.
So we have taken an extensive look at what's in this and I've provided some
materials -- you can see all of this in more detail.

But looking at everything

all together, we think that Prop. 165 represents the most harmful measure to
California's children of any proposal in recent memory in California; and that's
for three reasons which I'd like to go over with you just briefly.
First is you've heard a lot about the budget authority from the standpoint
of good government.
important.

There is also an angle affecting children which is terribly

By upsetting the constitutional checks and balances in the state

budgeting process, we are really touching the lives of every single child in the
state.

I don't think there's a single child who doesn't benefit from some state

service, either public schools, immunization programs, abuse and neglect
programs, drug education programs.

For every one of these children the

continuity of these programs is now going to be left in the hands of just one
person and that is the governor.

So that just for instance, and I want to

stress that these comments are not directed at the Governor who is now governor,
this could be anybody, and let's just say we have a governor who believes that a
parent belongs at home taking care of their child and for that reason decides to
cut funding for child care and for child care licensing.

That is the kind of

power that Prop. 165 would allow and that is the kind of inconsistent commitment
to kids that we simply can't allow.
For the kids who have no vote and no high-paid lobbyist to represent them,
they simply can't get by with a shortened budgeting process of public input, and
you know this does shorten that process instead of beginning in January,
beginning in March.

Kids need a public airing of the budget issues, they need

the checks and balances, and I would say to you, most of all they need the kind
of consistency in programs.

What good is a drug education prevention program if

it's here one year and gone the next based on the whim of whoever is governor.
So that aspect has just got to be seen as a critical children's issue.
Secondly, the second major reason we think this is so damaging to kids has
really been laid out very well by Professor Wald and that's the million and a
half children who will be hurt by this attempt at welfare reform.

You've heard

from him what it will mean in terms of their ability to have a roof over their
head, their ability to have food on the table and quality child care.
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The other aspect we ought to be concerned about is that besides the harm
there, this proposal is really a double whammy for them because it doesn't even
constitute real welfare reform.

I think we are all in agreement that we need to

reform the welfare system, but this initiative does nothing to make health care
and child care available so that parents can work.

It does nothing to improve

the training and education so that parents are better equipped to find jobs.

It

does nothing to create the jobs for the many parents who desperately want them
and now can't get them.

So we are eager to work with you all to fashion real

welfare reform; this is not that.
Finally, the third reason we're so concerned is that we really believe that
Prop. 165 will cost taxpayers and children a lot more in the long run.

You

know, it's not simply the immediate harm to children that we're looking at, from
depriving them of the basics, but it's very clear that this is bad for kids in
the long run.

As you probably know, kids who grow up in a poverty situation are

much more likely, three times as likely, to die before their first birthday,
four times as likely to become pregnant as teenagers, and much more likely to
drop out of school later on.
You know, each year we do this report card on children which looks at how
our kids are doing on staying in school, getting prenatal care, and I am willing
to predict to you today that if Prop. 165 passes, kids are going to be worse off
on nearly every measure that we look at in this report card and taxpayers are
going to pay a lot more when we have to treat untreated health problems in
expensive hospital settings and when we have to somehow deal with kids who have
dropped out of school and are not prepared for the job market.
Lastly, I want to say from the standpoint of costing taxpayers more, I don't
know if people have focused on the fact but because AFDC is a federally matched
program, California will lose an estimated $400 million in matching funds at
exactly the time when we certainly need the investment that we can find from
revenues from other sources.
So for the sake of the 7.8 million kids in California, we really appreciate
your airing of this subject and hope that you'll help us let voters know why
this will be so bad for California's children.
Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
you brought to us today.

We also appreciate your input and the statistics that
Children Now has been prevalent in the halls of

Sacramento, always advocating for children and we're going to send you up to the
Secretary of Child Development and Education.
Thank you so very much.

Any questions, Members?
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All right.

We're going to ask now for Genevieve Heron.

Ms. Heron, I think you have

somebody with you that you want to introduce when you come up also.

Genevieve

is an In-Home Supportive Services provider for Frankie Banks and she'll tell you
about Frankie Banks.

Welcome.

MS. GENEVIEVE HERON:
my great aunt.

This is my Auntie Frankie Banks; she's 100 years old,

And she's been living with me since '78.

during 1983; she was 92 at the time she had a stroke.

And she had a stroke

And she has a provider

which is my daughter, I take care of her only at night and I have someone at
home because I'm sick myself.

I've done home-care work since 1959 off and on

and I've been nursing in convalescent homes and hospitals.

And I specialize

with geriatric people.
This Prop. 165 and the devastation that it will have on the older people -And as Frankie, the doctors when Frankie had her stroke -- it was on her left
side and they were very surprised that Frankie recovered, but I think it's
because she was at home and I knew what to do for her and to give her the proper
care because they didn't give her very much chance to survive because older
people don't survive.

And by working with older people in a home and

convalescent homes, I know that it's best for an older person to stay in the
home with their family.

I took care of my mother and father, my grandmothers,

and they do much better in their own home, in their own surroundings, with their
own family and people that can see that they get the proper care.
My mother had a girlfriend just put into the convalescent home.

The

convalescent homes do not provide lotions, they do not provide incontinent pads,
because I had to take it to her.

Her clothes get stolen, they get very upset.

I've seen people come into the convalescent home and a couple of weeks, they'd
be dead -- that's a fact -- because it's not good for them.

And I think the

best thing in the world is for them to have the providers because a lot of these
people, they don't have families and their providers become a part of them,
their life; they are their arms, legs and their sight.

They take care of them,

they take care of their business, they become their children, and they have
somebody to take care of.

In the convalescent homes, in the high sanitariums,

they don't have the personal touch or the personal care.

And these are people

that have given their lives to this country; they helped build this country to
where it is today.

And I think that we do them a very disservice when we don't

provide for them.
Do you have anything to say, Frankie?
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MS. HERON:

No?

Okay.

Did she want to say something?

"No," she said.
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Well, we're just so happy to have you here, Ms. Banks,

and anyone who can survive as long as you is a testament to proper living and
good care.

We hope that you can stay in your home and receive that service.

I understand that cuts in IHSS are going into effect today and that will cut
back some of the hours that -- 12 percent cuts will cut back some of the hours
that the clients will be served, and that's going to have a devastating effect
on many of the clients.

However, to the extent that the family and neighbors

come in, you know, they can kind of close that gap.

But the intention of that

program was to care for people in their homes where, as you point out, they can
be in a mindset to try to get well.

In the familiar surroundings, I think the

studies will show they thrive.
So we're hoping that we can offset in many ways the reduction in fees for
these services but it doesn't look too good right now.

But I'm hoping the next

fiscal year will be a better, more encouraging time for this program.
But thank you so much for coming and we certainly welcome you to stay until
the end of our hearing if you can.

What we have to do is to join together in a

coalition to be sure that 165 is defeated November the 3rd.
out to everybody:

So get that word

We don't want it.

Thank you.
Claire Deffense, Chair of the Area Board X Governmental Affairs Committee.
MS. CLAIRE DEFFENSE:

Hello, my name is Claire Deffense.

a child with a developmental disability.

I'm the parent of

I also chair the Governmental Affairs

Committee of Area Board X, but I'm not speaking for Area Board X today; I'm
speaking for myself and for my son, and I know that there are other parents and
children like us and I hope I speak for them, too.
At the outset I'd like to ask a favor of you and the audience.

My testimony

will contain my story but it's not just my story, it's the story of my son, too,
and he's still a child.

I would ask that you in the audience to please respect

his privacy and use discretion in any retelling of his story.
You've asked about the effect of Proposition 165 on children with
disabilities and their parents.

I've read Proposition 165 and I'm concerned

that it attempts to give the governor virtually unchecked power to repeal or
suspend the laws, such as the Lanterman Act, which have been adopted by the
Legislature to protect children and adults with disabilities.

Proposition 165

will do this by allowing the governor to suspend entitlements whenever the
Legislature fails to adopt the governor's budget and whenever the governor's own
budget estimates are incorrect.

An entitlement is my son's right to receive

treatment for his disability as provided by the Lanterman Act.
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An entitlement

is my son's right to an education as provided by California special education
laws.

Without an entitlement there is no right to services, and generally where

there's no right to services there are no services or they're inadequate
services or there are fewer services.
children.

These services mean the world to our

They provide the opportunity for a normal home life, for an

education, for jobs, and for independence.
In my own son's case, he is at home with me today only because of his
entitlement to services.

Two years ago my son, 10 years old at the time,

experienced a severe behavioral regression.

He was hospitalized for 40 days but

he could not handle being away from me and being sent to an isolation room for
hours on end, and he was released in worse condition.

His old school didn't

want him back and he was refused admittance to every school he applied to.
School and regional center professionals recommended out-of-home placement but
even residential institutions were refusing placement.
school or services, he was getting worse.

Meanwhile, without

The regional center began to

recommend the state hospital.
I knew from experience that he would never recover from another
hospitalization but I was beginning to believe that it was the only option.
Fortunately, we had friends who believed in Renoe.

One was a clinical director

of a children's day treatment program and she finagled an admittance for him.
Another suggested in-home behavior intervention and referred me to an agency.

I

began to get the idea that maybe Renoe could get the services he needed at home.
I will admit that his treatment was expensive.

The first year probably cost

as much as a year in the state hospital, but it worked.

In less than a year he

was able to move to a special education school and his behavior intervention
hours were cut.

The second year probably cost less than half of a year at the

state hospital.

This year he's moved to a public school campus and instead of

behavior intervention he gets only after-school care.

This year will probably

cost less than one-fifth of a year at the state hospital, and there's a good
reason to believe that the next year will cost even less.

He's doing very well

in school and at home and he's back to his normal, happy, cheerful self.
What scares me, though, is the thought of what would have happened if Renoe
had not had a right to treatment.

I had to fight every step of the way to get

the services he needed and won only because he was entitled by law to those
services.

If he had not had the entitlement, he would have been sent to the

state hospital and he would have stayed there.
Now that he's at home I still get scared at the thought that his services
could be cut.

I know that if the entitlement is suspended, the first services
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to be cut will be those to children at home, such as In-Home Support Services.
The theory being that they don't really need the services since they're already
at home.
home.

But without those supports, I'm not sure if I could keep my son at

He needs the structure and I need the respite and the security of knowing

that if anything happens again I can quickly access the right treatment.
I didn't want to end this testimony on a depressing note.

I'm very proud of

my son and very grateful for the services and people that worked for him.

I

want to end this testimony by reading a poem written by this 12-year-old
autistic child.
The man had tears after all his years.
He went to grind grain over near the plane.
He stood to gleam and he started to dream.
He dreamed he heard the stomping of pilgrims' feet
and the bumping of freedom's feet.
Then it all went away and he heard the screaming
of passion's stress and people shot in the
wilderness.
He heard people using strife at the sound of
people locked in chains and people losing their
life.
Then it all went away.
California also has a lot to gain from its people with disabilities.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Thank you so much.

Any questions or comments from

committee members?
How will your son be impacted by the reduction in rates?
MS. DEFFENSE:

The reduction in rates for In-Home Supportive Services?

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MS. DEFFENSE:

Yes.

He receives through the regional center services under

behavior intervention.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Oh, yes.

And you know the plan with the budget that

was adopted is to further regionalize the centers that provide you with the
services.
MS. DEFFENSE:

Right.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MS. DEFFENSE:

How's that going to affect you?

Well, to the extent that they can attract workers at the

rates that they're required to pay, then he may not get the services.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Now, you said your son was in a public school, special

classes?
MS. DEFFENSE:

Right.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

So he does not require special education in a different

institution but he can go to whatever they have in the public school.
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MS. DEFFENSE:

To a special education class in a public school, and the goal

is ultimately to mainstream him so that he will need no services.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Very good.

What kind of transportation services do you

receive?
MS. DEFFENSE:

He gets bussed to the school.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MS. DEFFENSE:

Uh huh.

And how far away from your home is that?

It's pretty far.

They usually are to find the right place.

It's about 10 miles, about an hour.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MS. DEFFENSE:

I live in woodland Hills.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
MS. DEFFENSE:

What area do you live in?
The school is in Northridge.

Thank you so very much.

Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
at Drew Medical School.
DR. LEWIS M. KING:

Dr. Lewis King, who is Dean of the College of Medicine
Dr. King, welcome.
Madam Chairperson and Members, my name is Lewis M. King.

I am Dean of the College of Medicine, Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and
Science.

Simultaneously I am also the Associate Dean for the College of

Medicine at UCLA and a professor at UCLA.
I have served a community for over 20 years situated at the heart of South
Central Los Angeles, better known as Watts.

Our medical center, anchored by the

Martin Luther King, Jr. Hospital, serves a population of 1.6 million people:

44

percent of them Black, 36 percent Hispanic, and the rest, 20 percent, consisting
of Native Americans, white, and Pacific Rim migrants.

These people are

generally poor, 41 percent under the poverty line, relying on the safety net of
welfare and medical benefits for basic survival.

About 81 percent of all

patients at my center are Medi-Cal patients, or have no ability to pay.
My testimony today is directed particularly to the implications of
Proposition 165 for health care of California.
Proposition 165 is based on the premise that basic health care funding is a
luxury ... a luxury over which the governor should be allowed discretion.

It is

therefore, at least on this issue, if not all others, fundamentally flawed in
treating health care for the poor as a luxury.

Health is a right; a fundamental

human right that must never be at the discretion of any individual.
This proposition takes dead aim at poor people, 54 percent of them white.
The mortality rate for poor of all colors with incomes below the poverty line is
approximately 50 percent higher than for others.

For all chronic diseases that

lead the state's list of killers, low income is a special risk factor -- heart
disease, 25 percent higher for low income; cancer; infectious disease; traumatic
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injury and death; increase in disability days, increase in mental health
problems.

Proposition 165, if enacted, would place in the hands of the governor

power to do the following:
1.

To turn off the life support system of 15 percent of California
citizens, or over 45 percent of the patients of my hospital center.

2.

Deny 750,000 patients access visits to care, or at my center 150,000
patient access visits each year to our facility.

3.

Further undermine a very fragile primary care and prevention system
deferring urgent care for the increasing populations of AIDS
patients, substance abuse patients, infectious disease patients,
high-risk pregnancies, trauma and violence, promoting only
hospital-based emergency care.

4.

Promote late diagnosis leading to higher costs for health care
services.

5.

Simply transfer on paper fiscal costs as a magical solution, but in
reality creating greater costs and real human suffering, resulting
in the exhibition of depression, delinquency, disease, and death.

I recall on the April 29 rebellion working with the gangs, and their major
concern was the health care for their mothers and children and their
grandmothers and mothers, and one of the things we provided at the medical
center was health care for these women.

Their constant pain may be in fact the

absence of these services.
A line item reduction of Medi-Cal service costs by any governor will not
only create a community of very ill people but also destroy our medical
education training programs which develop a new cadre of health care
professionals and particularly our network of community-based physicians who
historically have been the only providers of care for the poor.

Even now at

this present time restrictions in Medi-Cal have driven out of practice in South
Central Los Angeles 40 percent of the community-based physicians.

Any further

tampering with Medi-Cal funding will result in almost a complete elimination of
the community-based physician, the bedrock of health care for the poor in our
communities.
Proposition 165 is a narrow, ideologically driven, fiscal control strategy
that demonstrates no concern for real human consequences.

It is the equivalent

of the 1812 British law that declared that "anyone attempting to commit suicide
would be put to death."

It is the equivalent of solving the problems of a

delinquent parent or father who fails to be an adequate parent by giving the
police chief the right to deny his child the right to food.
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The problem is not

the poor; it is the poverty of our leadership.
This proposition, the product of false consciousness, promotes mediocrity
and diminishes the value of humans in a state that has previously been the
standard bearer in the search for excellence and the protector of rights of
every human being to adequate health care.

Health care funding must be stable

and predictable since it deals with issues of life and death.

At the minimum,

i t should be exempt from any continuous tinkering.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

Dr. King, you certainly have a reputation of looking at

our young people at risk.

You have done some research over the years as to how

we validate them by trying to assess their intelligence.

Can you kind of tie

that work in to what you would see as the consequences if this were to go
forward?

We already have had tremendous cuts in the budget already that are

impacting right now and the cuts that impacted last year.

Can you kind of

expand as to behavior and what you see relative to education?
DR. KING:

Thanks for the opportunity, Senator.

One of the things we have seen over the years is the very fragile
institutional structures we have in our communities, dependent largely upon the
safety net of governments.

As we begin to undermine these safety net actions

which support the family structures, which support the historical community
institutions, we further promote the feelings of distrust, fear, and anxiety
among our youth.

And we further promote a cadre of youth who would be relegated

to a particular attitude in their community which sees that some of us are
better prepared and some of us are less prepared.
What you make reference to is my work having to do with how youth are
evaluated and streamed into various groupings at an early age by use of very
common testing instruments which negate their very existence.

Testing

instruments which begin early in life which I'll call "intelligence tests" which
are only based upon the western value system which are defined largely by codes
of a narrow class in this society.
What we do when we undermine this fragile economic base for these youth is
to force them further and further away from opportunity structures to correct
historical destabilization in family structures, in institutional structures, in
economic systems and social structures, in the kind of lifestyles that ought to
be there as a bedrock, as a safety net for these youth.
I can elaborate with more examples but I know your time is short.

But in

essence, if you give the authority to one individual to make such cuts in our
system, what you are doing essentially is giving this individual the authority
to decide on individual life, authority over the rights of individuals, health,
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education, and welfare, and that, in a fundamental sense, is inappropriate and
incorrect.
CHAIRPERSON WATSON:

I keep having to point to the fact that we have two

basic policies in this one proposition.

One would give the governor authority

to declare a fiscal emergency and take over that process, and the other is to
address the welfare program and make these cuts there.

I see them going

hand-in-hand and I just wanted you to bring out your studies that you've been
doing because once we start to destabilize even more so -- I mean, poverty in
itself is a destabilizer, and then not being able to, to just finish this up,
being able to pay one's rent.

It means they're forced out and we don't have

adequate number of housing units as replacement housing so we further
destabilize.
Go ahead, please.
DR. KING:

You emphasize another important point.

One of the issues of my

work over the last 20 years in the community has been how does one overcome
dependency and how do you break into the consciousness born of a dependent
person.

The classic example that I may refer you to is our alcoholism program.

Alcoholism is a problem of dependency.

If you construct treatment models that

are based upon dependency you cannot treat a problem of dependency by
institutions of dependency.

If you continuously erode the possibilities to

develop institutions that remove themselves from dependency, if you erode that
you only create further and exacerbate the problems of dependency.

That's a

very important point to understand.
You can only break in to welfare and education and health issues if you can
break in to the psychological consciousness which emanates out of a poverty
circumstance, and you do that by constructing a net of activity which
facilitates the development of independent institutions which would become the
context for the evolution of consciousness of independence rather than
consciousness of dependency.

And every time you threatened the stability of

funding as these propositions clearly do, you foster another level of dependency
and you begin to reduce the person again to survival at the worst level and
remove the possibilities of them breaking free psychologically and becoming
independent, free citizens which can evolve independent strategies for their own
development and reconstructional reality.
That is the fundamental issue that undergirds these kinds of propositions,
the destabilization, the uncertainties, the indiscriminate cuts:

no one knows

for certain what will happen because their fundamental rights can be threatened
by one single individual.

That is really the fundamental issue.
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON:
what you've been doing.

I appreciate your input on that.

I just wanted to hear

Are there any questions from our colleagues here?

Well, with that, I want to thank you so much for coming down and testifying.
I want to thank the few people who are left in our audience, but I think it has
expanded, our hearing today has expanded our informational base and has really
pointed this proposition up as it should be seen in its true light, and that is
a fraud on the public.

It's just a very mean-spirited grab of the legislative

process on the budget and also the welfare cuts at the expense of our children,
that cynical plan to just cut and cut and cut until we are going to force
youngsters into chaotic situations.
So we have an obligation to defeat this measure and I think this second
hearing today will help us to do that.

And with that, if there are no closing

statements on the part of my colleagues here, I will declare this joint hearing
adjourned.
Thank you.

--ooOoo--
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I have been asked to place California's budget problems and policies in a national
perspective. My comments are divided into three parts:
o
o
o

Causes of fiscal problems
Comparison of taxes and service levels with other states
Policies in response to these problems

Causes of Fiscal Problems
California's fiscal problems are much more severe than those in the typical state. On
the other hand, California has some things going for it that make other states envious.
There are three principal reasons why California is in worse shape than most other
states. Two of these are long-run, and the third is short-run:
1. California must cope with bigger increases in populations to be served than most
other states. California has had unusually large increases in public school enrollment
and immigration. For example, public school enrollment increased 3.4% between
1991 and 1992 vs. a 1.5% increase nationally.
(The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has shown that welfare rolls have not been
growing much faster than in other states, when account is taken of California's rapid
population growth in general.)
2. The fiscal limitations adopted since 1978--especially Proposition 13, the Gann
limits, and Proposition 98--have forced California to get along with much smaller
increases in resources than most other states. The restrictive effect of the limitations
themselves was particularly marked because California was one of the very few states
that avoided a general tax increase in the 1980s.
California has changed from a high-tax, high-spending state to an average-tax, averagespending state. I will elaborate on this point below.
3. A third, less permanent difference is your relative economic performance, which
has been weaker than the national average during this recession. As the Center for the
Continuing Study of the California Economy has shown, defense cutbacks and the
volatile, depressed construction industry account for the unusual severity of the
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recession in California. Longer term, the high cost of living and doing business in
California will be a continuing negative, but on other hand, the traditional strengths of
the California economy and your exposure to the Pacific Rim will probably help you to
out-perform the national economy.
There is one other factor that has contributed to the severity of this downturn in
California relative to other states--the reliance of the state government on a highly
progressive personal income tax. While that income tax structure is laudable from the
viewpoint of equity, it also has the effect of making tax revenue unusually volatile.
This volatility is exacerbated in a downturn by the indexation of the income tax.
Adding it all up, the $14.3 billion deficit in 1991 and this year's $10 billion deficit
were much larger than the gaps in most other states, even taking into account the
difference in the size of state budgets. They were certainly among the largest in the
country. Their relatively large size resulted from many of the factors I have
mentioned--larger than average workload increases, a sharper than average economic
downturn, and the volatility and indexation of the income tax--as well as your indexing
of certain spending programs (like welfare benefits) that are rarely indexed elsewhere.

Does California Have Cadillac Services? How High Is Its Tax Burden?
In 1978, state and local tax revenue per $100 of personal income was $14.62, the
fourth highest in the nation; the national average then was $12.08. In 1990,
California's state-local tax revenue was $11.41 per $100 of personal income--about
equal to the national average, $11.46.
Although California imposes a relatively high personal income tax burden on highincome taxpayers, other taxes are not particularly high. Thanks to Proposition 13,
local taxes are significantly below the national average (although these figures do not
include many of the fees that proliferated in the 1980s):
State-Local Tax Revenue in Fiscal Year 1990

California
Total
State
Local

$11.41
7.50
3.91

United States
$11.46
6.87
4.65

California's tax burden is still not particularly high despite last year's tax increases. I
estimate that in fiscal year 1992 state tax revenue per $100 of personal income in
California was $7.61, while nationally it was $6.95.
Recently I heard Governor Wilson assert on a nationally televised program that
California has a "Cadillac system of government services" in comparison with other
states. Valid comparisons of services among states are extremely difficult to make, but
the Governor's statement is open to question in several respects. While some aspects
of California service levels seem high compared to other states, the opposite appears to
be the case for certain services. Because of the legacy of Proposition 13, California
has had to stretch its resources much more than is common elsewhere.
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Ewmples of low service levels

o

Elementary-secondary schools are probably the most important service for
which states and local governments are responsible, and the average class
size in California is nearly the highest in the country. In the Fall of 1990,
only Utah had a higher pupil/teacher ratio.

o

According to Care of the Mentally Ill: A Rating of State Programs (1990
edition), California's mental health programs are below average. California
was identified as one of the four states where the quality of programs was
deteriorating most. (This study was published by the Public Citizen
Research Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill.)

New Yorkers often look to California as a place that delivers services at much lower
cost than they do. For example, your average reimbursement for nursing homes is half
of that in New York, and the ratio of prisoners to prison staff is also much lower.
Possible examples of high-level services

o

Higher education. California has traditionally had a high-quality, low-cost
(to students, if not to the state) educational system. As a result of fee
increases over the previous four years, the university system in 1991-92 had
tuition and fees that were slightly above average, although community
college tuition and fees were the lowest in the nation.

o

Welfare benefits. In nominal dollars, California benefits are considerably
higher than those in most states, but account must be taken of the cost of
housing, which is also well above average. The Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities estimates that benefits adjusted for housing costs are only
the 17th highest in the country. Another important point is that even in the
most generous state, welfare benefits and food stamps fall well short of the
poverty line.

o

Medicaid. California is among the most generous states in the number of
optional services covered by Medicaid. Elimination of many of the
optional services would not, however, save the state a great deal of money.
While the priority of particular optional services is a valid issue, most of
them may be regarded as desirable because the cost of prevention is often
less than the cost of dealing with an illness after it has worsened.

Can the adjective Cadillac be fairly applied to the general level of services in
California? Not really. No service is more important (and has stronger political
support) than elementary-secondary education, but with such large class sizes California
compares unfavorably to nearly all other states. The broad coverage of the Medicaid
program and the past high quality of the higher education system may warrant the term
Cadillac, but they are not typical of the general level of services.
Spending depends on salaries and the level of employment. A recent study published
by the Center for the Study of the States shows that California has considerably higher
salaries for state and local employees than most other states. The study does not reach
a judgment about the justification for those salaries, maintaining that each state should
compare salaries to those of private sector employees with similar responsibilities (also
taking fringe benefits into account). The relatively high cost of living certainly
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warrants somewhat higher salaries in California than in other states. The key question
is: How much higher?

Policies
There are some important similarities between the policies adopted recently in
California and those in other states.
Nationally, in 1991 and 1992, state fiscal policies can be summarized as follows:

Taxes
There were many tax increases in 1991 and few in 1992. Last year, 34 states
raised taxes, for a total increase of $14.4 billion. This represented close to 5
percent of total tax revenue and is often touted as the largest increase ever
enacted in a single year. That is misleading for three reasons:
o

Two-thirds of the increase was in two states, California and Pennsylvania.

o

Only 12 states raised taxes as much as 5 percent. (In 1983, there were
twice as many.)

o

In real dollars, increases in 1967, 1969, and 1971 were higher.

This year, tax increases were only $1. 1 billion, not counting continuation of temporary
increases ($1.4 billion) and taxes on health care providers ($1.8 billion).
Approximately a half dozen states had large tax increases.

Spending
Little information is available yet summarizing spending policies this year. It appears,
however that the following generalizations can be made about policies adopted in 1991
and 1992.
Spending increased about 5 percent each year.
Three programs--Medicaid, elementary-secondary education, and corrections-accounted for virtually the entire rise.
Higher education was a prime target for cuts: nationally, it received less money
in 1991-92 than in 1990-91. As a result, tuition is soaring.
Welfare was cut in many states, especially ones with relatively generous
benefits. General assistance was hit more often than AFDC.
Gimmicks

Many states, like California, relied in part on gimmickry to avoid the pains of
expenditure cuts or tax increases.
Devices included accrual accounting, delays in local aid, cutbacks of pension
contributions, asset sales (in some cases, to state agencies), unrealistic estimates
of spending or revenues, and plain old fashioned borrowing.
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Taxes on health care providers played a major role in balancing the budget in
many states. The revenue from these taxes can be used as a match for federal
aid.
How does California fit with these national patterns?

California is similar to many other states in several ways:
Heavy reliance on tax increases in 1991 (including higher income taxes on the
affluent) and avoidance of substantial tax increases in 1992
Welfare cuts
Tuition or fee increases for higher education
Partial reliance on gimmicks and optimistic assumptions
Governor Wilson is to be applauded for attempting to force contemplation of long run
trends. Your local government realignment enacted last year was the most far-reaching
change in state-local relations adopted in many years.

Outlook
In my book, The State Fiscal Agenda for the 1990s (NCSL, 1990), I predicted that
states would face a very difficult fiscal environment in the 1990s.
The economy will grow more slowly.
Federal policy will add to state problems, e.g., through mandates.
Demographic developments will cause spending to increase, especially the
growing school-age population, senior citizens over 85 years old, and increasing
immigration.
Courts will force higher spending for schools, prisons, Medicaid, and mental
hospitals.
AIDS and the drug war will become more expensive.
More will have to be spent on children and for adult retraining.
Voters will resist tax increases.
Confronting these problems, states ought to reform spending, taxes, intergovernmental
policies.
The delivery of services must be reformed, increasing reliance on incentives and
markets, giving greater weight to accountability, and targeting resources more
carefully. In cutting budgets, states should be careful (a) not do long run
damage to important institutions and (b) to maintain equity.
Reforms should not just be fiscally driven. I doubt that the best way to design
reforms is in the budget process, especially when dealing with complicated
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intergovernmental issues. The 1990s are a period when bipartisan commissions
can play an important role in developing innovative policies that are difficult to
structure in the legislative process. Such commissions may be able to assemble
reform packages that reflect trade offs and concessions that parties would be
unlikely to accept on a piecemeal basis. Some commissions might focus on
particular problems, but others might be permanent, such as a state Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
Tax systems should be reformed, but tax levels will continue to increase. The
long run budget gaps facing states are so substantial that it is unrealistic and
undesirable to deal with them solely by cutting or restraining spending. From a
national perspective, two obvious areas for California to consider are
broadening the sales tax base and increasing local taxes. California is among
the lowest states in terms of the number of services subject to the sales tax.
In this period of fend-for-yourself federalism, state policies affecting local
governments should be reformed, including reconsideration of sorting out,
reform of aid programs, greater local revenue diversification, and relaxation of
many mandates.
In the years ahead, state and local governments should face up to the need to
restructure their programs. Some useful themes are found in the book Reinventing
Government by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, but the approaches discussed there do
not offer easy answers for the challenges confronting governments.
States have taken a much more prominent role in our federal system as the federal
government has cut back since the late 1970s. They need to rethink many of their
traditional policies in the coming decade, or else the pendulum will swing back toward
greater control by Washington, which can hopefully be avoided.
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GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH
1400 TENTH STREET
SACRAMENTO 95814

STATEMENT OF RICHARD SYBERT, DIRECTOR OF OPR,
REGARDING BUDGET-CUTTING MECHANISMS UNDER
THE TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT (PROP 185)

RICHARC'' SYBUiT

GOOD MORNING, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS.
SYBERT.

MY NAME IS RICHARD

I AM STATE PLANNING DIRECTOR AND THE HEAD OF THE

GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH.

I AM HERE AT YOUR

INVITATION TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE PROPOSED BUDGET-CUTTING
MECHANISMS UNDER PROPOSITION 185, THE TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT ON
THIS NOVEMBER'S BALLOT.

I UNDERSTAND THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OP FINANCE;
THE OFFICE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION.,....ANB THI! DEPARTMEM!f

eF &MPLOVMENT

BE~ELOPMENT

WILL TESTIFY ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE

ACT, SO I WILL CONFINE MY OWN COMMENTS TO A COMPARISON OF THESE
BUDGET-CUTTING MECHANISMS TO THOSE OF OTHER STATES.

AS YOU KNOW, THE ACT WOULD PROVIDE CALIFORNIA'S GOVERNOR WITH THE
ABILITY TO REDUCE SPENDING TO MEET REVENUES WHEN THERE IS A
DEFICIT, AND THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT OR HAS NOT ACTED TO CLOSE IT.
IN CERTAIN DEFINED CIRCUMSTANCES, THE GOVERNOR WOULD THEN BE
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EMPOWERED TO CLOSE THE DEFICIT THROUGH CUTS IN APPROXIMATElY 60/.
OF BUDGET CATEGORIES.

SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THE OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH CONDUCTED A
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF THE FIFTY STATES TO COMPARE THE MECHANISMS
AVAILABLE TO OTHER STATES' GOVERNORS TO REDUCE A DEFICIT.

WHAT WE FOUND, IN A NUTSHELL, WAS THAT CALIFORNIA WAS ALMOST ALONE
IN HAMSTRINGING ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN THIS AREA.

AT LEAST

FORTY -FOUR OTHER STATES GIVE THEIR GOVERNORS MORE AUTHORITY THAN
CALIFORNIA CURRENTLY DOES TO BRING SPENDING INTO LINE WITH
REVENUES.

ONLY 6 OTHER STATES--FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, MAINE,

MICHIGAN, AND NEW HAMPSHIRE--DENY THEIR GOVERNOR SUCH AUTHORITY,
AND AT LEAST ONE OF THESE--FLORIDA--IS WORKING TO CORRECT THIS.

MOREOVER, WE FOUND THAT THE POWERS PROPOSED BY PROP. 166 FALL
ABOUT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RANGE OF SUCH AUTHORITY GRANTED OTHER
STATE GOVERNORS.

IN OTHER WORDS, PROP 165 IS A FAIRLY MODERATE

VERSION OF WHAT IS FAIRLY STANDARD GUBERNATORIAL AUTHORITY.

ONE

MAY ARGUE WHETHER OR NOT, ON THE MERITS, A GOVERNOR SHOULD HAVE
THIS AUTHORITY, BUT IT IS SIMPLY INACCURATE TO CLAIM IT IS UNUSUAL
OR EXTREME.

THE EXTENT OF THE GOVERNOR'S INDEPENDENT BUDGET AUTHORITY VARIES
AMONG THESE 44 OTHER STATES.

AT THE LOWER END, A GOVERNOR IS

PERMITTED TO ACHIEVE MINOR SAVINGS BY REORGANIZING EXECUTIVE
BRANCH DEPARTMENTS.

FIVE STATES--KENTUCKY, MONTANA, NEBRASKA,

ILLINOIS, AND ARKANSAS--GRANT THIS LIMITED AUTHORITY.

AT THE UPPER END, A GOVERNOR IS PERMITTED TO REDUCE ANY
EXPENDITURES NECESSARY TO BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH REVENUES, WITH
FEW OR NO LIMITS AS TO THE BUDGET CATEGORIES THAT MAY BE CUT, AND
TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

20 STATES GIVE THEIR

GOVERNORS THIS KIND OF AUTHORITY, INCLUDING ARIZONA, NEVADA, AND
OREGON.

IN BETWEEN THESE TWO ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM, THE REMAINING 1 9 STATES
GIVE THEIR GOVERNORS A VARIETY OF LIMITED MECHANISMS.

RELATIVELY

CRUDE ONES INCLUDE REQUIRING THAT CUTS BE MADE ACROSS THE BOARD,
AS IN ALABAMA AND GEORGIA; OR THAT CUTS BE MADE UNDER AN AGREED
SET OF PRIORITIES, AS IN ARKANSAS.

IN OTHER STATES, SUCH AS

CONNECTICUT, THE GOVERNOR HAS DISCRETION TO MAKE CUTS UP TO A
CERTAIN PERCENT AGE, OR, AS IN MISSOURI, CAN MAKE CUTS ONLY IN
CERTAIN NON-EXEMPT CATEGORIES OF THE BUDGET.

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY REORGANIZED IN THESE STATES.
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PROP 186 AGAIN IS IN THIS MIDDLE GROUND Of MECHANISMS.

IT WOULD

NOT PROVIDE THE GOVERNOR WITH UNLIMITED DISCRETION AS TO WHERE TO
MAKE CUTS, BUT INSTEAD WOULD ALLOW HIM TO MAKE NECESSARY SPENDING
REDUCTIONS IN ABOUT 601. Of THE BUDGET.

THE OTHER HALF OF THE

BUDGET, INCLUDING DEBT SERVICE, EDUCATION, LOCAL SUBVENTIONS, AND
85/. OF STATE EMPLOYEES' SALARIES, WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM ANY CUTS.
THIS MAY BE CONTRASTED, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH PENNSYLVANIA, WHERE NONE
Of THE BUDGET IS EXEMPTED FROM CUTS; NEW YORK, WHERE ONLY 6.8/. IS
EXEMPTED; OR ARIZONA AND COLORADO, WHERE ONLY EDUCATION IS
EXEMPTED.

I BELIEVE IT IS INACCURATE TO CLAIM, AS SOME HAVE, THAT
PROP. 165 WOULD GIVE THE GOVERNOR UNLIMITED BUDGET POWER.
INSTEAD, PROP. 165 GIVES THE GOVERNOR THE ABILITY, IF HE AND THE
LEGISLATURE CANNOT AGREE ON A BUDGET, AND ONLY If THERE IS A
PROJECTED DEFICIT, TO MAKE CUTS, BASED ON THE THEN CURRENT OR MOST
RECENT BUDGET BASELINE, IN ABOUT HALF OF BUDGET CATEGORIES, AND
THEN ONLY ENOUGH TO CLOSE THE PROJECTED DEFICIT.
QUITE DIFFERENT THINGS.
BUDGET.

THOSE ARE TWO

PROP. 165 DOES NOT LET A GOVERNOR WRITE A

IT LETS HIM CLOSE A DEFICIT ACCORDING TO SET CRITERIA AND

AN ESTABLISHED BASELINE, EITHER WHILE THE BUDGET DEBATE GOES ON,
OR WITH THE CURRENT BUDGET STILL IN PLACE.
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WE ALSO FOUND THAT THERE IS A CORRELATION BETWEEN GREA TEA
GUBERNATORIAL AUTHORITY AND BETTER STATE FISCAL MANAGEMENT.

THE

STATES WHOSE GOVERNORS HAVE SIGNIFICANT OR FULL BUDGET-CUTTING

•
AUTHORITY THIS YEAR HAVE FACED AVERAGE BUDGET SHORTFALLS OF 2.5Y.
OF PLANNED EXPENDITURES, LESS THAN HALF THE AVERAGE 5.7i. SHORTFALL
OF STATES LIKE CALIFORNIA WHOSE' GOVERNOR HAS LITTLE OR NO
AUTHORITY.

PUT ANOTHER WAY, STATES WHOSE GOVERNORS CAN REDUCE

SPENDING WHEN THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT, TEND TO RUN SUBSTANTIALLY
SMALLER DEFICITS.

FINALLY, IN OTHER STATES THESE PROVISIONS ARE OCCASIONALLY
CHALLENGED AS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF
POWERS.

HOWEVER, MOST ARE UPHELD.

THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT SUCH

AUTHORITY IS CONSTITUTIONAL, AND DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS, IF IT IS CONSTRAINED WITHIN BROAD POLICY LIMITS SET IN
STATUTE.

THE TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT APPEARS TO MEET THIS TEST,

AS IT SETS WHICH BUDGET CATEGORIES MAY BE CUT, AND WHICH NOT.

IN SUMMARY, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS, THE BREADTH OF THE
GOVERNOR'S AUTHORITY TO CUT THE BUDGET ESTABLISHED IN THE TAXPAYER
PROTECTION ACT IS COMMON AND NORMAL IN MANY OTHER STATES, AND
GENERALLY PASSES LEGAL MUSTER.

IN FACT, PROP 165 IS A FAIRLY MILD
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VERSION OF SUCH AUTHORITY, FALLING ABOUT IN THE MIDDLE OF SUCH
MEASURES.

THE ALTERNATIVE IS DEFICIT SPENDING, WHICH IS FORBIDDEN

UNDER MOST STATE CONSTITUTIONS INCLUDING CALIFORNIA'S.

PUT

SIMPLY, WHEN THE MONEY ISN'T COMING IN AS PLANNED, AND THERE IS
POLITICAL GRIDLOCK, SOMEONE HAS TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND.

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.

I WOULD BE PLEASED TO

RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS THAT THE CHAIRMAN OR MEMBERS
MAY HAVE.

Governor's Authority to Act on State Budget,
Subject to Guidelines,
in the Absence of Legislative Action
FULL AUTHORITY
can Reduce Budget without Legislative Approval
can Reorganize Departments without Legislative Approval
(20 States)
Alaska
_Arizona
Colorado
Georgia
Hawaii

Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Maryland
Minnesota

Rhode Island
Tennessee
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming

y-Nevada
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
., Oregon

SUBSTANTIAL, BUT CONSTRAINED AUTHORITY
Can Reduce Budget without Legislative Approval
Cannot Reorganize Departments without Legislative Approval
(19 States)
Alabama
Connecticut
Delaware
Iowa
Massachusetts

Mississippi
Missouri
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

Ohio
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas

Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia

VERY LIMITED AUTHORITY
Cannot Reduce Budget without Legislative Approval
Can Reorganize Departments without Legislative Approval
(5 States)
Arkansas
Illinois

Kentucky
Montana

Nebraska

NO AUTHORITY
cannot Reduce Budget without Legislative Approval
Cannot Reorganize Departments without Legislative Approval
(6 States)
California
Florida

Louisiana
Maine

Michigan
New Hampshire

Abstracted from Budgetary Processes in the States, published by the National Association of State Budget Officers.

*Guidelines include percentage caps, categorical exemptions, or proration.

Authority to Cut Spending
Approx%of
Spending Exempted

State

Exempted Categories

Minnesota

0

none

North Carolina

0

none

Pennsylvania

0

none

Alabama

2.4

debt service

South Carolina

2.4

debt service, other items that may be exempted by proviso
in the appropriation legislation
federal and state mandated programs

Delaware
New York

6.8

debt service, pledged revenues associated with bond issues

Georgia

7.0

law enforcement, prisons, mental health

Mississippi

10.3

Medicaid

Rhode Island

28.3

core safety net programs such as cash assistance

Arizona

31.8

K-12 education

Colorado

31.8

K-12 education (partial and if revenues improve)

Connecticut

34.2

direct care programs

New Jersey

34.2

direct care programs

Tennessee

42.1

K-12 education, Medicaid

California
(under Prop. 165)

50.0

debt services, Proposition 98 (R-14 education),
constitutional expenditures, State employees' salaries

Missouri

50.5

K-12 education, higher education, revenue sharing, certain
mental health programs, student financial aid

Iowa

65.6

K-12 education, local aid, entitlements under specified
conditions

Ohio

73.7

human services, education, correction, revenue-generating
programs

Indiana

78.0

military officers and Armory Board, State Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, State Fair Commission, higher education,
local aid

Maryland

79.7

prisons, Medicaid, human resources

Massachusetts

80.3

all program areas are exempt, except allotments to agencies
under the Governor's control

Post-budget cuts were not necessary in 1991 in the other 23 states that give their governors budgetcutting authority.
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THE SYSTEM

Good Morning.

My name is Janis Nielsen and I am here today

representing the League of Women Voters. The League has made the
defeat of Proposition 165 its highest priority this fall. The League, and
its members throughout California are working to educate California's
citizens about the dangerous changes in our system that the enactment of
Proposition 165 would bring.

The League is adamantly non-partisan, we never support candidates, but
we do take strong stands on issues. We have taken the strongest possible
stand opposing Proposition 165. Based on '·the latest Field Poll data,
California voters appear to inclined to agree.

After hearing of the

proposition, 50% indicate opposition, while only 37% support the
measure. The ballot label assigned to Proposition 165 nearly says it all,
"Grants governor const1tut10na
• • l power to reduce certam
· expend'1tures to
balance budget during "Fiscal Emergency".
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Proposition 165 upsets the balance of power between the executive and the
legislative branch.

It destroys our systems of checks and balances and puts

unprecedented, unilateral control of the state budget in the hands of one person.

How does this happen?
Currently the governor submits his proposed budget to the legislature by January
10. Proposition 165 would delay that submission until March 1 allowing seven
fewer weeks for legislative and public scrutiny. If the budget is not passed and
signed by July 1 the governor can declare a fiscal emergency and make cuts in any
area not constitutionally protected: health care, law enforcement, transportation,
family planning, environmental protection, and yes .... education, a point to which
I will return in a few moments.
To understand the real magnitude of this constitutional shift of power you have to
read section 12.2(b) in the initiative. That section clearly indicates that no one can
stop the governor's cuts because the legislative override provision is effectively
eliminated. Section 12.2(b) reads, " Any reductions proposed under subdivision
(a) shall become effective 30 days after the proposal is transmitted to the legislature
unless, prior to the end of the 30-day-calendar period, the legislature passes the
\

budget bill and the bill is signed by the governor".

The League of Women Voters believes that any override of a governor's actions
requiring the governor's approval is no override at all. Indeed, the Department of
Finance testified Monday that they believe that 165's veto override provisions are
in direct conflict with existing constitutional provisions.
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Two weeks ago the League of Women Voters and the PTA unveiled the coalitions
radio campaign opposing Proposition 165.

The radio spots point out the

unprecedented and unchecked powers that 165 would give this and all future
governors. In response the proponents issued a press release calling our spots, 11 a
disgrace ... that blatantly lie to the voters of California. 11 Furthermore, the release
stated that "the legislature can override the governor at any time."

On Monday, after several hours of harsh questioning by both republicans and
democrats, the proponents of 165 were forced to admit the initiative is flawed.
They admitted that the wording that would enable the governor to virtually control
the entire budget process was the result of a technical error, that was essentially
inconsequential.

They further stated that, "the court can disregard the literal

meaning of the language of a law. " The operative word is "can." Maybe the court
can disregard the language. Can we be sure they will?
Initiatives often have a great deal of fine print that we as voters are encouraged to
read. The proponents of this initiative ask us to take a giant step backwards. They
are asking the voters to ignore the fme print and trust that the issue will be
resolved after the election.

I can imagine how most legislators must feel about this. Throughout California's
history, you and the public have had one real weapon against dictatorial powers of
the executive. By a two-thirds vote of both houses, you can tell a governor "NO".

Proposition 165 changes that rule. When its provisions are triggered, you could
override the governor's spending decisions by a 100% vote of both houses, but the
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governor could still ignore your vote simply by refusing to sign the override.
I would think the legislature would be very hesitant to give up their veto override.
Certainly the League of Women Voters has grave concerns about it. We do not
single out one governor on this matter. We do not believe that this or any future
governor should have such immunity from checks and balances.
Even after the budget is passed and enacted the danger continues. Section 12.5
gives the governor the power to declare a "fiscal emergency" anytime the budget
is out of balance by 3% or more. Simple miscalculations by the Department of
Finance could trigger a so called "emergency". We all know how hard fiscal
projections are to make. In 7 of the last 10 years the Department of Finance has
made these miscalculations and since the Director of Finance is appointed by and
works for the governor, the chances of similar miscalculations might increase as
soon as 165 becomes law.
Once again, any override would have to be approved by the governor. Section
12.5(b) reads, "Any reduction proposed under subdivision (a) shall become
effective 30 days after the proposal is transmitted to the legislature unless, prior to
the end of the 30-day-calendar period, the legislature enacts in each house by
\

rollcall vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring,
alternate legislation to bring anticipated revenues and expenditures for the fiscal
year into balance and that legislation is signed by the Governor."

The proponents of Proposition 165 state that governors in 44 other states have
similar authority to keep their budgets balanced. That is simply not true. Despite
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any claims to the contrary, Prop 165 would give the governor of California more
power over the enactment of our state budget than any other governor in the
country.

In no other state has the publics ability to participate in the budget

process been so limited and the legislative override provision been eliminated.

Returning to education funding for a moment, assertions that Proposition 165 does
not affect the level of school funding are misleading. Proposition 165 does not
expressly exempt school funding from spending reductions as stated by the
proponents. All of the discretionary money above the Proposition 98 guarantee
could be cut by one person alone. It allows the governor to unilaterally reduce
funding while still complying with the provisions of Proposition 98. This past year
the governor proposed to cut education funding by $2.3 billion, an action he could
have taken unilaterally had 165 been the law. And of course, higher education is
not protected at all.

The governor claims that this initiative would give him and all future governors a
powerful incentive to improve legislative action. In truth, this initiative would give
the governor's own party an incentive to delay the process so that their own leader
could ultimately define the budget, perhaps ignoring public priorities.

Why

compromise when you can have it all?

Although he proposed the initiative, the issue here is not Governor Wilson. This
constitutional amendment will give this and all future governors virtually unchecked
power. The governor remains in control of the budget process from beginning to
end. We fear the chilling effect on regulatory agencies and independent boards and
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commissions whose budgets depend on the whim of the governor alone.
We are familiar with our current governor and past governors, but what about
governors in the future. What would happen if a particular governor disagreed
with strict oversight of the nursing homes that care for our elderly, or for tight
enforcement of our environmental protection laws or our worker safety laws?
The proponents of 165 like to focus the discussion on the welfare aspects of this
initiative.

165 does nothing to strengthen the already worn safety net for

California's 1.5 million poor children and their families. It provides no additional
job training, child care services or health care for the working poor, and does not
address the inadequate supply of jobs in California. Talking about welfare just gets
us off the main subject of this initiative ... a consolidation of power in one person.

The League of Women Voters fully recognizes the disenchantment and frustration
Californians feel with the budget and legislative process. We share that frustration
and constantly work to enact legislation that will make the process more efficient.
We are confident that when the public learns the true content of this initiative, that
they will not be seduced by the welfare provisions and will vigorously reject the
unprecedented and dangerous new powers 165 would put into the hands of one
\

person.
This is a constitutional amendment. Californians will take a great risk of losing
our checks and balances if they support this initiative and gamble on a court
decision. If this initiative wins and goes to court, it will be the taxpayers who foot
the bill for a change in wording that never should have been there in the first place.
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If it wins and doesn't go to court, we will have sacrificed public and legislative
participation for unchecked gubernatorial power. The only way for Californians
to win is to oppose 165.
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PROPOSITION 165.

BUDGET PROCESS.

WELFARE.

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE
INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND STATUTE
statement of Dr. Naomi Caiden, Professor of Public Administration,
California State University San Bernardino, before the Senate
Health and Human Services Committee, Senate Committee on Budget and
Fiscal Review, and Assembly Ways and Means Committee, Los Angeles,
Thursday, October 1 1992.
1.
I should like to thank the committees for the opportunity to
be here today and to testify before them on Proposition 165.
I am
currently Chair of the Department of Public .1\dministration at
California State University San Bernardino.
I have taught,
researched and written on public budgeting in a wide variety of
contexts for over twenty years.
For the last four years, I have
been the editor of Public Budgeting and Finance, a quarterly
journal for academics and practitioners.
2.
Proposition 165 seeks to amend the Constitution of the State
of California to augment the powers of the governor in the budget
process.
It would allow the governor to declare fiscal
emergencies during which ha would have unlimited authority to make
increases or decreases in the budget.
If passed, this proposal
would contravene the
separation of
powers
and
substitute
dictatorial executive power, without contributing to the democratic
resolution of conflicts, informed realistic and productive budget
debate, or resolution of the current California budgetary crisis.
3.
At the heart of the proposal is the power of the governor to
declare a "fiscal emergency" in two sets of circumstances and to
take certain actions during that emergency.
Both the
circumstances and substantive powers granted to the governor allow
him or her unilateral, virtually unchecked power.
First, the
provision to allow the governor to declare an emergency if a new
budget has not been signed by June 15 each year gives the governor
discretion when to call an emergency.
A budget may have been duly
passed by a two-thirds majority of the legislature, but if the
governor chooses not to sign it, he or she may declare a fiscal
emergency. Each year the decision is up to the governor.
Second,
the governor may declare a fiscal emergency during the fiscal year
if revenues are 3 percent below budgetary forecasts or expenditures
are 3 percent above budgetary forecasts, or each is 1.5 percent
below or above forecasts respectively.
Apart from normal
forecasting difficulties, particularly for revenues, forecasts are
notoriously easy to manipulate since they are not firm figures but
estimates, opening the possibility for deliberate under or over
estimates, and thus triggering declaration of fiscal crisis.
4.

Once a fiscal crisis has been declared, the governor has power

to change the budget.
In both cases, the legislature cannot
override the governor, even if it musters two-thirds rna j or it y,
since the governor's signature is required.
Thus, the governor's
version necessarily prevails, his or her priorities stand, and the
state of fiscal emergency continues, until the governor's agreement
is obtained.
The legislature cannot override the governor who,
during the fiscal emergency, has complete power to put into place
his or her own budget priorities.
The cards are stacked: in this
arrangement the governor cannot lose.
5.
Where similar unlimited powers over the budget are granted to
the executive in other countries, these are checked by the Cabinet
system of government.
The executive is dependent on retaining a
majority of the legislature, and if it loses a vote on the budget,
it has to resign.
There is no similar provision in a separation
of powers system, where executive power is independent of the
legislature, and the two branches of government share powers and
check each other.
Proposition 165 embodies the worst of both
systems, allowing the executive unlimited power over the budget,
without reciprocal power by the legislature to vote it out of
office.
6.
Other provisions of the proposition are clumsy and possibly
counterproductive.
The suspension of salaries if the budget is
not passed by June
15
is a
collective punishment,
more
characteristic of a colonial relationship than modern democratic
institutions, and which provides even more leverage for an
irresponsible minority.
The furlough and salary cut provisions in
case of budgetary imbalance during the year single out non-contract
employees, would have unpredictable results on programs, and would
probably adversely affect morale.
7.
What are the problems the proposition ostensibly seeks to
remedy?
They may be briefly inferred as
(a)
budgetary
irresponsibility;
(b) automatic· (auto-pilot) spending;
(c)
failure to reach agreement;
(d)
budget imbalance.
The
proposition, if passed, would not solve any of these problems, and
would probably worsen them.
(a) Budgetary irresponsibility is likely to increase:
the
governor is given unilateral power over the budget, while the
legislature which constitutionally holds the power of the
purse, may be ignored, even if it can muster a two-thirds
majority.
Neither has an incentive to responsible behavior.
The governor already has considerable budgetary power, notably
a line item veto.
(b) The proposition excludes the major areas of automatic
spending which are protected by the constitution, with the
exception of the welfare area.
It therefore does not prevent
automatic increases in spending in these areas, and provides
an
incentive
to
protect
more
expenditures
through
constitutional means, further reducing flexibility.
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(c) The proposition would shorten legislative debate on the
budget by about two months because presentation of
he
governor's budget would take place in March instead of
January.
The reduction of time for debate would make gaining
agreement more difficult, rather than easier.
In any case,
the governor would have no incentive to try to reach agreement
since the executive could impose its will by unilateral fiat.
(d) The proposition would not cure budget imbalance, which is
related to substantive political and economic issues that
cannot be resolved by gimmicks.
The failure of the GrammRudman legislation at federal level exemplifies the poverty of
this approach.
Giving more power to the governor, bullying
the
legislature,
and
complicating
processes
through
mechanistic measures,
does not substitute for reasoned
analysis and debate toward the understanding and resolution of
problems.
8.
In conclusion, Proposition 165, if passed, would not achieve
its ostensible aims.
It would result in a dangerous transfer of
power to the governor, allowing unilateral implementation of
executive priorities.
And it would contribute to a worsening of
the
budgetary
climate,
making
agreement,
compromise,
and
responsibility more difficult to achieve.
It would be better at
this time to facilitate budgetary agreements by making it easier to
pass budgets through the removal of the two-thirds majority
provision, than to incre~se budgetary conflicts and submit to the
vagaries of arbitrary power that our constitution is designed to
prevent.
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CALIFORNIA CONGRESS OF PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND STUDENTS, INC.
930 Georg1a Street • PO. Box 15015 • Los Angeles. California 90015
(213) 620-1100 • FAX (213) 620-1411

My name is Diane Brahams and I am the Community Concerns Advocate for the California
State PTA. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today.
The California State PTA is strongly opposed to Proposition 165. No single issue on the
ballot could be more devastating to education, as well as other services to children and
families, than Proposition 165. And no single issue could be more devastating to our
traditional American system of checks and balances in government.
While the proponents of this measure want the public to believe education is protected from
cuts, this is simply not true.
As you know, Prop 98 provides only the "minimum guarantee• of funding for schools.
Because of a strong-commitment to public education, the state has provided, until this year,
funding above the Prop 98 minimum. If prop 165 becomes law, during a Governor declared
"fiscal emergency" the governor would be able to cut education down to the Prop 98 level.
As we learned this year Prop 98 does not truly protect education. If prop 165 becomes part of
our Constitution the Governor will have new unilateral power over the budget to further erode
Prop 98 funding by cutting the base on which it is predicated.
What would that mean? Well, earlier this summer Governor Wilson proposed $2.3 billion in
education cuts. Under Prop 165 he could have single handed made those cuts. He also
could have prevented 110,000 little children from starting kindergarten this year.
All of that could have happened without any provision for legislative override. And without
violating or manipulating Prop 98.
Budget funding levels are always based on estimates of General Fund revenues, personal
income, school enrollment, and property taxes. As part of the "fiscal emergency" language in
the initiative, the Department of Finance, appointed by the Governor and the determinants of
the revenue calculations. could re-calculate the Prop 98 funding level, at any time, to lower
than when the budget was adopted. Nothing in Prop 165 prevents the Dept. of Finance from
declaring, as part of the fiscal emergency, that their earlier estimate of the Prop 98
guaranteed was in error. Therefore, the Departments over estimated budget calculations will
have caused an apparent ·over-funding• of public schools. The Governor would then be free
to cut school funding to the Departments newly calculated Prop. 98 minimum level and still
stay within the Constitutional Language of Prop 98.
Another way that education funding could be hurt under Prop 165.
If, during the budget deliberation , the legislature casts a two-thirds vote to suspend Prop 98,
there is then no limit to what the governor can cut from the education portion of the budget in
a "fiscal emergency,· because the education funding would no longer be protected.
Although budget cuts are always harsh, these cuts would be particularly devastating because
they would occur during the middle of the year. Classes would be eliminated. Teachers
would be laid off. And children's lives would be painfully disrupted.
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I am a member of PTA because children are my first concern. But as a citizen of California 1
am also concerned about good government. And, simply put, Prop 165 is bad government
and violates American Constitutional principals.
Although this year's budget battle was the worst ever, there was eventually a negotiated
solution between the Legislature and the Governor. And the Legislature stood firm behind
education.
Under Prop 165, why bother electing a legislature? Their ability to override the governor is
eliminated because the language of the initiative clearly states the governor must "sign" the
budget.
Earlier this week the proponents of 165 asked the citizens of California to ignore this exact
language in the initiative, assuring us the courts would straighten this, and I quote •technical
error:
This is not just a technical error, it is a major revision in the Constitution! We are asking the
governor to withdraw his support of Proposition 165. The citizens of California should not
have to rely on the courts or pay for an expensive legal proceeding to restore our system of
Constitutional separation of balance of power.
Prop 165 gives one person too much power over the state budget. No one governor,
Democrat or Republican, should have that much power to hurt education or placed his or her
priorities above the will of the people.
our public schools are too important. Our children are too important. That's why the
California PTA is strongly opposed to Proposition 165.

Text of prepared testimony given by

Bishop Phillip F. Straling
Diocese of San Bernardino
before the
California Senate Health and Human Service Committee
California Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee
California Assembly Ways and Means Committee
California Assembly Intergovernmental Committee
on Thursday, Oct. 1, 1992, regarding

The Government Accountability
and Taxpayer Protection Act
(Proposition 165 on the November 1992 California General Election Ballot)
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OOD AFfERNOON. MY NAME IS PHILLIP F. STRALING. I AM A Catholic
bishop with jurisdiction over the counties of San Bernardino and Riverside
making up the Catholic Diocese of San Bernardino. I also serve as the vice-president of the California Catholic Conference.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and discuss the
concerns of the California Catholic Conference with Proposition 165, the welfare- and
budget-reform act.
As I begin my testimony I would like to context my remarks against the
realities of our current economic and social scene in southern California. I feel it is
essential to do so, for too frequently in today' s world we rush off to solve major problems
lacking both knowledge and understanding. The result of our ill-conceived action then
compounds our problems and further jeopardizes all our well-being.
The major problem that we see with Proposition 165 is that it represents a
series of ill-conceived solutions to major social and economic problems of our day. It
appears that those who developed Proposition 165 did so based on myths and stereotypes
that ill serve the seriousness of the issues addressed. Further, lacking both knowledge and
understanding of the real issues, Proposition 165 would, if passed, produce immeasurable
suffering in the lives of the most vulnerable members of our society, poor children. At
the same time, it would deliver a mortal blow to effective government in our state.
Permit me to share with you my concerns in the first area mentioned. The
premise of Proposition 165 is that California's budget problems are being created, in part,
by an uncontrolled growth in welfare triggered by a benefit that is making California the
U.S. Mecca for people who don't want to work. I wonder, if those who developed
Proposition 165 have been following the news recently or have any memory of recent
history. News headlines daily give us information of the worse economic recession to hit
southern California since the Great Depression. Perhaps they have been too quick to forget
the devastation of the industrial base in the early '80s that turned cities and towns in Ohio
and Pennsylvania into ghost towns and produced one of the largest in-country migrations
from the Northeast to the West and Southwest. Or perhaps, they don't remember the
unprecedented foreclosures and land sales that dislocated thousands of farm families in
the mid-' 80s. Obviously, they remember nothing of the of the savings-and-loan collapse
-
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coupled with one of the worse banking crises in our history, a collapse that is continuing
to have a particularly adverse effect on the building industry throughout California.
Perhaps, they choose to forget the great tax giveaways of the '80s that have created the
worse income gap between rich and poor in our country since records began to kept in
this area. And finally, perhaps, they fail to realize that the Cold War ended and approximately 20-plus percent of California's thriving economy of the '80s is fast disappeanng.
l wonder if they ever read the newspapers:
• The story of Sept. 3, 1992, in the San Bernardino Sun, that had the
Commerce Department reporting that income growth, adjusted for inflation, declined by
1.9 percent in 1991, the worse decline on record going back to 1970.
• Or. the story of Aug. 12. 1992, Los Angeles Times, that reported that in
cities with populations of 100,000-plus, more than one-fourth of the children are living
in poverty; that approximately 10,000 American children "die of poverty'' each year. In
the county in which I live, San Bernardino. the figure is 34.4 percent. The story concludes
that. "Children are the poorest citizens in California and are suffering the consequences."
• Or, the headline of Sept. 26, in the San Bernardino Sun, that read, "Job
picture the worst in 10 years."
Yes. California has some serious economic problems. contributing to some
very serious social problems. And yes, these problems are placing severe strains on the
fiscal well-being of the state. But, I think based on the evidence available to us that it is
safe to say that the major causes of the state's fiscal problems are a changed world
economy coupled with a changed world political reality. These factors coupled with the
short-sighted, greed-oriented and failed economic po~icies of the '80s need to be addressed
if we are to rebuild our national and state economy. I fail to see how any responsible
person could blame the economic tragedy of the '90s on helpless children. Seventy percent
of the recipients of AFDC in California are children - 1.6 million children. Of this
number, 200,000 are infants. Or blame it on unemployed workers trying to hold a family
together, or the aged, blind and/or disabled.
Yet that in fact is what Proposition 165 would do - punish these groups
as though they were the cause of our problems. Proposition 165 would, if passed.
immediately reduce welfare benefits by 10 percent, and in six months, if the adult member
of the family did not find work, benefits would be reduced an additional 15 percent. This
would be in addition to the benefit cuts that will be experienced by most beneficiaries
within the next month as a result of the this year's budget resolution. A family of three
would have combined benefits- AFDC and food stamps- reduced to $751 a month
or $9.012. a year. Using today' s poverty line of $11,570 for a family of three, that family
would be made to Ii ve at 79 percent of that which is established by the federal govern mcnt
as barely sufficient for a family's survival. Further the benefit would be frozen at that
level for seven years. If the present economic crisis continues for another two or three
-
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years, that family in 1995 would be living with an income level equivalent to 60-65 percent
of the established poverty line. In a state where many AFDC families are already spending
in excess of 50 percent, some as high as 70 and 80 percent, of their income for shelter
reductions of this nature would serve only to increase the ~\ready unacceptable number
of homeless families, as well as insure the destruction of many more innocent young lives.
Further, these cuts would make the quality of all of our lives unbearable and surely,
hamper any real possibility of any economic revival in our state.
I could go on in this area for much longer but I honestly feel that we alL at
least those of us in touch with the human faces of poverty in our streets, are sufficiently
pained by present circumstances without imaging the horrors to come if the short-sightedness and mean-spiritedness of Proposition 165 is adopted.
Proposition 165 is not satisfied with wrecking havoc in the lives of poor
children, their families, the aged and disabled. Proposition 165 would reconstruct our state
government by effectively destroying the balance of powers between the legislative and
executive branch of governments. It would, if passed, vest the equivalent of absolute fiscal
power in whoever sits in the governor's chair. This would essentially destroy the systems
of checks and balances designed by our forefathers and mothers as a safeguard for our
democracy. Short-sighted and myopic thinking on the part of the proponents of 165 would
jeopardize the established processes of good government designed to insure that the
common welfare of all people is served by a balanced representative government.
Recently, we Catholic bishops of the United States published a statement
titled, Putting Children and Families First- A Challenge for our Church, Nation and
World. Our motivation in issuing this statement is captured in the opening paragraph:
"'Our nation is failing many of our children. Our world is a hostile and
dangerous place for millions of children. As pastors in a community deeply committed
to serving children and their families, and as teachers of a faith that celebrates the gift of
children, we seek to call attention to this crisis and fashion a response that builds on the
values of our faith, the experience of our community, and the love and compassion of our
people.''
Further, in the same statement, we advance a criteria for national policy. I
think, this criteria could serve us well in California. I will conclude my remarks this
afternoon by applying this criteria to our state:
Our great state of California must move beyond partisan and ideological
rhetoric to help shape a new consensus that supports families in their essential roles and
insists that public policy support families, especially poor and vulnerable children. In
pursing this goal we as a state should advocate for policies and programs that:
• Put children and families first.
• Help. don't hurt, families and children.
• Insure that those with the greatest need get the most help.
• Support policies and programs that empower families to meet their respon-
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sibilities to their children.
• Fight economic and social forces which threaten children and family life.
• Build on the strengths of families, reward responsibility and sacrifice for
children.
While I find myself unable to see any real value in Proposition 165 by way
of fashioning a response that will enhance the well-being of poor children, their families
or. for that matter, any segment of our society, let me state categorically the defeat of
Proposition 165 is not our exclusive goal. It is not our goal to embarrass any political
personage or party. Our goal, looking beyond the defeat of Proposition 165, is to impel
all to build with one another a society, state, nation, a world with a clear priority for all
families and children in need.
Thank you.

References
For those interested in reading further into the scenarios of a post Proposition 165 world I would strongly recommend any or all of the following:

Welfare Reform and Children's Well-being, issued by Stanford Center for
the Study of Families, Children and Youth.
Harder Times: the Working Poor and Wilson's Welfare Cuts, by Casey
McKeever.

Beyond Rhetoric;: the Facts About Poverty and Welfare in California, and
the Government Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992, by Marcia K.
Meyers, MPA, and Sally Brown, MSW.
Transferring the Burden, Delaying the Cost, an analysis of the Government
Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act, by the San Francisco Department of Social
Services.
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Governor Wilson has proposed a ballot initiative, Proposition 165, which will be
on the November ballot. While the proposal claims to help taxpayers and children, it
will not In fact, it will seriously harm the poorest and most vulnerable children in
California, could have adverse consequences for the well-being of more well-off
children, and will cost taxpayers more in the long run.
Millions of children who receive state services in any area from education to child
abuse and neglect prevention could be affected by the proposition's dismantling of the
constitutional checks and balances in budgeting. In addition, 1.5 million children -one in five children in California - will be affected by the proposal because they live in
families which receive Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). AFDC,
commonly known as welfare, is a federally mandated program run by the state. The
program was set up as a transitional safety net to help families, mostly single mothers
and their children, to get through financial crises such as divorce, unemployment, or
illness. Cost of living adjustments to AFDC grants were signed into law by former
Governor Reagan as an inflation buffer. The key features of the proposal follow:

Budeetary chanees:
• Move the introduction of the budget by the Governor from January 10 to
March 1, and maintain the July 1 deadline for legislative approval.
•

Allow the Governor to declare a fiscal state of emergency if a budget is not
passed and signed by July 1 or whenever state revenues drop 3% below
projections.

•

Give the Governor, during a fiscal state of emergency, the authority to
reduce spending on programs not specifically protected by the constitution.
The reductions would automatically go into effect unless the Legislature
passes a budget within 30 days and it is signed by the Governor.

AFDC chanees:
• A 10% cut from Jan. 19921evels in AFDC grants (from $663 to $597 each
month for a family of three);
•

An additional 15% cut ($597 to $507 per month for a family of three) after 6
months unless the adult recipient is unable to work;

•

Denial of additional benefits for children who are conceived while either
parent is on AFDC;

•

One year of lower benefits to families who move to California from other
states;

•

A $50 monthly bonus to teen parents if they stay in school, but a $50
reduction in the grant if they drop out of school;

•

Elimination of special assistance for poor women pregnant with their first
child.

ST
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In addition to the aspects of the initiative that affect children, there are several other important
features:
•

Cost-of-living reductions after 1996 for the elderly, blind and disabled
under the Supplemental Security Income program-- SSI;

•

Elimination of the duty of counties to provide general assistance benefits for people
with no other means of support, including disabled persons who are awaiting approval
of their SSI applications.

This fact sheet outlines ten reasons Californians should oppose this proposition.

#1:

The proposition is anti-child.
Children make up 70% of all people on AFDC in California and they are the ones who will
bear the consequences of this proposal. In most cases the plan would cut Aid to Families with
Dependent Children grants by 25% from January 1992levels- from $7,956 annually for a
family of three to $6,084. Even with the additional food stamp money available, a grant of this
size leaves a family with only $8 a day to house, clothe and feed each child

#2:

The proposition gives the Governor unprecedented powers over the lives
of California's children.
Children's programs make up the majority of the state budget Under the "fiscal state of
emergency", the Governor will have sole authority to cut these, or any other, programs.
Because revenue projections are done by the Governor's own Department of Finance, it is
very easy for him to create a fiscal state of emergency. The Legislature cannot even override
the Governor's veto of a budget bill that it passes during a fiscal state of emergency. This is
the ultimate violation of the constitutional system of checks and balances.

#3: This proposition is based on myths about Aid to Families with Dependent
Children.
Governor Wilson has described California as a welfare magnet for people from other states and
countries. In fact, a much greater cause of the growth in the number of people needing
assistance is the condition of the economy. A recent state-by-state analysis by the nonpartisan
Congressional Budget Office found that all of the "growth spurts" in AFDC since 1973 have
occurred during periods of economic decline. In the current recession, California's welfare
rolls have not grown as fast as other states' rolls. In 1990, California's population grew faster
than 47 other states while its welfare rolls grew faster than 29 states. Five western states -with benefits about half of California's -- all had greater AFDC growth rates than did
California.
Most families on AFDC are not recent immigrants. The nonpartisan Legislative Analyst,
through a study of the birthplaces of children on AFDC, found that families do not move to
California to take advantage of higher grant levels. In addition, undocumented persons are not
eligible for welfare, and only 3% of California's AFDC recipients were on welfare in another
state.
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Also, most families on Aid to Families with Dependent Children are small and on welfare for a
short time. The typical family has one parent and two children and 90% of recipients have
three or fewer children. Most AFDC recipients go off aid within three years.
#4: The proposition punishes children when their parents cannot find jobs -- a
particularly harsh measure in this recessionary job market.
California has lost more than 600,000 jobs since May 1990. It is unrealistic to expect
unemployed parents to find jobs after 6 months, while the state is losing jobs. This proposal
penalizes children for the current economic conditions when their parents do not have adequate
job opportunities.
#5: Although the proposition claims to help taxpayers, it will have minimal
impact on the state's budget problems and will cost taxpayers more in the long
run.
The AFDC program makes up only 6% of the state's general fund and the estimated $700
million in welfare savings that would result from the governor's proposal represents less than
2% of the total general fund. While these grant cuts will have a minimal impact on the budget
shortfall, they will have serious long-term effects on children and taxpayers.
Such sudden income reductions can have devastating effects on a child's health, educational
success, and psychological well-being. Society will end up paying more later for this neglect
in the form of higher health insurance premiums, higher prison costs, lost productivity to the
economy, and higher costs of training undereducated workers. This proposal will clearly
undermine the Governor's other preventive initiatives in preschool education and teen
pregnancy prevention.
#6: There are more sensible alternatives for dealing with the state's budget
problems.
Solving the state's budget problems by giving one person the sole authority over the state
budget is undemocratic and a serious threat to important children's programs. There are other
sound alternatives. The California State Commission on Finance has identified $21 billion in
tax expenditures which could be eliminated to generate needed revenues. For example, limiting
business meal and entertainment deductions to 50% would save the state $225 million and
eliminating oil company tax loopholes would bring in another $2-300 million. Streamlining the
state's many health programs and recouping the $3 billion in uncollected child support
payments are also crucial parts of the solution.

#7: The proposition will cause California to lose millions of dollars in badly
needed federal matching funds.
Because the federal government helps finance the A.FDC program, California will lose an
estimated $400 million in federal matching funds if this proposal is adopted. At a time when
the state economy is weak, it is important to bring in as much outside money as possible to
stimulate growth. In addition, since more recipients will now tum to county-operated aid
programs, this proposal in fact shifts costs from the federal government to the counties which
face severe budget shortages and will simply be unable to find the dollars.
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#8: The proposition will lead to more hunger and homelessness among
children.
Currently, AFDC grants do not cover a family's basic needs. Rental housing costs alone in
most urban areas of California are higher than the entire AFDC grant, leaving no money for
food, clothing and other basic necessities. If Prop. 165 passes, it is estimated that 170,000
more children will be hungry and 95,000 families will become homeless. After a 4.4%
reduction in AFDC grants was imposed in 1991, the Hamilton Family Shelter in San Francisco
had to turn away an average of 439 people every month. This is a 395% increase over the
months preceding the grant cut

#9: The proposition claims to bring about welfare reform, but doesn't.
Simply cutting grants will not result in more people going to work, as this proposal suggests.
The most effective ways to put people back to work are to help create jobs, train people for
them, and stimulate the economy. Access to affordable health care and child care are also
necessary before people will be able to work. Programs such as GAIN (Greater Avenues for
Independence) provide people with job training and education so they are better equipped to
find jobs. In addition, better enforcement of child support payments from absent parents is a
crucial pan of any strategy to keep people off welfare. Better collection of child support can lift
families out of poverty and off welfare and prevent them from going on welfare in the first
place.

#10:

The proposition appears to violate constitutional protections.
The provision to require a family needing assistance to wait one year before receiving full
California benefits probably violates the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Several Supreme Coun decisions have found other such residency requirements to be
unconstitutional.
In sum, this proposition represents the single most harmful anti-child measure
in recent memory. The initiative hurts the state's children by upsetting the
constitutional checks and balances in state budgeting and by dramatically
reducing AFDC grants. Because children cannot vote or represent themselves
in this public debate, they need every Californian to become educated about
the harm in this proposal. We all have a responsibility to protect children's
interests as these decisions are made. We urge aU voters to oppose this
measure and ask candidates to do the same.
For more information on the No on 165 Campaign
NOON 165
980 Ninth
16th Floor
Sacramento, CA 95814
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Deadline for Submission of Governor's Budget to the legislature and
legal Source of Deadl;ne
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of the governor's budget is constitutional. By statute, agency budget requests
must be submitted to Joint Budget Committee by November 1.

~
l
j.

l
~.

!

l

I

2.

Colorado -

Date listed is for final submission.

3.

Connecticut -

In even years, budget is due on first day of session.

4.

Florida -

Budget must be submitted to the legislature at least 45 days prior to regular
session.

5. Hawaii -

~.I
3

6.

~,

Indiana -

I,,.
7. Kansas -

~

l·:J

l':J

Agency budgets are due November 1.

Budget must be submitted to the legislature 20 days prior to the session.
Budget document that is submitted one ·or two weeks prior to the session does not
necessarily reflect budget message that is given sometime during first three weeks
of session.
On or before eighth calendar day except in the session following election of a new
governor, in which case budget must be submitted on or before the 21st calendar day.

8.

Kentucky -

Budget must be submitted by tenth legislative day; newly elected governor submits by
fifteenth legislative day.

9.

Maine -

legislature convenes in December prior to first session. Budget is due no later
than Friday following first Monday in January. In years with a new governor, budget
is due no later than Friday following first Monday in February.

10. Michigan -

long-range capital budget, 30 days.

11. Mississippi -

The governor's budget must be submitted to legislature by November 15, except in
first year of a governor's term, when the deadline is January 31.

12. Nebraska -

On or before January 15 of each odd-numbered year.
has until February 1 to submit budget.

13. New Jersey -

New governor allowed one month or more.

14. New Mexico -

Statutes provide later date (twenty-fifth legislative day), however; legislature
traditionally receives budget on first day or at pre-session conference of standing
finance committee.

15. North Carolina-

By custom.

Governor in first year of term

(No statutory or constitutional provision.)

16.

North Dakota -

11. Ohio Oklahoma -

Budget must be submitted on the first day of session in January.

19.

Oregon -

Budget must be submitted on December 1; if new governor, february 1.

20.

South Dakota -

Not later than the first Tuesday after the first Monday of December.

21.

Utah -

Submitted within three days after start of session; confidential copy submitted to
fiscal analyst 30 days prior to session.

22.

Washington -

By December 20 prior to January's annual session; 20 days prior to any supplemental
session.

West Virginia -

Within ten days, odd-numbered years .and the first day of session, even-numbered
years.

Wisconsin -

Convening date is determined by scheduling resolution while budget submission date
is statutory. (Usual time difference has been about two weeks.)

Wyoming -

On or before December 1 of the year preceding the year the legislature convenes in
budget session.

25.

~

{I:J
~

If new governor, by March 15 (approximately 75 days after convening).

18.

. 23 •

t~

Budget submitted to legislative Council only on December 1; rest of legislature
receives by third day of session.

Source:

N.C.S.L.

Amount of Time Legislature/Committee Has to Consider Budget

State

Arkansas
Cal1fornia
Colorado
Connecticut

Number of Weeks from
Time Governor Submits
Budget Until the End
of Legislative Session/
Fiscal Year legislature
Has to Consider the Budget

28
20
N/L
Odd Year - 17
Even Year - 13

12
?

!

Delaware
22
Florida
~
i -Ge.: . .;o: . .;.r-'!-g-i-ia:;;..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,,.;..4
Hawaii
15
Idaho
N/L
Illinois
N/R
Iowa ___________13 - 155
KentucK,y
8
louisiana
NIL
Maine
9
~Ka_n_s_a_s

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
Hew Hampshire
New Jersey
Hew Mexico

Odd Year - 12_ _ __
Even Year - 9
7
15
5 - 6

9

N/L
N/R

~-N~/~L

rrMa~r~y~l-an-dr----------------10

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Number of Weeks
Appropriations/
Finance Coamittee Has to Consider the Budget

15 -

15 - 20

1 6 l~
!

Long Sess. - 20
Short Sess. - 14
20
14

5- 6
48\ - - - i0
5

26
37

16

Var~ie-s~y-----

15.

jig___

Long Sess. - 20
Short I~il· - 14
12
16

20
20
20
Odd Year - 8 - - - Odd Year - 8.5
Even Year - 8
Even Year - 3
Hew York
10
10
North Carolina
20
20
Variesl6
VarieslY
North Dakota
8- 10
-Ohio
20 - 22
Oklahoma
24
12
Oregon
Incumbent Governor - 32 Incumbent Governor - 26
New Governor - 24
New Governor - 24
18
8
Rhode Island
14
10 - 12

Number of WeeKs from
Time Governor Submits
Budget Until the End
of legislative Session/
Fiscal Year legislature
Has to Consider the Budget

State
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
Was hi n'ton

12 -

Number of WeeKs
Appropriations/
Finance Cormaittee Has to Consider the Budget

22
12

4 - 8
6 - 7

N/l

House - 8 - 10
Senate - 10 - 12

i

!8
8

3

Wisconsin
~u~~~~--------------------------------~12
nYOmlng

1/2

6

12
12 - 16

------------------------~~~1~0~----------

KEY: N/l - No limit

N/R - No response

NOTES
1.

Alaska -

Budget to.be submitted December 15, legislature
convenes second or third Monday in January, regular
session limited to 120 days.

2.

Alaska -

Theoretically, the entire session, but recent
practice is for the first body to pass the General
Appropriations Bill for the operating budget by the
90th day of the session.

3.

Colorado -

The Joint Budget Committee begins budget
considerations in early or mid-November and
introduces a budget bill several weeks prior to the
end of the legislative session. This occurs in
March or April in most years.

4. Georgia -

This includes a one-week recess for budget hearings.

5.

Iowa -

Until the end of the session; late April - even
years; early May - odd years.

6.

Iowa -

Tech'nically, from the time the governor delivers the
budget message until the end of session.

7. Kansas -

Consideration of "regular" appropriations bills is
subject to self-imposed schedule and varies
accordingly "The budget," as a whole, is typically
considered throughout the session and the wrap-up or
"omnibus" bill is often the last or nearly last bill
to be enacted.

123tL

8.

Louisiana -

9. Maine -

Typically, both House and Senate committees have
approximately 4 weeks each.
In each legislature's first regular session
(odd-numbered years) until mid-June. "Current
services" budget is passed usually by April.

10. Maine -

In first regular session, Appropriations Committee
receives "current services" and "supplemental"
budgets in January. Each, of course, must be
finalized by mid-June (statutory adjournment).

11. Minnesota -

Conference committee can and does meet until day of
adjournment in odd-numbered budget years.

12. Mississippi -

In the first year of a four-year administration; in
the second, third, and fourth year, the legislature
has 12 weeks to consider.

13. Mississippi -

In the first year of a four-year administration; in
the second, third, and fourth year, the committee
has 11 weeks to consider.

14. Montana -

Eight weeks in joint subcommittee; three weeks
additional to complete in House Appropriations
Committee.

15.

Sixteen to 18 weeks available but committees
typically use 10 to 12 weeks for formal
deliberation.

New Jersey -

16. North Dakota -

The governor submits his proposed budget to the
Budget Section of the legislature at its
organizational (2-3 day) session in December of
every even year. The legislature goes into session
on the first Tuesday in January of every odd year.
The 1987 session completed its work on April 19,
1987 - 105 calendar days.

17.

The first house usually has until the 31st
legislative day to consider the budget. The second
house usually has until the 48th legislative day to
consider the budget. Conference committees made up
of members from both houses often work on the budget
to the last legislative day.

North Dakota-

18. Texas -

The regular session is limited to 140 calendar days,
beginning the second Tuesday in January of
odd-numbered years. The fiscal year begins on
September 1. If the budget is not adopted in
regular session, the governor would call a special
session (30 day-limit).

19. Texas -

No specific limit, but the House and Senate usually
have passed their bills by the 15th week (105 days)
to allow fQur or five weeks for the work of the
12~

conference committee and final passage of the
general appropriations bill.
20.

Wisconsin -

Until June 30 or "upon passage of budget."

21.

Wyoming -

Generally hold hearings for four weeks prior to the
start of the session. A fifth week is spent in
hearings, reviewing budget action already taken, and
finalizing appropriations for preparation of
appropriations bills.

APPENDIX 3.
Source: N.C.S.L.
~-

~:f

Provisions or Procedures to Finance the Current Operations of
State Agencies Until Passage of the Appropriations Act(s)

r..i

State Has Provisions or
Procedures to Finance
the Current Operations
of Agencies Until Passage of the Appropriations

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arfzona
Arkansas
ca11 forn1 a
· Colorado
Connectrcut

:'

t
~

Act(~)?

- ~--· - -- -

De 1aware--~- ..

FTorlda
Georgia
Hawati
1dallo -Jlltnois
lnd ana
Iowa
Kansas

Kentucy--~

louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Mlcfiigan
Mlnnesota

:t~~!~~tp~

Montana
~

t-J

C..'l

- ----

·-·-·--~·

Continuing
Resolutions

Current
Year
Levels

Other

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
N/R
N/R
N/R
- ----lf/R
No 1
Yes--------------------------------~x~---------------No
N/R
N/R
N/R
Nl[
No 2
X
No
No
No
· - ---- -Yes
x3_
No4
Nos----------------------------------------------------No
No
No

~~6-----------------------------------------------------

No

State

State Has Provisions or
Procedures to Finance
the Current Operations
of Agencies Until Passage of the Appropriations
Act(s)?

Continuing
Resolutions

Current
Year
Levels

Nebraska
Neviila
New- Himpslil re
New Jers~,Y____ __
Hew Mexlco
New York
North-taroHriaNorth Dakota
Ohio

Other

No
No
Yes
.x
No ..
No - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : - : - - - - - - - - - - Yes
X
Yes
x
No
--------No
Oklihoma
No
Oregc:m__________
Ye~
. X
·. Pennsylvania ---- ----- ----- --ves
Rflo<le Is 1and
Yes
---x
south-taronna
No . .
South-Dakota - -------- · --------- ---No 0
Tennessee
No - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Texas
No
Utah
No
Vermont
No~
flrjfnta
No~-----------------------------------------------Nashington
No
West Yirglnla_____ ----- --- - -No
- ------Nt sconslri
-------------ves
-----------------·- ----x
Wyoming
No

TOTALS
N/R = No response

~

(~

~1'1

~

No•39;

Yes=~;

N/R=2

3

6

J·

lo

'"

·'

f·.

~·

•

!'

...

NOTES

~

~
j

I.

Georgia -

There are two exceptions: 1) payment for debt service (General Obligation Bonds)
is continous; and 2) dedicated revenue for the Department of Transportation would
be available to be spent by that department.

2.

Indiana -

The state has a very limited "Emergency Contingency Fund" ($5-$6 million), which in
very rare circumstances may be used at the discretion of the state budget agency.

1

3.

louisiana -

No specific provisions.

r

4. Maine -

No General Fund appropriations; although this situation has not occurred in Maine,
dedicated revenue funds could be allocated by "financial order."

.

5. Maryland

Budget must be enacted; otherwise session cannot adjourn sine die .

,,F.
~~
~

>

•f

~·
~

"'i
~

~

i.'

~

l':J

~

6.

Missouri

Except for payment of the public

7.

New Mexico

In FY83/84, the state discontinued the use of a continuing resolution within the
Appropriations Act.

8.

South Dakota -

Appropriations always are completed by the first week of March, the new fiscal year
starts on the following July 1.

9.

Virginia -

Since a biennial process is used, failure to amend the Appropriations Act during a
short session simply would cause the previously adopted budget to prevail.

d~bt.

APPENDIX 4
STATE BALANCED BUDGETS:
CONSTITUfiONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
GUBERNATORIAL AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Stat~

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Governor
Governor
Ug/s/a/Urt!
must sign a
must mbmit a must pass a
bafanctrd
balant:ffl
May carry
balanctrd
0~ d~jiclt
budgt!t
budgt!t
budgt!t

Alaltlal ............
Alulla ••............
Arizona •............
Arb- ...........
CallforDia ...........
Colomlo ...........
Conn«tkat .........
DelaW11re ...........
florida .............
Geoflll .............
Hawlll .............
Idaho ..............

IUiaola ...•..........
India...............
loW11 ...............
ICIMII .............

Kentedly ...........

Louisa• ............
Maine .............
Marylaad ..........

;i
R

(')

§
2:

0
....

en

e
B

0

0

~

3

a

n

::I

.....

Massadlaeethl .......
Mklllpa ...........
Mln-aa ..........
Mtfllllsttppl ..........
MIS!Oari ............
Montaaa ............
Nebraska ...........
Ne•ada .............
New Hampshire .....
New .Jereey •.........
New Meldco. . . . . . . . . '
New 'fork ..........
Nortll Carolla1 ......
Nortll Dakoll .......
Ohio ...
······
Oklahoma ..........
Oreco• ............
Pennsylnnla ........
Rhode Island ......
Soutll Carolina ......
South Dakota .......
Tenneseee ..........
Tnas ..............
Utah ...... ......
Vennoat ............

In

w

U\
U\

Sec footnotes at end of table.

~
l·~

C"l
~

c,s
s
c
s
c
s
c
s
c
c.s
c
c
c
c
c
c,s
c.s
s
c
c
c
s
s
c
c
c
s
s
c
c
c
c
s

c.s
s
c
s
...
c
s
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
s
c
c
c
c
s
s
...
c
c
c
...

(5)

(s)

c,s
c
c,s
c

c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
.. .

(w)

c
c
s

...

c.s
c
s
. ..
c
c
s
c
c.s
c
...
c
c
c,s
s
...
c
c
s
c
...
...
.. .
c
...
(p)

s
c
c
c
s
c
c
c
c
s

...

...

*• (b)
.

..

*
...

...

...
...
...
...
...

.. .
. ..
...
...

•

...
. ..
.*. .

...
. ..
...
...
.*. .

Gubernatorial Authority
Can rtrdua
Go!H!nlor budg~t without RestrlctlotU
htu lin~
on budg~
l~lslat/v~
Item veto
approval
rt!ductlotU

*•

•*•
*
*
*

•*
*
**
...
*

•

*
.*. .

...

*

**
**
**

. ..

*

•

*
...
...

.*..

...
...
.*. .(v)

*
*
...
*
*
*
*
*

...
...
...

*

**

••*
...
*
* (e)

* (f)
*
**

...

*
*

*
...
.*..
*
*
...
*
**
* (m)
. ..
*
...
* (n)
** (q)
(o)

•*
*
*

**
**
**
*
*
*

ATB

...
(c)

ATB,MR

*
MR

•

ATB

...
...

. ..

ATB
MR (h)

*

MR
ATB (I)

...
...

MR
MR

...
MR
...
...
*
...

I.Lglslatlv~

Votrs rt!quirtrd
to ovurid~
gubematorlal

lnt:rt!tut!

budg~

Majority
Majority elected
Ill elected
314 elected
213 elected
Majority present
Majority present (d)
Majority elected
Majority
Majority

213 elected
213 elected
31' elected
Majority
2/3 elected
2/l elected
213 elected
211 present
213 present
(lc)

Majority elected
Majority
Majority elected
Majority
Majority
Majority elected
Majority elected
2/3 elected
Majority elected
Majority

Majority elected(&)
Majority
3/S elected
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority present
l/2 elected

2/3 present
213 elected
2/l elected
2/3 elected
2/3 elected

Majority
Majority elected
Majority elected
213 elected
Majority elected

2/l elected
3/S elected
213 elected
213 elected
2/l elected

Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority (r)
Majority elected
Majority
Majority
Majority elected
Majority
Majority

2/3 present
213 elected

ATB

211 elected

(u)

...
ATB

...
...
ATB
(x)

Votes fY!tiUirtrd
to pass

Majority
Majority elected
1/2 elected
l/4 elected
2/l elected
MaJority present
Ma ority present (d)
l/' elected
Majority
Majority

111!10

(q)

ATB

Votes nquirtd
to pass nv~nu~

Majority elected
:J/4 elected (a)
213 elected
Majority elected
2/l elected
2/3 elected
2/l elected
3/~ elected
211 elected
2/l elected

...

...

Authority

l/~

2/l
2/l
2/3
liS

elected
elected (t)
elected
elected
elected
present

213
213 elected

Majority elected
213 elected
2/l elected
213 present

2/3 elected
Majority elected
Majority
Majority
Majority

(j)

Majority
Majority (I)
Majority elected
Majority elected
Majority
Majority elected
Majority
liS elected
Majority
Majority present
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority

(r)
elected
(t)

elected

Majority elected
Majority elected
Majority elected
Majority
Majority

STATE BALANCED BUDGETS-Continued
Constitutiont~l

State

Govttrnor
must Sllbmit a
balanced
budget

Vlrpala .............
Wuld111toa .........
West Vlralnla .......
WIKoasla ...........
Wyomlna ...........

s
s
c
c

11nd St11tutory Provisions
ugislaturt
Governor
must sign a
must pass a
May carry
balanced
balanced
over deficit
budget
budget

...
c
c
c

...
c
c
c

Gubern11torial Authority
Can reduce
Governor
budget without Restrictions
on budget
legislative
has lint
approval
reductions
item veto

(y)

...
...
...
...

Souree: N;uional Association of State Budaet Orfi"n, Bud(ttary Processes in the States (July 1989);
updated April 1982 by The Council or State Governments. Update renects literal readina or state constitutions and statutes.
Key: C · Constitutional
S - Statutory
ATB - Across the board
MR · Maximum reduction dictated
•- Yes
. . . -No
(a) Joint session.
(b) May carry over "casual deficits," i.e., not anticipated.
• (c:) Governor may redu" budaets or administration-appointed qencies only.
(d) Must have quorum.
(e) Budaet reductions are limited to executive branch only.
(f) The Governor and elected cabinet may redu" the budaet. The reductions must be reported to the
lqislature and advi" as to proposed reductions may be offered.
(J) If aeneral fund expenditure "ilina is exceeded, 213 vote required; otherwise majority of elected

members.
(h) Reductions allowed only to aet back to a balanced budaet.
(i) Oovernor may expend funda up to one year. Certain restrictions apply to ATB reductions.
(j) For emeraency enactment, 2/J votes required.
(k) Governor has no veto power over the budaet bill, but vote or 3/S elected required to override veto
on other bills.
(I) For capital budaet. 2/3 votes required.
(m) May reduce appropriations by IS perant ex"pt debt service, leaislative and judicial branch ap-

SOURCE:

~

t-J

'i

•

•
•

•

•

•
•
•

'(aa)

MR (z)
ATB
ATB (aa)

...
...

Legislative Authority
Votes required
to override
gubernatorial
veto

2/3
213
2/3
213
2/3

present
elected
elected
present
elected

Votes required
to pass revenue
increase

Majority elected
Sl 'It
Majority
Majority present
Majority

Votes required
to pass
budget

Majority elected
sI 'It
Majority
Majority present
Majority

propriations, school foundation proarams, and salaries of elected officials.
(n) May not redua debt servi".
(o) May redua budaet of aaencies under Governor's control only.
(p) Technically, the Governor is not required to sian a balanced budset, however, in order to consum·
mate the sprina borrowina the Governor must certify that the budaet is in balance.
(q) May redua budaet without approval only for state operations; only restriction on reductions is
that reductions in aid to localities cannot be made without leaislative approval.
(r) Emeraency measures and measures that amend a statute that has been referred or enacted throush
an initiated measure within the last seven years must pass both houses by a 2/3 majority .
(s) There is no constitutional or statutory requirement thai the Governor submit or the leaislature enact
a balanced budaet. There is a constitutional requirement thai theleaislature provide surficient revenues
to meet s\ate expenses. The Governor is required by statute to examine monthly the relationship between
appropriations and estimated revenues and to reduce expenditures to prevent imbalance.
(t) Emeraency measures require a 3/4 majority for override. Budget bills usually require Emergency
Clauses and therefore require 213 vote for passage.
(u) Governor recommends a biennial budget that is subject to legislative approval.
(v) May carry over deficit into subsequent year only.
(w) Formal budaet submitted by Budaet and Control Board, not Governor.
(x) May not chanae legislative intent when reducing budaet.
(y) The Constitution specifies that expenditures shall not exceed revenues at the end of the biennial
period.
(z) The Governor has power to withhold allotments or appropriations, but cannot reduce leaislative
appropriations.
(aa) May reduce spending authority.

Council of State Governments, BOOK OF THE STATES:

1992-1993

Source:

N.A.S.B.O.

Gubernatorial Budget Authority and Responsibility
MustPruenz
llalmtced
Buds_et

Sl4k
Alabama
Alaab
A.rizoM

Atkanaa
California
Colorado
~

Del&ware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

DWioi•
IDdiaaa
Iowa

Kulu
Kealuclcy
Louiliau

\faine
\farvland
duaach~Ue~U

dicb.iga.o
.tilme.at~~

.{iaaiuippi
.(isaouri

oioalalla
februb
icmcla
..... Hamplb.in:

...,J_

lftf Mexi<:o
lnr York

lorlh Carol.iDa
lonh Dakota

lbio
ltlahoma
'regon

eaasytvuaia
bode b1ud
outh Carolina
ausb Dakoca

eDI
.lab

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

-·
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Must Sign
Bai.anced
Bud~et

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

•

Line Item
Veto

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

Lee_.

Aee.roval

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

'ilcODiiD
IICftO

JUco

X
X

-·
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

I.e&_. Ae.e.roval

RulrictioM
on Budget
Reductiof!S

X

ATB

withouz

X

x•

X
X
X

-·
-·
X

X

x••
x•
X

X
X
X

X
partial•
X
X
X
X
X

x•

x••

MR.
X
MR.

X

ATB

x•
X
X
X

X

X

ATB
ATB
MR.

ATB

X
X

X
X

X

MR

X

X
X
X

-··
-·
-·

•••

X
X

X

MR.
X
MR.

X

irJinia
'eaV"qinia

Reduce Budget

X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X

x•
x•
x•

X

X
X
X

-··
x••

...

_

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

ermolll
~~

Spend Uruvuictpa~ed
Fetkral Funds
wlo I.e~: Aeeroval

X

X
X
X
X
X

•
X
X
X

Reorganize
wlo

De~

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x••

x•
X
X

....
ATB

x•

X
X

X

ATB,MR

x•••
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

x•

X
X

ATB
X
MR.

X
X

ATB

X
X

ATB

X

ATB .....Aci'OIII-Che-board cuta only
MR .•. Jdaximum reduction dictated

OOia:

SOURCE:

4
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APPENDIX 6.
Executive Authority to Cut the Enacted Budget

State

No
restrictions 1

Alabama

Can cut
only across
the board

Maximum
percent
reduction

Must consult
with the
legislature

Other

X

Authority

Constitutional: Amendment No. 26

Alaska

X

Statutory: AS 37.07.080 (g) (1) and (2)2

Arizona

X3

None3

X4

Arkansas
California

Biennial legislation
None

Colorado
5%6

Connecticut

xs

Constitutional: Article X, Sec. 16
Statutory: C.R.S. 24-75-201.5

x7

Statutory: Sec. 4-85
PA 91-3 JSJ (Sec. 20 and 46)

xs

NoneS

Hawaii

X

Constitutional: Article Ill, Sec. 16

Idaho

X9

Constitutional and statutory

Illinois

xto

Indiana

X

Delaware
District of
Columbia (N/R)
Florida (N/R)
Georgia (N/R)

xu

x12

N/R
Statutory: 4-12-1-12

State

No
restrictions 1

Can cut
only across
the board

Iowa

X

Kansas

xB

Maximum
percent
reduction

Must consult
with the
legislature

Other

Authority

Statutory: Chap. 8.31
xt4

Statutory: KSA 75-6704 (across-the-board)
and KSA 75-3722 et. seq. (other)

Kentucky

5%15

Louisiana

to%16

xt7

N/R

25%18

xt9

Statutory: State Finance and Procurement
Article, Sec. 7-213

x2o

Constitutional: Article V, Sec. 20
Statutory: 18.1371-18.1372, 18.1382, 18.1384,
18.1391-18.1392, 18.1395, and 18.1453;
Michigan Compiled Laws

x21

Statutory: 27-104-13 and 31-17-123

Statutory: 48.130

Maine (N/R)
Maryland
··Massachusetts (N/R)

X

Michigan

Minnesota (N/R)
Mississippi
Missouri

x22

Constitutional: Article IV, Sec. 27
Statutory: Sec. 33.290 RSMO
15%23

Montana

Statutory: Sec. 17-7-140
None24

Nebraska
Nevada
~
f~

00
~

New Hampshire

x25

Statutory: NRS 353.225
x26

Statutory: RSA 9: 16-a
Fiscal Committee: RSA 14:30A

State

No
restrictions 1

Can cut
only across
the board

Maximum
percent
reduction

Must consult
with the
legislature

Other

Authority

New Jersey (N/R)
X27

New Mexico
New York

Constitutional: Article VII, Sec. 2

X

North Carolina

X

North Dakota

x29

Ohio

x28

Constitutional: Article VIII, Sec. 1
Statutory: Title I, Vol. 2, Chap. 126.08
Constitutional: Article 10, Sec. 23

X

Oregon

X30

Pennsylvania

X

Statutory: Executive Budget Act,
General Statutes 143-25
Statutory: 54-44.1-12 and 54-44.1-13

X

'Oklahoma

Constitutional: Article IV, Sec. 30

__ 30
Constitutional: Article IV, Sec. t631

Puerto Rico (N/R)
Rhode Island

X

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
~

tv

to

Utah (N/R)

X

X32

N/R
Statutory: Appropriations biD

X

SDCL 4-8-23

X
X

X33

Constitutional: Tenn. Code Annotations,
Article 3, Sec. 18

x34

Constitutional: Article 16, Sec. 69
Statutory: Chap. 317, Government Code35

No

State

restrictions 1

Can cut
only across
the board

Maximum
percent
reduction

Must consult
with the
legislature

Other

X36

Vermont

Authority

Statutory: Appropriations· bill

Virginia (N/R)
Washington (N/R)
x37

West Virginia

Statutory: WV Statutes 5A-2-20 to 5A-2-22

X38

Wisconsin
X

Wyoming

Statutory: Sec. 16.50 (5)
Constitutional and statutory

N/R: No response.
·.Notes:

,.......
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0

1. No restrictions

Executive can cut selectively or across the board in all areas, without consulting the legislature.

2. Alaska

A court decision puts this authority under question.

3. Arizona

Although the governor has unilaterally reduced state spending, there is some question about his legal authority to do so (Arizona Legislative Council
memo, June 22, 1982). In practice, the legislature has usually approved reductions exceeding 1 percent of expenditures, through amendments to the
original general appropriations bill.

4. Arkansas

The governor must make cuts according to the guidelines established by the legislature in a bill passed every two years concerning the distribution of
funds.

5. Colorado

Sec. 24-75-201.5 requires the governor to take the following steps when a revenue shortfall occurs: ( l) formulate a plan for reducing general fund
expenditures so that the general fund reserve does not fall below one-third of the 3 percent reserve (or below one-half of the 4 percent reserve
beginning with the 1992-93 fiscal year); (2) promptly notify the General Assembly of the plan; (3) promptly implement the plan usill$ procedures
available under Sec. 24-2-103,24-30-206, 24-50-109.5, and any other lawful means; and (4) transfer general fund money from the capttal construction
fund to the general fund (and restrict capital construction proje(..1s) if the s.overnor's plan reduces general fund expenditures by at least 1percent of
the total amount or general fund appropriations for the fiscal year. (Dcta1ls of these procedures are contained in a memorandum dated :september
12, 1991, from the Colorado Office of Legislative Legal Services to Senator Ted Strickland.)

6. Connecticut

Five percent of an appropriation or 3 percent of a fund.

7. Connecticut

The Appropriations Act of 1991, Sec. 20, authorizes secretary of the Office of Policy and Management to reduce other expense accounts by
$.33,064,213 and allows the governor to reduce agen(..)' allotments to achieve these savings without regard to statutory limits on his authority to do so.
Sec. 46 requires the governor to submit a plan to reduce allotments within 30 days of a comptroller's report that projects a general fund deficit of
more then l percent of general fund appropriations.

8. Delaware

No specific statutes detail how deficits are to be handled. It has been the practice in the state, however, for the governor lo require agencies 10
reduce their spending when revenues are short.
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9. Idaho

The governor can, by executive order, reduce agency allotments as necessary. Reduction of legislative and judicial budgets requires permission of
those branches of government. Legislative concurrence is not required.

10. Illinois

With respect to executive agem:y operations and capitai.

ll. Illinois

Two Ia~ t~is year direct the governor to establish formal_re~rves: (I) early retirement: $50 million in savings; up to 1.5 percent of the agency's total
appropnatwn but not more than 5 percent from any one hne ttem and (2) FYJ992 Emergency Budget Act: reserve up to $350 million with specific
amounts established by agency but not program or line items. Both are repealed July l, 1992.

12. IUinois

To pass laws and allow reductions in grants and agencies not under control of the governor.

13. Kansas

Effective July 1, 1991, the governor has new authority to cut across the board, with certain limitations, to restore the state general fund estimated
year-end balance to not more than $100 million.

14. Kansas

As interpreted by the attorney general's opinion, law allows the governor to reduce appropriations as he sees fit (no legislative or judiciary
reductions), but only to the extent that cuts would result in year-end zero balance. In the two instances where such reductions have occurred, budget
reductions were sanctioned by appropriations acts that permitted the lapse of funds.

15. Kentucky

Five percent of budget. If revenues are up to 2.5 percent below official estimates, branch heads are authorized to reduce spending to the extent funds
are available in the budget reserve fund and the general fund surplus account. If the revenues are 2.5 percent to 5 percent below official estimates,
an enacted reduction plan is implemented, which includes application of budget reserve funds and general fund surplus account resources prior to
other budget reduction actions. The law is silent on shortfalls greater than 5 percent.

16. Louisiana

Ten percent of a budgetary unit.
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Louisiana

Appropriations for certain retirement programs and minimum foundation program for education may not be reduced.

18. Maryland

Twenty-fiVe percent of any item of appropriation.

19. Maryland

These items may not be reduced: appropriations for payment of interest and retirement of state debt; appropriations to the legislature, public
schools, and the judiciary; and salaries of public officers during term (Maryland Statutes, Finance and Procurement Article, Sec. 7-213). Salaries of
merit system employees may be reduced through the secretary of personnel.

20. Michigan

The following may not be reduced: expenditures of the legislative and judicial branches and funds for constitutionally dedicated purposes (Michigan
Constitution of 1963, Article 5, Sec. 20).

21. Mississippi

The governor can cut selectively up to 5 percent. After all agencies are cut up to 5 percent, then additional cuts must be equal and uniform.
Authority for cuts exists in two statutes. Under one statute, cuts are initiated at the governor's discretion. The governor, by another statute, is
required to cut if revenues fall below 98 percent of the estimate after October.

22. Missouri

If revenues do not meet projections used when the budget was passed.

23. Montana

Fifteen percent of the budget. The governor may not reduce apfropriations for ( 1) interest and retirement of state debt; (2) legislative branch; (3)
judicial branch; (4) school foundation program, including specia education; and (5) salaries of elected officials during their terms of otrtce.

24. Nebraska

The governor has no legal authority to reduce appropriations, other than administrative controls that may be applied to agencies under the
governor's direct control, to mana~e spending. However, he can request agencies to reduce their expenditures, and he can enforce that request for
those agencies where he has appomted the department head. Only the legJslature can reduce the appropriation to an agency by amend~ the
appropriation during a regular session or special session called by the governor.

25. Nevada

The governor may set aside a reserve of any amount in agencies of the executive branch from general funds appropriated or any other funds available
to the agencies.

26. New Hampshire With prior approval of the Legislative Fiscal Committee for executive branch appropriations only.
27. New Mexico

Executive may order the limitation on expenditures for agencies only under his direct control. The judicial branch, universities, and public schools
operate separately. The legislature is the only entity that can actually reduce appropriations levels.

28. North Carolina

The governor also may transfer money from reserve funds and revert capital improvement appropriations. He may not reduce the principal and
interest payments on bonds and notes of the state (Constitutional: Article Ill, Sec. 5 (3)).

29. North Dakota

The executive branch can cut across the board without consulting the legislature except when the budget reduction is the direct result of an initiative
or referendum action.

30. Oregon

An opinion of Oregon's attorney general has concluded that, given a projected revenue shortfall, the executive department may reduce allotments to
prevent a deficit during the current biennium but not a future biennium. This "new" power has not been used, the governor choosing to call special
legislative sessions to deal with two subsequently projected deficits in 1982. Projected deficits for 1993-95 have raised the issue again for the 1991-93
biennium.

31. Pennsylvania

Budget Reform Code requires a balanced bud~et. The only way a deficit could occur is if revenues do not reach earlier estimates. Because of the
balanced budget requirement, there is no reqUirement as to what the governor and/or legislature must do should a deficit situation occur (governor
has line item veto).

32. Rhode Island

Appropriations for the general assembly and legislative agencies may not be reduced (Rhode Island Statutes, Sec. 35-3-16).

33. Tennessee

The governor may call a special session to deal with a deficit.

34. Texas

The Legislative Budget Board must approve.

35. Texas

The governor may plead for agencies to reduce spending and/or call the legislature into special sessions to cut appropriations or propose cuts (not to
exceed 10 percent) using constitutional and statutory budget execution authority. The governor's proposed cuts, using budget execution authority,
requires Legislative Budget Board approval.

36. Vermont

However, the governor may control the rate of expenditure~ state agencies through his allotment powers. In so doing, he may reduce an allotment
if he determines that a lesser amount than was appropriated ts required. But he has no statutory authority to unilaterally reduce appropriations in
order to balance the budget.

31. West Virginia

In order to balance the budget, the governor may make equal and pro rata reductions in all appropriations out of general revenue. Legislative and
judicial branches do not have to participate in cuts but usually do.

38. Wisconsin

Following budget enactment, if previously authorized expenditures are determined by the secretary of administration to exceed available revenue-but
by less than 0.5 percent of the total general fund appropriations for the year-the secretary may unilaterally take action to adjust agency expenditures
(except for aid programs) to meet the revenue shortfall. If estimated expenditures are expected to exceed available revenues by more than 0.5
percent or total appropriations, then the governor is required to submit a bill to the legislature to correct the imbalance.

Source: NCSL survey of the National Association of Legislative Fiscal Officers, Autumn 1991.
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Chairpersons and Members:

My name is Lewis M. King. I am Dean of the College of Medicine, Charles R.
Drew University of Medicine and Science, situated in the heart of south central Los
Angeles, in an area known as Watts. our medical center, anchored by the Martin
Luther King, Jr. Hospital, serves a population of 1. 6 million people; 44% Black, 36%
Hispanic, and the rest, 20%, consisting of native Americans, white and pacific rim
m1grants. These people are generally poor, 41% under the poverty line, relying on
the safety net of welfare ( 33%) and Medi-Cal benefits ( 64%) for basic survival.
About 81% of our patients are on Medi-Cal, or have no ability to pay. My testimony
today is directed particularly to the implications of Proposition 165 for health care
of California.
Proposition 165 is based on the premise that basic health care funding is a
luxury ... a luxury over which the governor should be allowed discretion.

It

is

therefore at least on this issue if not all others fundamentally flawed in treating
1

1

1

health care for the poor as a luxury. Health is a right, a fundamental human right
that must never be at the discretion of an individual.
This proposition takes dead aim at poor people, 54% of them white.

The

mortality rates for people of all colors with incomes below the poverty line is

approximately 50% higher.

For all chronic diseases that lead the state's list of

killers, low mcome is a special risk factor (heart diseases -

higher f.::>r low

income, cancer, infectious diseases, traumatic injury and death, mer ease in
disability days, increase in mental health problems) . Proposition 165, 1f enacted,
would place in the hands of the governor, power to: ( 1) turn off the life support
system of 15% of California citizens, or over 45% of the patients at our King/Drew
hospital; ( 2) deny 7 50, COO patients access visits tc care, (or 150, 000 patients access
v1s1ts each year to our facility); ( 3) further undermme a very fragile pnmary care
and prevention system deferring urgent care for the increasing populati::m of AIDS,
substance

ab~Jse,

infectious disease, high risk :)regnancies. and tn.uma -=tnd

violence, promoting only hospital based emergency care;

1

4)

promote late dL1gnosis

leaC.in<;' to higher costs for health care services; ( 5) simply transfer on paper fiscal
costs as a mag1cal solution, but :;.n reality creating greater costs and ::::-eal
.;u:fering, resultinq in the exacerbation of depression, :::1elinc::uency,

:l '_lman
-=tnd

:~isease

death.
;::., line item reduction on Medi-Cal service costs by any governor ·.vul n:>t ·:>nly
create

community of very ill people, but also destroy our medical educatiJn training

~)rograms,

and our network of community based physicians, who histJncally have

been the only providers of care for the poor.

Even now, at this present time.

restriction in Hedi-Cal has driven cut of practice in south Central Los A;1geles
:>f the community based physicians. Any further tampermg with Medi-Cal funding
will result in almost a complete elimination of the community based physician
bedroc:~

I

the

of health care for the poor.

Proposition 165 is a narrow, ideologically driven fiscal control stn.tegy that
1

demonstrates no concern for real human consequences.

It is the equivalent of the

1812 British Law that declared that "anyone attempting to commit suicide will be put

to death"; it is the equivalent of solving the problem of a delinquent father, who
fails to be an adequate parent, by giving the police chief the right to deny his child
the right to food.
The problem 1s not the poor

1

but the poverty of our leadersh1p.

This

proposition the product of false consciousness, promotes mediocrity and
1

the value of humans in a state that has previously been the standard bearer in the
search for excellence and the protector of right of every human being to adequate
health care.
Health care funding must be stable and predictable since it deals with issues
of life and death. At a minimum, it should be exempt from continuous tinkering.
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SUMMARY OF REPORT

In November, Californians will vote on Proposition 16), "The Government Accountability and
Taxpa\er Protection Act of 1992" sponsored by
Governur Pete Wilson. Proponents claim that various
r-nwisions in the Proposition will reduce welfare
spendmg and dependency. The largest welfare program
affected by the Initiative is Aid to Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC), a program specifically
designed to protect the well-being of poor children.
Monev for AFOC comes from both the federal and
state gewernments, but the state government alone
decides the amount of AFDC grants. Children constitute 70"\J of the recipients of AFDC; over 1.6 million
California children, including 200,000 infants, currently rece1ve support. Based on estimates from
national studies, as many as one third of all children
born in the 1980's will need support from AFDC at
,;ome puint before thev reach 18.

grants and food stamps for a family consisting of a
mother and two young children - the most typical
AFDC family - is $10,200 a vear.

The Proposals. Proposition 165 would reduce bv
10% the cash support provided to all virtually families
receiving AFDC; families that receive AFDC for longer
than six months will have this support reduced by an
additional15%. The reduction in the cash grant wtll he
partially offset by an increase m food stamp benefits.
Nonetheless, the income of a family of three would be
reduced to $9012 a year. The benefit reductions will
apply even to single mothers with children younger
than one year of age, to parents who cannot find
employment or child care, and to recipients who are m
education or job-training programs or working parrtime. Pregnant women without other children no
longer will receive AFDC.
In addition, families that have newborns while the
family is receiving benefits would not receive an
increase in the cash grant to cover the costs of this
child and recipients who have lived in another state m
the year before they apply for benefits would be lumteJ
to the benefit amount available in that state. Finallv,
the Initiative contains several proposals focusing
exclusively on teenage mothers and pregnant teens.
Most importantly, teenage mothers who do not attend
school regularly will lose $5C a month; those who do
attend regularly will receive an extra $50 per month.

This report is the first to examine the probable
effects nt the proposals in Proposition 165 on the
physic!! health, academic performance and emotional
well-bemg nf children. Our goal1s tel provide the public
with the mfe1rmation necessary tn evaluate the
lnttiattw·s full costs and benefits. Tel Jo this, we have
examtned a large body of research, statistics and
empincal studies that describe and evaluate the AFDC
program in California and elsewhere. We also have
done '' •me original analyses of data to obtain a better
~ense , f who receives suppnrt, why the\' need support,
how r,1renh are likely to respond to the various
dements of the Initiative and hmv children will be
,lt"fectecl.

According to the Initiative's sponsors: ( 1) the
renefit reductions and other provisions will reduce the
number of applicants for AFDC and the length of time
recipients receive support; ( 2) the benefit reductions
and legislative changes accompanying the Initlati\·e
will result in more recipients working; (3) rec1p1ents
will be able to replace the lost mcome through earnings; ( 4) and the various provisions regarding teenagers
v;ill reduce the number of births to mothers youngt::r
than 18 and will induce more teenage mothers to
complete high school.

The AFDC Program. AFDC pnl\'ldes support to
children who live in families with very low incomes.
AbelUt /)'~·;, ot the children live with a single parent.
virruallv always their mother. The other parent is
permanently ,~bsent, generally due to death, divorce, or
-;epar~lt!<m. Approximately 20':X) nf the children live in
two-parent families where the pnmary wage earner IS
unemr'ldyeJ <lr working part-time and not earning
enough to r'rovide hasic support to the family. Ahout
)'\,of the children live w1th a twn-parent relattve or
nther caretaker. AFDC also provides support to the
children's parents. Caretakers, other than parents,
receiH' ,urpurt if they are needy. Poor :,mgle pregnant
women wirh<lllt other chtldren also are eligible for
support trom the time of conception.

Evaluating The Proposals. The current AFDC
svstem does not work well, from the perspecti1·e ot
recipients as well as of the general public. Although
there is need for reform. some changes may beneftt
children, while others may harm them. Evaluating
Proposition 165 requires two different types of assessments. First, what will be the actual effects of the
,pecitk proposals on bnth parental behavior and un the
11·ell-being of children. Tu 11 hat degree will the gu:1ls ell
the proponents he achieved! Will the proposals have
undesired effects or unintended consequences? In
analy:ing these questions it is necessary to consider the
, 'vera II effect of the entire package of proposals. since :1

E11111lie, receive cbh grant' rh.1r v,1rv with fa1111l\'
,1:e. The nuxtmum ca,h grant fur~~ famdy of three is
$663 .1 month. Families abel are d1gible tn receive food
stallll'' .mclt11ll,;t <lt their medical care ts covered by
\!edi-(:.d.l:urrentlv, the ecHnbtnL'd value nfthe cash
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ballot initiative, unlike legislation, is an aU-or-nothing
approach.

More than half of all recipients in this group are not
sufficiently profiCient in English to be able to find jobs
with wages adequate to support a family: m times of
high unemployment they cannot find anv JObs.

Second, are the value judgments reflected in the
proposals the right ones? Among the most important
value issues are: Should getting AFDC recipients into
the workforce be the top priority of welfare policy,
regardless of harm to children resulting f110m the means
used to encourage work? If not, what is the proper
balance between the goals of protecting children and
encouraging work? Should mothers of very young
children be forced to work? Should this depend on the
quality of child care available to them?

Between 50 and 60% of all families that enter the
AFDC system receive support for less than a year.
although some families enter and exit the system
several times. The mothers in the first group tend to be
the early leavers; still a number of them require 18 to
24 months of support before they can be self-sufficient,
especially if they are trying to complete their education. Without this education they cannot obtam Jobs
that pay enough to provide adequately for their family.
Mothers in the second group generally receive surport
for 1 to 5 years, although 10 to 15% will remain
recipients longer. Their lack of education makes tt
extremely difficult for them to find jobs that pay wages
above the poverty level. Finally, at least half of the
two-parent families need support for two or more years,
although they may also he working. They too have
difficulty earning enough to he completely independenr
of AFDC, given their lack of education and proftctencv
in English.

Using this framework, we have examined both the
benefits and the harms that children are likely to
experience if the Initiative is adopted.

\Vhy Parents Require AFDC Support. The first step
in our analysis is an examination of the reasons why
families need AFDC. Understanding the situo.tions of
these families is essential to understanding how the
parents are likely to respond to and be affected by the
benefit reductions and other provisions.
In this regard, it is useful to think of AFDC
families as fitting into one of three categories (these are
our constructs, not legal categories). Among the single
mothers, one group is composed primarily of women
above 25 years of age, with high school or greater
educations, who apply for AFDC following a divorce or
separation. One national study found that 1 out of 6
mothers who were not receiving AFDC before a
divorce or separation became recipients afterwards.
Most of these mothers have little or no earnings before
the divorce; their spouses earned most of the family
income. These mothers need AFDC to enable them to
reorganize their lives following the loss of their spouses'
earnings. The fact that nearly half of these mothers
have children 5 or vounger makes it extremely difficult
for them to find jobs which pay enough to support a
family, especially given the cost of child care. Although
the fathers are required to pay child support, most
rrovide little or no support.

Conclusions. We have carefully reviewed a large
body of research that helps us predict how parents are
likely to be affected by, and respond to, the provistons
in the Initiative. The effects on children will derend
upon how parents are affected. Based on these analyse~
and data we have reached the following conclusions.
First, an analysis of the economic needs of families
makes it clear that current grants are too low to allow
parents to meet the basic needs of their children. These
families all have incomes below the poverty line. v.:hich
is $11, 570 a year for a familv of three. The poverty line
is the federal standard for the minimum income needed
to meet the basic needs of children. According to the
National Commission on Children, "AFDC fails ro
meet most families' mintmum economic needs." A
large percentage of current recipients lack enough
income to provide children with safe housing and
consistently adequate food; a recent report by Congressional Republicans concludes that AFDC does nut
provide enough for "baste survival." The proposed
reductions would leave a family of three wtth an
income 20% below the povertv line. ln public upmion
polls Californians state that nearly twice as much
income is needed for a minimally adequate income.

The second group is composed primarily of nevermarried mothers between 20 and 30, the majority of
whom have not completed high school. Many have
worked at some point but due to their limited education they cannot earn enough to support their children.
Some are not proficient in English. Contrary to popular
images, few of the recipients in this group are teens 5.R'X) are 18 or 19 and only 1.8°/t) (9,000) are under 18.
Many of mothers who begin receiving AFDC in their
20's had their first child as a teen, however. Again, the
fathers ,lf these children contribute little support.

The children who receive AFDC already are m
great jeopardy because their families have so ltttle
income. The National Commission on Children
concluded that "poverty and economic instahlit\· take
a dreadful toll on children." This conclusion is cumpelted by numerous studies showmg that poor children
have significantly greater health, academic and
emotional problems than children from non-roor
families. This is equally true for children living lli

The final group consists of two-parent families.
The parents in these families have very little education. Over 30'7h of the parents are refugees, predomin;ltely from the war-rom countries of Southeast Asia .
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families receiving AFOC and for children living in
"worktng poor" families, that is families with incomes
below the poverty line that do not receive AFOC.

falling behind in school, and more children with
emotional problems. Children m families that become
homeless or that have their mcome reduced for longer
than a year and infants exposed to inadequate child
care will be in special jeopardy. Not all of these
problems will not be evident immediately; some will
emerge throughout the children's childhoods and after
they become adults. But it is certain that many
children's development will be significantly impaired.

Second, contrary to the expectations of the
Initiative's proponents, passage of the Initiative is
extremely unlikely to result in a reduction in AFOC
caseloads: at most there will be a slight decrease in the
number of people who enter the welfare sy.stem and a
small reduction in the length of time some recipients
require support. Even with reduced benefits the vast
majority of recipients could not earn enough to avoid
needing AFOC support. In fact, many experts believe
that the entire package of proposals actually will
increase caseloads.

Not all children will be hurt. A small percentage
of the families currently receiving AFOC may be able
to combine work with AFOC support and be better off
economically; their children certainly will benefit from
the increased income. In addition, as a result of one
proposed change working families not currently
receiving AFOC will become eligible to receive AFOC
grants to supplement their present earnings; their
children should benefit as a result. And older children
of mothers who enter the workforce may benefit just
from the fact that their parents are working, if the
children receive high qualiry child care.

Third, at least half of all recipient families will not
be able to replace any of the lost income. This group
will remain unemployed for much of the time they
receive support. Benefit cuts do not address the reasons
these parents remain unemployed. Many of these
parents lack the skills to get reasonably paying, or any,
jobs. Others cannot find or afford child care. Child care
is an especially great problem since more than 40% of
the children in these families are 5 or younger. Even
among the 40 to 50% of the parents who may find jobs,
most will still wind up with less money. A parent with
even modest child care costs would have to work at
least 20 hours a week at $5 an hour just to make up for
the benefit reduction. Particularly among more longterm recipients, most parents will not be able to work
this much, unless they receive further education or job
training.

It also appears that the provisions aimed at
potential and actual teenage mothers will not achieve
the desired effects. Teenage parenthood does pose
special risks for both mothers and children. Preventing
pregnancies and helping teenage mothers finish school
would alleviate many social problems. Studies from
other states indicate, however, that financial rewards
and penalties do not induce most teenage mothers to
complete school. Many of these teenagers have
dropped out of school before becoming pregnant. To
increase the number who return to or finish school
requires programs that include outreach, special classes,
and child care, not just financial incentives.

Fourth, the children in these families will be
considerably worse off overall. As is the case for
children in all families, the greatest determinant of
their well-being is the care provided by their parents
and other caretakers. The loss of income will force
parents to live in less safe housing and neighborhoods
and to rely on poor quality child care; many parents
themselves will provide less adequate care of their
children, due to the greater economic and emotional
stress they will experience. At greatest jeopardy are the
200,000 infants currently receiving support. If their
mothers do not seek or find employment they will lose
support critical to meeting their infants' needs. Yet
most ot those who are forced into the workforce will be
unable ro find, let alone afford, the type of child care
ahsolutdy essential for children younger than a year old
- stahle, continuous care by a single caretaker.
As a result, we can expect a decline in the physical
health. academic performance, and emotional status of
manv children. The harms will not, for the most part,
be dramatic ones- such as more deaths or lifethreatening tllnesses - although there will be some of
these. Rather, the effects will include more accidental
injunes to children, more ongoing physical problems,
such as earaches and dizzy spells, far more children

The Initiative may have other unintended
consequences. For example, the benefit cuts may force
many recipients to abandon the education or jobtraining programs provided through California's GAIN
program, since the reductions apply even to parents in
such programs. Also, pregnant mothers may feel
themselves compelled to have abortions that would
have otherwise been unwanted. In sum, it is clear that
the number of children harmed will greatly exceed the
number helped, under the approach to welfare reform
taken in the Initiative. Because an Initiative is an all or
nothing approach, there is no way to separate out its
beneficial or possibly beneficial aspects.
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At the end of this report, we outline some other
approaches to welfare reform that could help recipients
leave the system and obtain jobs that pay adequately,
wtthout jeopardizing their children's well-being. For
example, single mothers with children 3 or older, and
the primary wage earner in two-parent families, already
are subject to the work requirements of California's
GAIN program. This program requires that participants be enrolled in an education or job training

program or be actively seeking employment. The
program also helps with child care and exempts
mothers of very young children. Early evaluations of
the program are favorable. While it is not the purpose
of this report to recommend specific approaches, we
believe that a full evaluation of Proposition 165
requires consideration of alternatives that will not
harm, and may benefit, children.

II

INTRODUCTION

In November, Californians will vote on a ballot
initiative, Proposition 165, entitled the Government
Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992
and sponsored by Governor Pete Wilson. Although the
Initiative addresses several issues, it is being promoted
primarily as a means for reducing welfare spending and
dependency. Since virtually everybody believes that
the current welfare works badly, the Initiative's promise
of welfare reform may appeal to many voters.

Written with the assumption that all Californians are
concerned abo.ut the well-being of children, the report
is intended to provide the public with the information
necessary to assess the full costs and benefits of the
Initiative.
The report reviews the findings of a large body of
research, statistics and empirical studies describing and
evaluating the AFOC program in California and
elsewhere. It also contains original analyses of data,
some of which was not previously available.

The Initiative raises issues far more complex than
voting for or against the current welfare system,
however. The largest program affected by the Initiative
is Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFOC),
a program specifically designed to protect the wellbeing of poor children. Over 1.6 million children who
live in poor families benefit from that program.
Children constitute 70% of the recipients of AFOC;
the remaining recipients are the parents or other
caretakers of the children. If passed, the Initiative
would reduce the support provided to virtually all
children who receive AFOC by 10%; children in
families that receive support for longer than six months
will have their support reduced by an additional 15%.

The report is divided into ten sections. Section
One describes the current AFOC program. Section
Two presents the main elements of the the proposals in
the Initiative that affect children. Section Three
contains two proposals. The Fourth section presents
the rationales that have been offered in support of the
Initiative and a framework for evaluating its effects.
Section Five looks at the current economic status of
the families, in order to see how they might be effected
by the Initiative. Sections Six and Seven describe why
parents rely on AFOC, the characteristics of current
recipients, and how long families require support. The
next two sections examine the likely impacts of the
Initiative, first on parents and then on children.
Section Ten discusses whether the effects of the
Initiative's cuts in benefits can be mitigated by the
provision of alternative services to needy children. In
the final section, we discuss other options for welfare
reform that would not harm children.

This report analyzes the Initiative from the
vantage point of the several million California children
who will be most deeply affected by it. It is the first
study that examines the probable effects, both positive
and negative, of the reductions and the other provisions of the Initiative on the physical health, academic
performance and emotional well-being of children.

a

AFDC AND OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES

The AFDC Program

earner must be unemployed or working less than 100
hours per month, but he or she must have some history
of labor force participation. This parent also must be
registered for work and be available for, and seeking,
employment. In effect, the program provides support to
families in which an unemployed primary wage earner
is not covered by unemployment benefits.

While the Initiative will affect several programs
that provide support to needy individuals, the main
program that will be altered is Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). It is this program that
most people probably equate with "welfare." This
section outlines AFOC, as well as the other sources of
support that may be available to families receiving
AFDC.

To qualify for support for either component a
family must have limited assets. The maximum a family
may own is $1,000 of real and personal property,
excluding the family home, an automobile worth
$1,500 or less, burial plots or burial insurance, tools of
trade needed for employment, household furniture, and
other "items essential to day-to-day living." Recipients
must be U.S. citizens or legal aliens admitted to the
U.S. for permanent residence. Aliens classified as
refugees, conditional entrants, parolees or asylees may
also be eligible.

Established by Congress in 1935, the AFDC
program provides cash grants to qualifying families
whose other income, if any, is not adequate to meet
their children's basic needs. 1 States are not required to
participate in AFDC, but all 50 states and the District
of Columbia do participate. While each state must
comply with certain federally-established guidelines,
states are largely free to set their own benefit levels and
to supervise their programs as they wish. Federal funds
pay from 50 to 80% of the AFOC benefit costs in a
state (54% on average), depending upon the state's per
capita income; the higher the income the lower the
federal contribution. In California, a state with a
comparatively very high per capita income, the federal
government contributes 50%, the state pays 47.5% and
counties contribute 2.5%.

If a family meets these quaiifications, and some
additional eligibility requirements, it is entitled to a
monthly cash grant that vanes according to family size.
Currently, the maximum monthly grants in California
are:
Table I

AFDC consists of three major components:
AFDC-Family Group (AFDC-FG), AFOC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U), and AFDC-Foster Care
(AFDC-FC). This last program, which provides support
for children in foster homes, is not affected by the
Initiative. In order to qualify for either of the other
components, families must meet certain eligibility
requirements, primarily regarding family structure,
income, residential status, and assets. Eligibility of
families is determined by local welfare offices. Families
must provide information monthly, and each family's
eligibility is reviewed annually.

Maximum Monthly Grant by Family Size
Oune 1992)
Family Size

Amount

I

$326
535
663
788
899
1010
1109
1209
1306
1403

2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10+

AFDC-FG provides support to needy children
younger than 19 who have been deprived of parental
support due to the death, incapacitation, or continuous
absence of one of their parents. Support also is provided to their needy caretakers. Most of these children
live with their mothers, although needy children living
with single fathers, other relatives and unrelated
individuals also are eligible. Additionally, AFDC-FG
support is available to low-income, pregnant women
during the final trimester of pregnancy. California
currently extends this coverage by using state funds to
support low-income pregnant women from the time of
conception.'

Source: California Welfare & Institutions Code, 11450.

Parents who work may be eligible for partial
support if the family's gross income falls below a certain
amount, which varies by family size. If a family has
earned income, the amount of the AFDC grant is
reduced by the amount of earnings. However, to
encourage recipients to take even low-paying jobs,

AFOC-U is available only to children in twoparent families. The parent who is the primary wage
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recipients are allowed to disregard certain expenses in
calculatmg their earned income. These include actual
childcare expenses up to $175 a month per child ($200
for children under two), and $90 of work-related
expenses. In addition, the first $30 a family earns each
month is not counted as income for one year and an
additional one-third of the recipient's earnings is
disregarded for the first four months of employment
(referred to as the 30 and one-third rule). 3

The dollar amount dtspensed in food stamps ts
determined by the level of a family's income: As a
result, AFDC families restding in states where A FIX:
cash grants are lower receive higher food stamp benefits
than in states where AFDC payments are higher, such
as California.

Non-Cash Benefits. AFDC and Food Stamps are
the two major programs providing cash or its equivalent directly to low-income families in California. The
level of these benefits determines how a family lives on
a day-to-day basis. In addition, all AFDC recipients are
eligible for health-care benefits through state Medicaid
programs, Medi-Cal in California. This program pays
providers directly for authorized medical services.

California recipients also are subject to the
requirements of the Greater Avenues for Independence
program (GAIN). 4 This program, established by the
state legislature in 1985, is designed to help recipients
become self-sufficient and to ensure that able-bodied
recipients do work. Participation in GAIN is mandatory for all principal wage-earners in two-parent
families (usually fathers) and all single parents with no
children under three (primarily mothers). In some cases
both parents in an AFDC-U household are required to
participate. Parents who have a disability, a family
cnsts, or similar conditions are exempted. Those not
required to participate may volunteer.

Another source of support available to some
AFDC families throughout the country is public or
subsidized housing, which can substantially reduce a
family's housing costs. The availability of public and
subsidized housing varies considerably from one state to
another. In California, only 12% of the state's AFDC
families live in public housing or receive housing
subsidies, ranking California 50th among the states.;

Participation is mandatory until the parent finds a
job or stops receiving AFDC. Refusal to enroll or
failure to attend GAIN activities is punished by
sanctions. For the first sanction, the AFDC grant is
patd to a third parry for "money management." A
second sanction results in the loss of all or part of the
grant for three months; further non-compliance results
in a six month penalty. In rerum for participation, the
state provides remedial education, job search assistance, assessment, skills training, education, on-the-job
training, and pre-employment preparation (work
experience assignment in a public or nonprofit agency),
as appropnate for each participant.

Families on AFDC may be eligible for other
benefits, primarily school lunches and breakfasts,
assistance with energy costs, and subsidized childcare.
While helpful to many children and parents, support
from these programs does not significantly alter most
families' economic status. s

Participation Rates
During 1992, at any given point in time, approximately 2.3 million Californians are receiving some
support from the AFDC-FG and AFDC-U programs.
This equals a little over 7% of the state's population."
As noted, the overwhelming majority of recipients, 1.6
million or 70%, are children. Seventy-eight percent of
the recipients are in the AFDC-FG program, 22% are
in AFDC-U. About 14,000 pregnant women without
other children also receive support. In recent years, an
increasing proportion of total cases are AFDC-U, as
more two-parent families experienced unemployment.

Other Sources of Support
Families receiving AFDC are eligible for several
other federal and state benefit programs, which may
supplement their incomes. While the Initiative does
not directly alter these programs, they are relevant to
assessing the impact on recipient families of the
proposed cuts in AFDC grants.

While only a relatively small proportion of the
state's parents and children receive support at any one
time, a much larger percentage need aid at some point.
It has been estimated that, nationwide, over a third of
all families with children will experience poverty at
least once before the children are 18 and that from 25
to 30% of all children will receive AFDC for some
period before they tum eighteen. 1c Thus, AFDC is a
critical source of support for a substantial portion of the
population.

Food Stamps. Established by the Food Stamp Act of
1964, the Food Stamp program provides low-income
families with coupons redeemable for food at retail food
stores. The program is not restricted to AFDC recipients; any household with a gross income below 130% of
the federal poverty line, a net income (gross income
less certain deductions) below the poverty line, and less
than $2,000 in disposable assets may qualify. 5 In
California, approximately 76% of AFDC families
receive food stamps, so the program provides an
important supplement to the AFDC grant. 6
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THE PROPOSALS

Proposition 165 contains six proposals that relate
toAFOC.
I.

who have not graduated high school. If the mother
attends school and has no more than four absences
a month, the family grant would be increased h\$50. The basic grant would be reduced by $50 for
every month in which the mother has more than
two unexcused absences. The Initiative also
requires teen parents under 18 years of age to live
with their own parents or guardians, except in
certain circumstances.

The Initiative would reduce by 10% the monthly
cash grant that is provided to all families receiving
AFDC. In addition, the statutory requirement that
benefits be adjusted to reflect the cost-of-living
would be repealed. Because federal food stamp
benefits automatically increase when income
drops, a part of the AFDC cuts would be offset by
increased food stamp benefits.

6.

2. The monthly cash grant would be reduced by
another 15% after the family has received support
for six months, except in cases where the mother is
younger than nineteen and regularly attending
high school or vocational school or where the
parent(s) is disabled or older than 60.

3.

Under current law, families receive a basic grant
tor the parent(s) and an additional amount for
each child. The Initiative would eliminate the
additional amount received for all children
conceived while the family is receiving AFOC,
until the family has not received any support for 24
months.

4.

Under current law, a pregnant woman is eligible
for support from the time she becomes pregnant, if
she meets certain income requirements. The
Initianve eliminates this support to poor pregnant
women, although they still would be eligible for
Medi-Cal.

5.

The lmtiative establishes new regulations for
families headed by mothers younger than nineteen

Under current law, a qualifying family is eligible
for a full AFDC grant immediately upon moving ro
California. Under the Initiative, new recipients
who have not been residents of California for at
least one year prior to the time they apply for
support would receive the same amount of support
the family would have received in the state m
which the family last resided before moving to
California.

In addition to these changes contained in the
Initiative itself, the state has received permission from
the federal government to alter the "30 and a third"
rule, if the Initiative passes. The state was mandated to
seek waivers by legislation passed last year. Under the
new rule recipients with earned income will be allowed
to have one-third of their earnings disregarded indefinitely in calculating the amount of their grants; at
present, this disregard applies for only four months.
Parents who work while receiving support therefore
will be able to retain a greater amount of their earnings. As we discuss later, this change also mav increase
the number of people who enter the welfare ;ystem. 11
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FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

If the Initiative passes poor children will become
even poorer, unless their parents are able to make up
for the benefit reductions through increased earnings or
other sources of support. The cuts in benefits also will
increase the risk of children experiencing developmental problems. Are these outcomes justified by potential
benefits from the Initiative's proposals? This section
reviews both the rationales that have been given to
justify the Initiative and the concerns of those opposing it. We then offer a framework for assessing the
potential costs and benefits of the Initiative.
Nobody likes the current welfare system. AFbC
clearly serves very important functions, most importantly providing income to children whose families are
experiencing economic hardship. Unfortunately, the
AFDC program often operates in wavs that seem to
undermine its purposes. Those who have studied the
system find that the benefits are too low to adequately
provide for children's needs. Recipients find the system
demeaning. At the same time. critics of all political
persuasions worry that the current structure induces
some people to rely on welfare who are able to be selfsufficient, discourages recipients from working, allows
some recipients to remain in the system longer than
necessary, and fails to provide a route to self-sufficiency
for those recipients who want to leave the system but
can't overcome various barriers to employment.
Efforts at reform are being tried throughout the
country. California was a leader m this regard, through
its adoption of the GAIN program. While further
reform may be needed, both the goals of reform efforts
and the appropriateness of the means selected to try to
achieve the goals require careful scrutiny. There is a
tension between the goal of protecting needy children
and that of minimizing welfare participation and
expenditures. An adequate evaluation of any reform
proposal must consider how any given proposal affects
each of these objectives of welfare policy.
The goals of the sponsors have been articulated in
the Preamble of the Initiative, in the ballot arguments
in the Yuter handbook, and in speeches and press
releases by Governor Wilson and members of his
administration. All of these documents make it clear
that the Initiative focuses exclusively on the cost
aspects ,Jf the current system. 1: The stated goals of the
proponents are to discourage welfare "dependency," to
encourage work by recipients, and to reduce welfare
expenditures. The specific means that have been
selected to try to achieve these ends are based on the
following premises and assumptions:
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I.

Californians who are capable of supporting thetr
families are relying on welfare rather than work.
The size of the AFOC population, which has been
growing in recent years, is heavily influenced bv
California's relatively high cash grants. Thererore,
if benefit levels are lowered, fewer people wdl
'apply for welfare.

2.

People receive AFOC for longer periods than
necessary, in part because parents can obtam more
income from AFOC than they could by W<)rking.
In order to make low-paying jobs more attracttve,
benefits should be further reduced after six
months, so that work becomes relatively more
attractive. It is assumed, moreover, that JObs w1ll
be available for all current and future adult
recipients, since the mability to find a job dues not
prevent the loss of benefits.

3.

The number of famdtes receiving benefits m
California has been mmg rapidlv in recent years.
One of the reasons 1s an increase m births tu
unmarried teenage g1rls, espectally those yuunger
than 18. It is assumed that some teenagers are
having children solelv to be able to establish their
own homes. To discourage such births, the
Initiative would requtre most mothers younger
than 18 to continue to live with their own parents
or guardian.

4.

Recipients who begm receiving welfare as teenage
parents generally remam in the system for longer
periods of time than clther recipients. On the
assumption that teenage mothers become economically self-sufficient more quickly if they
complete high schooL the proposals reward teen
mothers who stay in school by providing them an
additional $50 a month and penalize those who
miss school by deductmg $50 a month from their
grants.

5.

People who are receiving support should not have
additional children. Parents should have children
only if they can afford them. In order to end anv
"incentive" for such btrths, recipients who have
additional children while receiving AFOC will not
get the increase in benefits that currently accompanies an increase in family size.

6.

California's AFDC caseload is being increased by
people in other states coming to California in
order to take advantage of California's relatively
high cash grants. T,) reduce any incentive to
migrate solely for this purpose, new recipients from
out of state will receive only the amount they
would have received in their previous state, for a
period of 12 months.

7.

Allowing pregnant women to receive support from
the time of conception is a waste of money. These
women can work until late in their pregnancies.
Therefore, California's special grant program
should be eliminated.

Second, a voter must determine what the actual
effects of the specific proposals in the Initiative are
likely to be on parental behavior and on the well-being
of children. To what degree will the means adopted in
the Initiative have desired effects? Undesired effects 7
Will there be unintended consequences? What will be
the overall impact of the entire package of proposals?
Since a ballot initiative, unlike legislation, is an aU-ornothing approach, voters must decide whether the
Initiative as a whole is desirable.

In addition to these premises which have been
stated explicitly, there are two other value judgments
implicit in the proposals. First, proponents of the
Initiative must believe that getting parents receiving
welfare into the workforce is an all-important goal,
regardless of the ages of their child or the type of care
the child will receive while the parent is employed,
since the benefit cuts apply even to mothers of newborns and regardless of whether they can find
childcare. Second, proponents apparently believe that
it is more important for a parent to take a low-paying
job than to receive education or training that might
prepare the parent for a higher-paying job, since
benefits are reduced even for those parents participating in JOb-training or education programs.

The starting point for an analysts of these questions is to examine the evidence regarding each of the
empirical assumptions that seem to underlie the
proposals: For example, what is actually known about
whether higher beneftt levels induce more welfare use
or whether financial penalties prod teen mothers to
increase school attendance? At the time of the preparation of this document, supporters of the Initiative had
not provided any comprehensive analysis of the
evidence suggesting that the proposed changes would.
in fact, be likely to achieve the goals sreCified m their
literature.

Supporters of the Initiative have not addressed the
question of its impact on children, except for one
point. They claim that one of the reasons to discourage
long-term welfare receipt is that children who grow-up
in homes receiving welfare are likely to become AFOC
recipients as adults.

Knowing whether a particular provtston might
have some of the desired effects on parents is only the
first step in an adequate analysis, howe\'er. The
proposals obviously will affect different people differently. For example, as a result of the cuts, some
mothers might indeed decide to take JObs that they
otherwise might not have taken; others wtll not.
Among those who seek employment, some wtll find
and retain jobs; others will nor. Some of these Johs may
tum out to be good, others less so. Some mothers will
find adequate childcare, while others wtll not. Some
teens may decide not to have children (by stopping sex,
using contraceptives or having abortions); others will
have children nonetheless. Unquestionablv, the most
that can be hoped for wtth regard to each of the
proposals is that the behavior of some parents wtll he
influenced as the proponents would like.

Opponents of the Initiative make a number of
counter-arguments. First, they take issue with some of
the proponents' value judgments. For example, they
believe that if the Initiative is adopted many families
will certainly have reduced income, that this will be
harmful to children and parents, and that it is wrong to
jeopardize children's well-being in order to reduce the
state hudget. Second, they believe that the empirical
assumptions underlying several of the proposals are
incorrect
the assumption, for example, that
California's caseload size is driven by the relatively
high cash grants - and that these proposals therefore
are unJustified. Third, they argue that others proposals,
such a' the penalties for missing school, will not have
their Jestred effect and may even be counter-productive.
In dectding whether to support the Initiative, a
voter thus must make two different assessments. First,
each V<)ter must decide whether the value judgments
reflected in the Initiative are the right ones. Among
the most important value issues are, should getting
welfare recipients into the workforce be the top prioritv
nf welfare policy, regardless of anv negative effects on .
children c)l the means used to encuurage work? If not,
what '' the proper balance between the goals of
protecting children and encouragmg work? Should
mother:. llf verv young children he forced to work?
Should this depend on the qualitv of childcare availahle t<) rhem:

To the degree that a proposal does not have its
desired effects, children will wind up in poorer households. Thus, assessing the likely effects of the Initiative
requires weighing the rrohahilities of various outcomes.
An adequate analysis c1f the proponents' claims would
seek to determine:
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I.

To what degree will the cuts and the other
proposals reduce the number of new AFDC
recipients?

2.

To what degree will the proposals increase the
workforce participation hv current recipients' Will
working parents he ahle t< 1 replace the lust mcome'

3.

To what degree wdl the \'arious rmrosals reduce
the birthrate among current recipients and among
teenagers?

4.

To what degree will the proposals facilitate long
term self-sufficiency for current recipients?

Finally, any assessment of the desirability of the
Initiative requires some examination of alternative
means to achieve the same goals, that may offer le~s
risk to children's well-being. For example, California
already has a program, GAIN, designed to move people
from welfare to work. This approach is based on verv
different premises than the Initiative; its effects are .
currently being carefully studied. 11 Other states have
taken alternative approaches in trying to achieve many
of the same goals that Initiative proponents hope to
achieve.

The impact of each proposal on children then·
must be considered. A proposal might have the desired
effect on parents, yet the outcome wtll be worse for
children. For example, if the Initiative is successful in
forcmg mothers of infants into the workforce the goals
of the Initiative's proponents may be achieved, but the
results for children might be quite bad, if they do not
receive adequate childcare.
A full assessment requires evaluating the package
as a whole. Since each of the proposals potentially can
affect differing numbers of people, it is necessary to
consider whether any potential benefits from one
proposal are outweighed by the possible negative
impacts of another proposal that applies to larger
numbers of people. For example, the proposals addressing migration and teenage mothers each can potentially affect, either positively or negatively, less than
10% of the total families recetving support. In contrast,
the I 0% cut in benefits affects all reCipients.

The remainder of this report will analyze the
Initiative according to this framework. Since we begin
with the value premise that in any welfare reform
children's interests must at least be considered, if not
made paramount, we examine the Initiative both in
terms of its sponsors goals and its likely impacts on the
well-being of children.
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THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF FAMILIES RECEIVING AFDC IN CALIFORNIA

Defining Adequate Income

Because California's cash grants are relativelv high,
some people may assume that AFDC families can
absorb cuts in benefits without a significant Impatrment in their standard of living. Governor Wilson has
suggested that the curs will force recipients to cut down
on extras, not on basic necessities. The evidence is to
the contrary. This can be seen by comparing
California's benefits with three widely used measure>
for assessing the economic well-being of families: I ) the
federally established poverty standard; 2) cost-of-living
studies; and 3) median family income in the United
States.

The central provisions of the Initiative are the cuts
in benefits. In order to get a sense of how poor parents
and children are likely to be affected by the proposed
cuts, it is useful to understand more about the economiC situations faced by these families. We will look
at the cuts from the perspective of a child in the typical
AFDC family-that is, a single mother with two children, one of them under five, living in an urban or
suburban area of the state.
Combining AFDC and food stamps, a family of
three currently is eligible to receive a maximum of
$850 a month or $10,200 a year. Under the Initiative,
that amount will be reduced to a maximum of $814 per
month for all such families; after a family has received
benefits for six months the amount will be reduced
further, to $751 a month or $9,012 a year. 14 The cash
grant will be frozen for at least seven years, regardless of
changes in the cost of living.

The Poverty Line. The most widely used standard
for measuring the economic well-being of families ts
the poverty line. The poverty line is a measure of the
income necessary to meet people's minimum material
needs for shelter, food and clothing. Devised hv rhe
federal government in 1964, it was based on the
"thrifty food plan," which was developed bv the
U.S.Department of Agriculture (USDA) to provide
families in need with a dietary guide for temporan me.
in times of economic emergency. 1' In 1964, famtiies
generally spent one-third of their income on food;
therefore, the federal poverty line was set at exactlv
three times the cost of the thrifty food plan. Since
1969, the poverty line has been adjusted annually on
the basis of the consumer pnce index rather than on
the basis of food costs alone. Currently, the poverrv
line is set at $11,570 per year for a family of three and
$13,950 per year for a famdv c)ffour.

How should voters think about these amounts? As
with all aspects of the welfare system, how one views
the adequacy of grants depends on one's goals. It is
well-known that California has one of the highest cash
grants for AFDC recipients of all the states. As noted,
proponents of the Initiative look at the grant solely in
terms of welfare costs, arguing that current grants are
too high in light of the need to cut state expenditures.
In contrast, a very different focus is appropriate if
one is concerned with protecting the well-being of
children. From this perspective, the issue is whether
the grant level is sufficient to provide every child with
adequate food, shelter, clothing and health care.
Focusing on children, one would also want to know
how familv mcome affects a child's chances of success
at school and, ultimately, obtaining a good job.

At present, the maximum combmed AFDC .gr.mt
and food stamps for a California famtlv of three equab
only 94% of the poverty line- and not all famdies
qualify for the maximum. Under the proposed cuts,
benefits will be reduced to 85°itJ of the poverty Ime
immediately and to 79% for families who recetve
support for longer than six months. Families in which
the mother has an additional child while receiving
support will live even further below the povertv lme
since there will be no support for the added chdd. /\'
shown in Tables 2 and 3, the situation for all families
will worsen each year, since the lninative repeals the
statutory requirement of cost-of-living adjustments m
the cash grants; such adjustments alreadv had been
statutorily suspended until 1996-97 .

Unfortunately, the goals of protecting the wellbeing of poor children and of controlling expenditures
in the AFIX: Program may cont1ict, especially when
the long-run economic and social costs of leaving
children m poverty are ignored. In this section, we
examine whether the benefits are adequate to meet the
basic needs of children and their parents. In later
sections, we discuss the relationship between benefit
levels and rates of AFDC participation.
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Table 2

AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits in California During
the First Six Months of Aid, Under Proposition 165

Year

Maximum
AFDC Benefit
Family of 3

Max.
Food
Stamp
Benefit

AFDC and
Food Stamps
Combined

Poverty
Line
Family of 3

AFDC as
Percent of
Poverty

AFDOFood
Stamps as
Percent of
Poverty

62.7%

85.5%

1992-93

$597

$217

$814

$951

1993-94

597

232

829

986

60.6

84.1

1994-95

597

248

845

1,021

58.5

82.7

1995-96

597

264

861

1,058

56.4

81.4

Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C.

Table 3

AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits in California After
Six Months of Receiving Aid, Under Proposition 165

Year

Maximum
AFDC Benefit
Family of 3

Food
Stamp
Benefit

AFDC and
Food Stamps
Combined

Poverty
Line
Family of 3

AFDC as
Percent of
Poverty

AFDC/Food
Stamps as
Percent of
Poverty

53.3%

78.9%

1992-93

$507

$244

$751

$951

1993-94

507

259

766

986

51.4

77.7

1994-95

507

275

782

1,021

49.6

76.6

1995-96

507

291

798

1,058

47.9

75.4

Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C.

What is life like for people living at or near the
poverty line? Although there is some controversy about
the meaning of the term poverty, and how income and
assets should be counted in determining whether a
family is poor, the vast majority of people who study
income and welfare agree that, for most families, living
below the poverty line jeopardizes the basic well-being
of all family members. 1" In fact, the Republican
members of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means recently concluded that
people with incomes at the poverty line often do not
have enough money for basic survival. 17

other aspects of the cost of living and food costs have
declined as a percentage of the family's budget, but the
poverty line has not been adjusted to reflect this. It is
hardly surprising that a 1989 study by the U.S. Census
Bureau found that nearly one out of every five families
( 18%) with incomes below the poverty line lived in
housing that had one or more major physical problems,
such as frequent breakdowns in heating or plumbing,
serious electrical problems, lack of hot or cold water or
a toilet, holes in floors or ceilings, or rats. 18 Some of
this housing, built before 1960, also has lead-based
paint dangerous to children.

Most cntically, it is very difficult for a family with
income below - or even somewhat above the poverty
line
to obtain adequate housing, especially in urban
areas. In the years since the poverty line was established, housing costs have risen far more rapidly than

California families receiving AFOC face special
problems. According to the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, which calculates
Fair Market Rents (FMR), California's rents are the
highest in the country, with the possible exception of

•

Massachusetts. 19 The average metropolitan FMR for a
two-bedroom apartment in California is $750, more
than $220 higher than the national average. Moreover,
five California metropolitan areas, where many AFDC
recipients reside, rank among the 10 most expensive
metropolitan areas for fair market rents in the entire
country.

childcare, medical care and all other expenses families
normally incur for children were excluded. For singleparent households. the necessary monthly amount 1s
approximately $1200 across all counties: The amount
ranged from $994 in San Joaquin County to $1428 in
San Francisco. Not surprisingly, the amount is similar
to estimates made by the general public. In a 1989
Gallup poll, respondents indicated that they believed a
family in California required $16,790 to live above
poverty. 23 This is considerably above the poverty line
and 150% more than will be available to welfare
recipients if the Initiative is adopted.

Obviously, families in poverty pay well below FMR
for their housing; a recent study found that the average
California AFDC family of three paid $342 per month
on rent, not including utilities. To obtain housing
within their budget, many AFDC families must live in
the poorest quality apartments and in the most
dangerous parts of their communities. Many poor
families live in over-crowded conditions, often
doubled-up with other families. As a result, poor
families move frequently in search of better accommodations. As we discuss below, all of these factors
adversely affect poor children.

Median Family Income. The standards discussed so
far calculate the income necessary to meet the minimal
needs of a family without jeopardizing children's
physical well-being. But children can also be harmed
by relative deprivation. Although large numbers of
children overcome the barriers imposed by growing up
in poverty, for manv children these barriers prove
insuperable. Extremely low income forces children to
live far from the mamstream nf American life. :\s a
result, many children are unable to envision opportll·
nity in the mainstream.

Many poor families also have trouble buying
enough adequate food. As we saw, the poverty line is
based on the USDA "thrifty food plan." Studies by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture have found that five of
every six families whose food expenditures meet this
plan are not eating a nutritionally adequate diet, 20
despite the fact that poor families tend to use their
dollars more wisely than other families. The basic
problem is a lack of income.

While there is no way of identifying the pomt at
which relative deprivation becomes a strong barrier.
many experts consider that anyone living for a substantial period of time at an mcome less than one-half of
the median income IS likelv to be significantly deprived.24 Median income is the income that represents
the exact middle for U.S. families, the pomt at which
half earn more and half earn less.

Of course, the circumstances of poor families vary
depending upon many factors, such as how long they
have been poor, the availability of support from others,
and the area of the state in which they live. While not
every family with income below the poverty line lives
in inadequate housing or lacks money to buy adequate
food, there is little doubt that families living below the
poverty line are very poor indeed.

In 1990, median income for California households
was $35,353. 15 Welfare benefits equal only one·quarter
of this amount. By this standard, welfare benefits would
have to double to provide children with reasonably
equal opportunity.

Cost of Living Stuliies. In fact, a substantial body of
research indicates that a family at the poverty line has
far too little income for a minimally decent living. 21 A
more realistic estimate was developed recently by
Consumers Union of America, which examined the
"minimum cost of living" for a "bare minimum"
existence in Califomia. 22 The study identified the
minimum amount needed for housing, food, clothing,
personal care, public transportation and laundry. The
cost of maintaining a car, household furnishings,

AFDC in California and Other States
By each of these three standards, California's
benefits are far too low. Yet, relative to other states,
California's AFDC grants are high. As Table 4 shows,
California's $663 maximum monthly cash grant for a
three-person family is significantly higher than the
national average. In fact, only four states (Alaska,
Connecticut, Vermont and Hawaii) offer higher
maximum cash grants. 26
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Table 4

Maximum AFDC Benefits for a Family of Three High States/
Low States, Ten Most Populous States (1/92)
High/Low
States

Rank

Max. Grant
Family of 3

Most Pop.
States

Alaska

I

924

California

663

Connecticut

2

680

New York

577

Vermont

3

673

Michigan

459

Hawaii

4

666

New jersey

424

California

5

663

Pennsylvania

421

Louisiana

47

190

Illinois

367

Tennessee

48

185

Ohio

334

Texas

49

184

Florida

303

Alabama

50

149

North Carolina

272

Mississippi

51

120

Texas

184

395

Average

400

U.S. Average

Max. Grant

Source: U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Overview of Entitlement Programs, 1992 (Green Book).

current housing. They will have to move to even
lower-quality apartments and will still have less cash
available to meet other basic non-food expenses.

Some people may assume that because families
receiving AFOC in other states "get by" on less,
California's families will not be adversely affected by
the cuts. Such assumptions are dearly wrong. It must
be recognized, to begin with, that despite the differences in cash grants, California's "benefit package" is
not more generous than most other states. First,
famtlies in other states generally receive more food
stamps than do California families, since under federal
law food stamps are reduced when cash grants are
higher. In addition, a far greater percentage of recipients in other states receive housing subsidies. In fact,
Caltfornia has the lowest percentage of families
receiving subsidies. Only 12% of California's AFOC
families receive any housing support, while nationally
about 26% of recipients receive support; the figures go
as high as 60%? The fact that Californians, on
average, are more affluent than most Americans
exacerbates the situation. Not only is the gap between
the poor and middle class greater here, thus increasing
relative deprivation, the more general affluence pushes
up housing costs and leaves the poor even worse-off. In
fact, when the relative costs of housing are added into
the calculation, families in 30 other states receiving
AFOC and food stamps have more income at their
disposal (see Appendix B).

Most importantly, whether California is more or
less generous is beside the point from the perspective of
children. It does not help a poor child achieve normal
development to know that some other children are
even poorer. Regardless of where California ranks, the
critical fact is that AFOC recipients everywhere are
vety poor. Just recently the National Commission on
Children, the most broadly representative and politically diverse group of politicians, service provtders,
community leaders and academicians ever to address
the needs of children, concluded that "AFOC fails to
meet most families' minimum economic needs .... In
none of the 50 states do combined welfare benefits
(AFOC, food stamps, Medicaid, and housing subsidies)
provide even a modestly secure standard of living for
families with children. "28
The Commission went on to state: "Poverty and
economic instability take a dreadful toll on children ....
Families with an adequate income are better able to
provide the emotional and intellectual, as well as the
physical, care children need to become healthy,
productive adults. Failure to prevent poverty and
address the economic needs of families will inevitably
lead to other social ills- more crime and delinquency,
more teenage childbearing, more unhealthy babies,
more child abuse and neglect, and lower productivity
.
. "29
among t h e workmg-age
popu lanon.

The cost of housing is especially important when
considering the effects of the Initiative. Housing must
be paid for out of the cash grant - which will be
reduced by $156 or 23%. Since housing costs already
constitute the families' largest expense, it will be
impossible for many families to continue living in their

It is against this backdrop that the Initiative's
approach to welfare reform should be evaluated.
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WHO RECEIVES AFDC?

Why Parents Rely on AFDC

divorced or separated from a spouse, and 7% are the
spouses of someone who is incarcerated or incapacitated. Finally, 3% are widows. 31

We now tum to an examination of who is served
by the AFDC system. We begin by describing, in a
general fashion, the circumstances that cause parents to
turn to the welfare system for support. We then look in
more detail at some demographic information regarding
the characteristics of current recipients, focusing on
those characteristics most relevant for assessing reform
proposals. The description concentrates on the AFOCFG population, since it constitutes the largest group of
recipients. Where there are characteristics distinguishing the AFDC-U population that are relevant for
policy decisions, they are identified.

Mothers who enter the welfare system following a
divorce or separation usually do so because they have
suddenly lost the support from their spouse and they
are unable to find employment to make up for this lost
income. The fact that divorce rates are highest among
low-income families increases the likelihood that a
divorce will leave custodial mothers in poverry. Even
though many married women are in the labor force at
the point they become single parents, they often have
part-time or low-paying jobs. Even working full-time
following divorce, many women still cannot earn
enough to avoid poverty.l2

In order to be eligible for AFDC, a parent must
have very little or no income. One clear question that
needs to be addressed is why are AFDC recipients
unemployed or earning so little? We attempt to piece
together the outlines of an answer, with the caveat that
much more needs to be known before anyone can
speak confidently about this question. It must also be
recognized that the paths onto welfare are highly
variable and no comprehensive generalizations are
possible.

The relationship between divorce and AFDC use
was analyzed recently in a study by researchers at the
U.S.Census Bureau. JJ Part of the study examined the
income and marital status of a large group of women
during the years 1983 to 1985. All of the women were
married in 1983. During the following two years, about
five percent of these women divorced or separated from
their husbands. Some of these families were receiving
AFDC prior to the breakup, and these women connnued to receive AFDC following the split. Most significantly, for present purposes, approximately one out of
six mothers (16%) who had not been m the welfare
system prior to the split had to apply for AFDC benefm
following the divorce or separation. The loss of the
fathers' income, the fact that most fathers did not pay
child support, and the low wages of the mothers who
were working all contributed to this outcome.

As previOusly pointed out, in order to qualify for
AFDC-FG there can be only one parent in the household; this is virtually always the mother. The starting
point for understanding why single mothers often
require support is the fact that, in general, women with
children generally have low earnings. They earn little
because many mothers work only part-time in order to
be available to take care of their children and because
women generally earn considerably less than men
whether thev work part-time or full-time. Various
explanations have been offered for this disparity,
including the fact that some mothers take lower-paying
jobs that offer more flexibility to be with children
when necessary; that many women do not prepare
themselves for high paying careers since they expect to
spend time as primary caretakers of children; and
discrimmatlon by employers. 30 Regardless of the cause,
rhe fact remains that most mothers depend upon
income provided by fathers in order to live reasonably.
When that income is lost, or when it has never been
available, many mothers find themselves in precarious
economic circumstances.

Not only does divorce lead to the loss of the
father's income, it is very difficult for those mothers
who are not working prior to a separation or divorce tn
begin working immediately. In fact, some mothers who
had been working find it necessary to stop work. When
a family breaks up, the mother often must search for
new housing, help the children enter new schools <md
deal with their emotional traumas. 34 Many mothers
(and fathers) experience considerable depression ar thi,
point, which can make job searching even more
difficult. Some mothers will move to be closer to familv
or other support systems, which may delay job searches.
Finding childcare also may be difficult, especially since
more than 50% of all divorces involve children
younger than five. 35 Finally, some mothers cannot fmJ
jobs. All of these problems are exacerbated by the
frequent failure of fathers to pay child support.

The mothers receivmg AFOC become singleparents in three ways. While many people may imagine
that most women enter the system as unmarried
teenagers with their first child and no work experience,
this is not the case. Only half of all mothers who apply
for support have never been married and fewer than
8% of all mothers are teenagers. About 40% are

The situation of never-married mothers parallels,
to a degree, that of divorced women, although the
proportion of all never-married women who ever
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become recipients is considerably higher than the
proportion of all divorced women who ever must rely
on AFOC. The majority of never-married mothers who
apply for AFOC women are in their early twenties.
While many enter the welfare system upon birth of a
child, others do so upon losing a job, after a personal
illness or the illness of a child, or in the wake of losing
support from another member of their household. This
last route is far more common than generally recognized. Many never-married mothers live with a
relative, boyfriend, and even the child's father. Like
married mothers, they may be totally or partially
dependent upon this person for support. If that person
moves out or loses a job, the mother may need to tum
to welfare for support. Never-married mothers are
unable to find employment for many of the same
reasons facing married women upon separation or
divorce. Moreover, because never-married mothers of
any age tend to have less education than married
women, these mothers have even less chance of finding
adequately paying jobs.

reform focuses on single mothers, the cuts will also
affect two parent families in the AFOC-U program.
There has been very little research regarding this
group, perhaps because the program was not mandatory
in all states until 1990. In fact, 40% of all AFOC-U
recipients now reside in Califomia. 40 Absent research,
any characterization of recipients must be fairly
tentative.

Among the never-marned mothers, teenage
mothers constitute a group of special concern. The
number of teen mothers actually is quite small as a
percentage of all AFOC reetpients: As noted earlier,
teenagers comprise only 7. 7% of mothers receiving
AFDC at any given time. Those younger than 18
constitute only 1.8% of all mothers currently receiving
AFDC. 1"

As this picture indicates, most parents m horh
AFOC programs apply for support because famtly
responsibilities keep them from working or hecause
they can't find employment that pays enough to keep
them out of poverty. The welfare system offers them J
source of secure income which thev cannot nbtain m
the labor market. Given their responsibilities to their
children, AFOC often seems to be the only way to
protect the children's well-being, as well as their own.

Because of the entry requirements, all of the
AFOC-U recipients are either unemployed or work less
than 100 hours per month. However, all have worked
at least part-time in the year and a half prior to
applying for AFOC. The key information about these
families is that the primary wage earners tend to have
little education, limited proficiency in English, and
large families. Over a thtrd of the fathers are older than
forty, which may limit employment opportumties. In
California, approximatelv a third are refugees, manv of
whom face all of these barriers to finding adequate
employment. Many others are agricultural workers,
experiencing periodic unemployment.

Nonetheless, teen mothers demand special
concern because early child-bearing entails risks for
both the mother and child, and because the teen
mothers are very likely to need support from AFOC,
either when they are teens or later on (or both). With
regard to welfare participation, estimates from national
surveys indicate that over half of all teen mothers will
recetve AFOC for some period - as many as 40% of
whites and 85% of blacks. 37 The majority of those who
receive support begin doing so following the birth of a
child, although others do not enter the system until
they are older- largely because they were married or
were cared for by their family when they were younger.
And while teen mothers constitute only a small
percentage of recipients at any given time, nearly 60%
of all women who receive AFDC at some point before
they are 30 had their first child while they were teens. 38

Demographic Characteristics of Recipients
Further insight into why these parents need
support, and how children will be affected by the
Initiative, can be gleaned by examining the avatiJble
demographic data describing current recipients. As
previously noted, approximately 2.3 million people
currently receive AFDC, 1.6 million children and
700,000 adults. About 6% of the family units consist of
a child living with a non-parent caretaker. The
remaining families all are comprised of children livmg
with one or both parents, although in some of these
families the child is the only AFOC recipient, either
because the parent is ineligible for support or is
receiving support under the social security disability
program. 41

It is estimated that nearly half of.all teen mothers
do not complete high school during their teen yearsabout 55% of all whites and Hispanics and 30% of
blacks.l'l And, approximately 20% of teen mothers
have a second child before they tum 20. It is hardly
surprising, m light of these facts, that early childbearing, especially by non-married adolescents, is a
major reason women need support from AFOC.

While many people probably have images of the
"average" adult recipient, it actually is very difficult to
develop a meaningful picture of the "average" adult or
family. First, there is enormous variation in the age,
race, education and other background characteristics of
both adults and children.
Moreover, the main source of published data
characterizing recipients provides a somewhat distorted
picture of the entire group of people who receive

\Vhile most attention wtth respect to welfare
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AFOC each year. This is because the published data are
based on a survey, or "snapshot", of the characteristics
of families receiving support on a given day each year.
But a much larger number of families receive welfare at
some time each year than are served on any given day.
People who receive support for a short period of time
and then leave the system are under-counted in any
snapshot; the data therefore are skewed towards a
picture of longer-term recipients. Since longer-term
adult recipients tend to have less education, not to
have been married, and to have had children when
they were teenagers, the available data over-emphasize
the degree to which all recipients have these characteristics. These caveats should be kept in mind when
considering the following description.

There are ethnic differences in family size: Both
African-American and white families average less than
2 children per family, while Asian families and Hispanic families tend to have higher numbers of children
(see Table 6). Because Asian and Hispanic adult
recipients have larger families, children from these
groups constitute a larger percentage of child recipients
than their parents do of the adult group.
Table 6

Average Number of Children per Family by
Ethnicity/Race of Parent or Guardian ( 1989-90)
Ethnicity/Race

In the FG program, over 96% of the adult recipients are women. As noted, few are very young - only
9,000 mothers are younger than 18. Nearly half of the
mothers are 30 or older and the average age is 29 (see
Table 5). The children, in contrast, are young. Sixteen
percent, or more than 200,000 children, are less than 1
year old; approximately 44% are below the age of 6.
The average is between 7 and 8.

Age of Female Parent Recipients AFDC-FG (in percent) (Jan. 1991)
1.8

18-19

5.9

20-24

20.5

25-29

25.2

30-34

22.2

35-39

13.2

40-44

5.1

45-49

3.0

50-54

2.0

55-59

0.9

60+

0.2

Black

1.85

Hispanic

2.06

Asian

2.83

Other

2.69

Another important feature of these families, often
overlooked in analyzing their well-being, is that in
approximately 45% of the families there are adults
living in the household who are not receiving support
These may be children older than 18, other relatives,
parents who are ineligible for support (such as prevtously undocumented persons), or unrelated individuals.
In some cases, these other individuals may contribute
to the household's incof11e, while in others thev requtre
support.

Source: Numbers derived from a special analysis of
information in Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
Characteristics Survey, january 1991: State of California
Health and Welfare Agency.

Most families are small. Approximately 70% of the
mothers have I or 2 children, the same as non-AFDC
families. Onlv 4% have 5 or more children. AFDC-U
families tend to have somewhat more children, but
most have 3 nr less.

1.70

One unusual aspect of California's recipient
population is that over 100,000 recipients are children
living with a parent who is not a recipientY Some are
children who live with parents receiving social securitv
or other benefits, rather than AFDC. Others are
children born in the U.S. to parents who entered the
country as undocumented aliens. When these parents
later became legal residents as a result of the "amnesty'
program, under the terms of the program they were
ineligible to receive AFDC. Their children born in the
U.S., on the other hand. are citizens and therefore
eligible if their parents have ltttle income.

% Recipients

Under 18

White

Source: Based on the author's calculations using information
on ethnicity of children and parents from "Characteristics
and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients," U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services for fiscal years
1988, 1989, and 1990.

Table 5

Age

Average No.

..

Recipients, like the population of California, come
from many racial and ethnic backgrounds. The largest
number are white; nonetheless, members of minoritY
groups are disproportionately poor and, as a result,
disproportionately rectpients of AFDC .

::·r·
1 d..J

There is a significant difference in the two
programs with respect to the proportion of AfricanAmericans and of families from Southeast Asia. As
shown in Table 7, African-Americans constitute 30%
of the FG population, but virtually none of the AFOCU group. The reverse is true for Southeast Asians;
people from these ethnic groups make up a large
percentage of the AFDC-U population but little of the
FG. Over 30% of AFDC-U recipients entered the
country as refugees. Not surprisingly, given this
difference, while 94% of FG recipients are ·u.s.
citizens, approximately 40% of AFDC-U recipients are
not.

Table 8
Percentage of Population Receiving AFDC-FG
by County Oan-June 1991)

County

Percent

County

Percent

Alameda

6.0
7.5
2.1
6.8
5.0
4.6
4.2
7.5
3.2
10.4
6.9

Orange

Sacramento

2.2
3.2
5.2
5.2
8.3

San Benito

4.5

Alpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Contra Costa

Table 7

Del Norte
Ethnicity/Race of Parent/Guardian (in percent)
(April 1990)

FG

ElDorado
Fresno

AFDC-U

Glenn
Ethnicity/Race
White
Hispanic
Black
Other

%

35.3
29.5
27.7
7.5

Ethnicity/Race %
White
Hispanic
Vietnamese
Laotian
Black
Cambodian
Other

33.0
24.0
17.6
10.2
4.8
4.2
0.2

Humboldt

7.4

Imperial

Madera

9.5
4.8
8.0
7.6
9.2
6.7
6.3
7.0

Marin

1.3

Mariposa

5.2
7.2
9.6
9.6
1.8
4.1
2.7
2.8

In yo
Kern
Kings
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles

Source: Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
Characteristics Survey, April 1990; State of California Health
and Welfare Agency.

Mendocino
Merced

It is often assumed that welfare participation is
higher in large cities or urban environments. In fact,
while the majority of recipients live in urban areas
along with the rest of the state's population, poverty
rates and AFDC rates tend to be highest in rural areas
and in areas of the state that have large agricultural
populations, such as the Central Valley. In the most
heavily populated counties. participation rates are
re!atively low. Because of its size, however, Los Angeles
contains approximately 30% of the state caseload (see
Table 8).

Modoc
Mono
Monterey
Napa
Nevada

Placer
Plumas
Riverside

8.0
San Diego
5.1
3.5
San Francisco
9.1
San Joaquin
San Luis Obisbo 2.6
1.7
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
2.9
Santa Clara
3.9
Santa Cruz
3.1
7.7
Shasta
4.3
Sierra
7.4
Siskiyou
4.8
Solano
3.1
Sonoma
Stanislaus
7.5
Sutter
5.8
Tehama
7.4
6.9
Trinity
10.3
Tulare
Tuolumne
4.8
Ventura
2.7
Yolo
5.9
10.8
Yuba

San Bernadino

Source: Calculated by author from State of California,
Department of Finance, Calif. Statistical Abstract Oct. 1991 ;
and State Department of Social Services, Statistical Services
Bureau, Public Welfare in California, January-June 1991.
Unfortunately, the state does not regularly gather
some information that might provide the public and
policy-makers with a more complete picture of welfare
recipients; most of the information collected focuses
solely on data needed to establish eligibility. For
example, no data are regularly collected on adult
recipients' educational background, primary language,

Ill

\')I
1"'""

physical and mental status, how long thev have lived in
California, or their work history prior to applying for

AFDC.
Some of this information can be pieced together
from various research studies. 43 It appears that about
half of all parents who receive AFOC have not
completed high schooL Approximately two-thirds of
new recipients have worked in the two years prior to
applying for AFOC, but most had income close to the
poverry line. Almost 20% have some type of disability
that limits their ability to work. Their own parents had
less income than the national average for all families,
in pan because recipients are more likely than nonrecipients to have lived with a single parent.
In California, a very large percentage of all
recipients lack proficiency in English. A recent study of
GAIN recipients in six counties (Alameda, Butte, Los
Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare) found that
from 5% to 32% of new applicants to the AFDC-FG
program had limited proficiency in English; among
applicants ro AFOC-U the range was 23% to 83%. 44
The highest percentages were in Los Angeles and San
Diego, counties which include a substantial proportion
of all recipients in the state.

In short, the large majority of parents, both single
and married, who receive AFDC lack the educatton
and/or skills needed to earn a reasonable living.
Perhaps one-fifth have physical or mental disabilities
that affect their ability to work. Because their own
parents and relatives also have low mcomes, they do
not have access to support in times of financtal
hardship. Many AFOC families live in the counttes
with higher unemployment rates.
Perhaps most importantly, the great maJOrity of
adult recipients are single mothers. Even two-parent
families with educational backgrounds similar to these
mothers find it difficult to earn an adequate living.
Single mothers, faced with childcare responstbility ancl
without the back-up of another parent, often have
little choice but to rely on AFDC for a period of time.
The fact that so many enter the system is less surprising
than the fact that most are able to exit the system
within several years, as is shown in the next section.

DURATION OF WELFARE RECEIPT

Probably the major criticism of the welfare system
is that too many people remain on welfare for periods
longer than necessary. As with many other aspects of
the system, perceptions of the problem are based partly
on accurate data and partly on myths. This section will
focus on what is known about the "dynamics" of
welfare use, that is, the patterns of use after people
enter the system. It must be recognized, however, that
the data describing the length of time people receive
support do not tell us anything about whether cutting
benefits will influence the amount of welfare current
usage. That issue will be discussed in the following
section; this section provides only a discussion of the
duration of welfare use and of the characteristics that
distinguish "short-term" from "long-term" recipients.

Table 9

Time Elapsed Since Beginning of Current Spell
(in percent) Oanuary 1991)

Any discussion about welfare dynamics must begin
by pointing out that it is impossible to provide a totally
accurate description of patterns of welfare use. Researchers face extraordinarily difficult methodological
problems in obtaining the type of data of most interest
and relevance to policy-makers and the publicY Due to
methodological problems reported findings often can
be misleading. 46

Time

FG

u

Less than 6 months

17.4

20.5

6 months to < one year

16.5

17.5

I year to < 2 years

19.9

16.2

2 years to < 3 years

11.8

13.0

3 years to < 4 years

7.5

6.3

4 years to < 5 years

5.9

4.2

5 years to < 6 years

5.6

4.1

15.4

16.7

0.2

1.5

Over 6 years
Unknown

Source: Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
Characteristics Survey, january 1991; State of California
Health and Welfare Agency.

The data from these snapshots are useful because
they reveal that over 80% of current recipients will
experience the full 25% reduction in support. They are
less useful in providing a true picture of welfare
dynamics. For the reasons previously discussed,
snapshots always contain a greater proportion <lf longterm recipients, thereby suggesting longer stays ,m
AFDC than is actually the case for all people who ever
receive support. This concept is somewhat hard t<l
understand. To explain the statistical issue, the start of
the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives deyeloped the following illustration,
using the example of hospitalizations:

Most impressions of welfare tenure in California
are derived from the "snapshot" data published annually by the California Department of Social Services
discussed in the previous section. These surveys show
how many months each current recipient has been
receiving support. In general, these snapshots reveal
that, at any given time, about half of all current
reCipients began receiving aid more than two vears
pnor to the survey (see Table 9). California's ~ercent
age of longtime recipients is slightly higher than in
most states with comparable populations.

Consider a 13-bed hospital in which 12
beds are occupied for an entire year by 12
chronically ill patients, while the other bed is
used by 52 patients, each of whom stays
exactly one week. On any given day, a
hospital census would find that 85% of the
patients ( 12/13) were in the midst of long
spells of hospitalization. Nevertheless, viewed
over the course of a year, short-term use
clearly dominates: out of the 64 patients using
hospital services, about 80% (52/64) spent
only one week in the hospital. Exactly the
same dynamic accounts for the results with
regard to welfare experienceY
Moreover, these snapshots do not reveal the fact
that, even among longer-term recipients, some people
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receive support for only part of a year, and others
receive only partial support to supplement earnings. For
example, a family could receive support from January to
March of one year, work for nine months, and return
the next January. This is not uncommon among low
paid agricultural workers, with seasonal employment.
Because of their data-gathering methods, many studies
treat such families as having received continuous
support for two or more years.

particular, any claim of precision should be disregarded.
This report attempts to identify some reasonable
parameters; while these estimates may be off by as
much as 20%, they provide a general sense of the
nature of welfare use.
The most relevant data for California come from a
study looking at California recipients between 1983
and 1985. This study, by David Maxwell-Jolly and Paul
Warren, followed a cohort of people who first received
AFDC in 1983. 48 Their patterns of usage were tracked
for a three-year period. The cohort reflected the
general welfare population in the state, except that it
excluded parents who were under eighteen. While such
parents tend to have longer-than-average stays on
welfare, they constitute only a very small percent of
initial welfare "adult" recipients. Thus, the data wtll
underestimate the length of stays for the entire
population at that time only slightly.

Developing a true picture of welfare dynamics
requires following a group of new recipients (a cohort)
for an extensive period of time and looking at their
welfare receipt on a month-to-month basis. (This is
called a longitudinal cohort study.) There are very few
such studies; none of a totally representative sample for
California or for the country as a whole. Even the few
studies with reasonably representative samples look at
recipients who were on welfare from 10 to 20 years ago.
Since the length of time people remain on welfare is
influenced by economic cycles, as well as the particular
characteristiCs of the recipients studied (for example,
the percentage of recipients who are younger has risen
in recent years), the findings of these studies do not
necessanlv ret1ect current patterns of use.

As shown in Table 10, about 45% of all AFDC-Fl i
recipients in this study were off aid within one vear,
55% within two years, and 60% wtthin three vears.
About 40% were still receiving support after three
years. There were significant regional differences,
reflecting both variations in the availability ot emplovment and in the characteristics of rectpients. The
length of stay was shorter for AFDC-U participants.

For all these reasons, claims about the dynamics of
welfare ''dependency" must be treated cautiously. In
Table 10

Percent of Recipients Off Aid at the End of Specified Intervals for those Entering AFDC During
February 1983
AFDC-FG

Length
I year

2 years
3 years

AFDC-U

Bay
Area

South
Valley

South
State

Rest
of
State

Bay
Area

South
Valley

South
State

Rest
of
State

43
59
63

42
51
55

41
53
59

47
59
64

57
71
76

53
64
68

54
70
76

57
68
74

Source: D. Maxwell-Jolly and P. Warren, California's Welfare Dynamic, California State Senate Appropriations Committee and Joint
Oversight Committee on GAIN Implementation, 1989.
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Whether a recipient was still receiving support after a given period of time tells only part of the story, however. A
number of recipients who were receiving welfare at the end of 2 or 3 years had left welfare for a period of time. In fact,
over 80% left welfare at some point. Only 18% of FG families and 12% of AFDC-U families received aid continuously
during the 3 years (see Table ll ).
Table II

Lengths of First Spells for Those Entering AFDC During February 1983 (cumulative percent)
AFDC-FG

AFDC-U

On AFDC
Less Than

Bay
Area

South
Valley

South
State

Bay
Area

South
Valley

South
State

3 months

22

19

23

19

14

IS

6 months

41

40

41

45

41

44

I year

60

59

58

66

68

66

2 years

76

76

75

81

85

82

3 years

84

82

82

86

89

88

Median months

9

9

9

6

7

7

Source: Maxwell-Jolly and Warren.
About half of those who left the rolls at some point needed to return before the end of three years; this accounts for
the difference between the 45% and 80% figures. The length of time they remained off welfare ranged from l month to
3 years; most returns occurred within 1 year (see Table 12).
Table 12

Cumulative Percent of Terminating Recipients Who Return (All Adult Recipients)
AFDC-FG

AFDC-U

Bay
Area

South
Valley

South
State

Rest
of
State

Bay
Area

South
Valley

South
State

Rest
of
State

I month

13

15

19

4

8

12

12

10

6 months

29

36

34

32

21

34

25

29

I year

36

44

41

27

42

30

30

36

3 years

47

56

50

51

37

55

38

46

Time
Since
Ending Aid

Source: Maxwell-Jolly and Warren.
From these cohort studies, we can draw some
general conclusions about welfare dynamics. At least
half of those who enter the welfare system probably will
leave within a year. Another 20-30% will leave the
system, at least for a period of time, within 3 years.
Between 20 to 25% of all initial recipients may receive
continuous support for three years or longer. And a
small proportion, perhaps 10 to 15%, will rely on
AFDC support for 8 or more years.

As previously mentioned, changing demographics,
economic cycles, rates of out-of-wedlock births and the
nature of available jobs all will cause variation in the
need for AFDC at different times. For example, one
recent study by two economists, R. Mark Gritz and
Thomas MaCurdy, involving a nationwide sample of
young mothers who received AFDC for some period
between their 16th and 24th birthdavs, indicates that
even young mothers often leave the system relatively
quickly. More than half of the mothers in their sample.
left the welfare system within a year."'~

There is a good deal of movement on and off
support. Of those receiving support in California at any
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given time, approximately one~third {36%) have had
previous periods of receipt. There are a number of
reasons for this. Because a large proportion of adult
recipients have low job skills, they often find employment in industries subject to economic fluctuations.
This is particularly true for recipients working in
agriculture, where employment is subject to seasonal
fluctuations, weather and general economic conditions.
Since many agricultural workers are not covered by
unemployment insurance, AFOC serves this function.
Among single mothers, many must leave jobs
because of family responsibilities. The loss of childcare,
personal or family illness, financial problems that force
the parent to give up housing, the loss of transportation
as well as other factors make it difficult for many single
parents to remain employed. Such personal crises affect
many people. But they have a far greater impact when
a parent is single, since there is no one to step in at a
time of emergency, and they can be particularly
devastating when a person is poor and doesn't have the
resources to cope with a crisis and continue to work.
Finally, some lose jobs because of poor performance or
leave jobs because they don't like the working conditions or find the pay too low.
For AFIX::>FG recipients, there are three routes off
AFOC: full-time employment, marriage, and a move to
other sources of support, such as disability benefits.
While earlier studies found marriage to be the main
means of exit, 5° the recent study by Gritz and MaCurdy
found that most recipients younger than 24 left AFOC
to work. Significantly, from the perspective of children,
this study also found that most mothers who left
welfare for work experienced a decline in income and
greater month-to-month fluctuations in resources.
Among AFOC-U recipients, increased earnings is the
basic route of exiting the AFOC system.
What distinguishes those parents who have longer
spells of welfare receipt? Again, less is known about this
than one might expect. Various studies report different
findings. Since no study looked exclusively at California, inferences must be drawn from studies of populations somewhat different from California's recipients.
The results of such studies have been summarized in a
recent review by economist Robert Moffitt. He
concludes that "exit rates are higher for women with
higher wage rates, higher educational levels, greater
levels of non-transfer non-wage income (that is support
from others), and for those with fewer children."' 1
One group that is generally thought to be at very
high risk of requiring support for long periods of time is
teenage mothers. Since about half of these mothers do
not complete high school, this concern seems reasonable. The evidence on this issue is not clear, however.
Most studies have looked at samples of recipients in the
1960's and 70's, or even earlier. During those periods,

teenage mothers were less likely to complete high
school than at present.
A more recent study looked at a large group of
women who were 14 to 16 years old in 1978. 52 Their
fertility and welfare receipt were tracked from 1979 to
1985. Among all
women in this sample who
received AFOC, women who gave birth to a child as a
teen did not have appreciably longer periods of welfare
receipt than women who gave birth between 20 and 24
years of age. The women's marital status and ethnicity
were the biggest predictors of length of welfare receipt.
Never married mothers were far more likely to require
support for two or more years.
One of the major questions is whether people
become more "dependent" on welfare after they have
remained on for a period of time; in other words,
whether receiving welfare, in and of itself, makes it
more difficult to get off the longer one stays on? One of
the reasons proponents of the Initiative want to limit
the length of time a recipient can receive welfare to a
very short time is the assumption that length breeds
dependency. Again, this is an issue about which there
is considerable debate and uncertainty. It is difficult to
distinguish conclusively between the effects of length
itself and the fact that those who stay longer have
fewer skills.
Economist Rebecca Blank has studied this question recently. 53 She reports that there is "some large
group which enters AFOC with virtually no alternative
opportunities, for whom the possibility of leaving
improves slowly over time, but who will be on welfare a
long time. There is another group which appears to
have opportunities to escape AFOC early, but who
become less and less likelv to leave AFOC as time
passes." This latter group might be thought of as
becoming "dependent. Yet, even this group continues
to move off welfare at a relatively constant pace. Blank
concludes therefore that, even though some women
receive support for long periods of time, the evidence
does not indicate that this is a result of their being on
welfare. Instead, it reflects the fact that they have little
chance to work their way off welfare, or to marry. In
other words, length may generate dependency somewhat, but the impact seems smalL
In sum, it appears, nor surprisingly, that single
mothers with the best job skills (or marriage prospects)
and who are weU situated to take jobs leave welfare
most rapidly. The same holds true with respect to
AFOC-U recipients. Wage earners with the strongest
past ties to the labor force, and with the most skills,
find jobs most easily. Among the AFOC-U group
language barriers may play an especially important role.
The recent six county evaluation of GAIN reports that
among the recipients in the AFOC program for longer
than 2 years the following percentages of recipients had

limited proficiency in English: Alameda 55.5%; Butte
24.4%; Los Angeles 82. 7%; Riverside 38.8%; San
Diego 53.9%; and Tulare 42.8%. And, for all groups,
the duration of receipt is related to unemployment
levels: People leave faster when there are more jobs.
These findings are highly relevant to an examination of
the probable effects of the Initiative's provisions, which
we tum to next.
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ANALYZING THE PROPOSAI....S: THE EFFECTS ON PARENTAL... BEHAVIORS

Our focus is on children. But assessing the
Initiative's impact on children requires examining the
likely effects on parents. The consequences for children
will depend on how parents respond to the cuts in
benefits and other new requirements. They also will
depend on how the proposal affects parents' ability to
provide adequate emotional support for their children.

The General Cuts in Benefits
We begin by the examining the likely effects of the
two main provisions of the Initiative - the initial
reduction in benefits and the additional reduction after
six months. These cuts lie at the core of the Initiative,
both in terms of children's well-being and the goals of
the Initiative's sponsors.
As previously suggested, these cuts are based on
the following assumptions: 1) if grants are smaller,
fewer people will find welfare attractive, leading to a
decline in caseload size; and 2) that the additional cut
after stx months will reduce long-term participation by
inducing more recipients to find jobs that will enable
them to leave the welfare system. Governor Wilson
also has contended that, at a minimum, the proposal
will do no harm because recipients can and will find
the lost income.
part-time work to

Size of Case load and Participation Rates. In recent
years the number of families entering the welfare
system has been growing, both in absolute terms
(caseload size) and in terms of the percentage of
women ages 15-44 who are receiving support (the
participation or dependency rate). 51 Proponents of the
Initiative frequently note that between 1980 and 1989
the number of people receiving welfare grew more
rapidly in California than in the nation as a whole, and
that welfare participation in California is somewhat
higher than the national average. Based on these facts,
Initiative proponents argue that California's relatively
high cash benefit rates encourage people to enter the
system.*
These
true, tell us nothing, however,
about why caseloads grew. It certamly does not
necessarily follow that either rising caseloads or higher
participation rates are caused by California's benefit
levels or that the proposed grant reductions will reduce

them. The evidence indicates that the caseload
increases and the participation are due to factors other
than the grant level.
Benefit levels are one of a number of factors that
might influence caseload size or participation rates.
Among the other important influences are economic
conditions, overall growth in the general population
size, the composition of the population (a state with a
high proportion of people over 50 probably will have
fewer recipients since this portion of the population ha,
few children eligible for AFOC), and the number ot
divorces and births to teens in the state.
In fact, there is good reason to believe that benefit
levels have only a small impact on caseloads and that
the reductions proposed in the Initiative will nor
reduce caseloads. Over the past twenty years, a half
dozen studies by economtsts have exammed the
relationship between beneftt levels and welfare
participation. While none of rhe studies is fully
applicable to California, given the particular mtx uf
factors intluencing caseloads here, these studies find
that while higher benefits mav mcrease parttciratton
rates the magnitude of the mcrease generallv is verv
small. 56
Actually, despite rhe rhetoric in the lnittanve,
even Governor Wilson arpears to agree rhat the
proposals in the Initiative will have very little tmract
on caseload size. According to the budget estimates he
submitted to the Legislature this year, tf the Initiative t'J
passed, all of the proposals combined would result in only
a 4% decline in the number of new cases next vear.
This includes the reductions that are anticipated from
the residency requirements, the exclusion of chddren
born to recipients and the provisions related to teens.
A look at the evidence shows why Californta's
caseload growth cannot be attnbuted to the grant level.
First, in 4 of 5 years between 1983 and 1988,
California's caseload growth was actually slower than
the state's overall population growth. Second, the more
recent "explosive" growth is recession related and not
unique to California
Table 13). In
caseload
growth in California since the recession has been
slower than in many states that have been hit less hard

*In dtscussing comparative caselor:ul size and growth, one issue that might be confusing w the publzc should be noted. The
ballot statement for the Initiative says that CaliforniQ. has 12% of the nation's population but pays 26% the welfare benefits.
Some people might take this w mean that California has 26% of the nation's welfare population, double the percentage one mrghr
expect if recrptents were distributed randomly among the states. This, course, is not true. Californw 's payments account for a
high percentage of tJ...e nation's payments primarily because California's cash grants are higher, rather than because California has
a higher than at.erage number of recipients, although the latter is true to a much lesser degree. As previously discussed, Califc>mia
zs not more generous when the entire benefit package is considered and cost of living factored in.

and have lower benefits. Although, in 1990,
California's population grew fourth fastest in the
country and it experienced the eighth largest percentage increase in unemployment, the AFDC caseload
grew at only the 21st fastest rate. Neighboring states
with much lower benefits had much higher growth
rates in caseloads than California in 1990. (N .M.,21 %;
Ariz.,18.1; ldaho,ll.7; Nev.,1l.l; Ore.,l0.5;
CA,l0.1) 57

recent caseload growth can also be seen by looking at
caseload growth in different California counties.
During the first six months of 1991, counties with
above-average unemployment also tended to have an
above-average percentage of its population on AFDC.
On average, 5.95% of the entire California population
received AFDC. However, Imperial County, which had
the highest unemployment rate in 1990, at 19.1 %, had
9.49% of its population on AFDC. In contrast, San
Francisco and Santa Clara counties, each with the
lowest unemployment rates during 1990, had only
3.5% and 3.8% of their populations on AFDC, respectively.60

Table 13
Percentage Growth in AFDC Caseload

(1988-90)
1988

1989

1990

California

3.0%

6.9%

9.7%

The West

2.8%

6.8%

9.6%

The South

2.6%

8.7%

10.4%

The Northeast

1.5%

3.5%

8.4%

Nationwide

0.6%

3.3%

8.4%

Among the factors discussed by the LAO, two
others deserve mention. The increase in case loads is in
part attributable to a substantial increase in births to
teenagers and to unmarried older women. While these
trends raise significant policy issues, they have been
nationwide, unrelated to benefit levels. 61 In addition,
California's caseload has expanded because manv
refugees, previously covered entirely by the federal
government, now have been added to state rolls. While
many state officials believe that the federal government
should assume full responsibility for helping refugees
who cannot find employment, the movement of this
group from federal to state caseloads cannot be attributed to benefit levels.

Source: Congressional Budget Office, 1991

What then accounts for the increasing caseloads?
This issue was studied recently by the California
Legislative Analyst's Office (LA0). 58 It attributes the
rising caseloads to a variety of factors other than
benefit levels. According to the LAO, at least half the
caseload growth is directly attributable to increases in
the population of women aged 15-44 during the past
ten years. In fact, between 1980 and 1988 the percenta~;e of growth in AFOC caseloads in California was
proportionate to the percentage of growth in the state's
overall populanon. There also was a large increase in
fertility among all segments of the California population during the 1980's, increasing the number of
children at risk of needing support. Since California's
population increased faster than that of the nation as a
whole during the 1980's, it is not surprising that it also
experienced a greater than average increase in AFOC
caseloads.

Increases in the overall population do not affect
the "participation rate" since, by definition, this means
the proportion of the population 15-44 receivmg
support at any given time. Participation rates are
influenced, however, by a number of other factors.
Interstate comparisons must, therefore, be treated very
carefully. Knowing that one state has a higher or lower
participation rate than another state, or than the
national average, tells us nothing about the reasons for
this. Accounting for a state's AFDC participation rate
is very difficult, as researchers recognize. All claims
about causes must be viewed very cautiously, since
many factors might account for observed differences.
The LAO also has identified a number of factors
that appear to account for California's relatively high
AFDC participation rate. One important element is
the composition of California's population, ~ince
certain groups are at higher risk of needing welfare
support. First, California's divorce rate and rate of
births to teenage mothers are among the nation's
highest. 62 As noted, mothers in both these groups often
need support from AFDC. California also has a large
percent of citizens from ethnic groups that historically
have experienced high rates of poverty. In addition,
many refugees, admitted to California to enable them
to escape political persecution in their native countries,
need support from the welfare system while they obtain
the language skills and education needed to find
employment.

As noted above, the most recent caseload growth
appears largely attributable to increased unemployment. In a comparison of 13 states in the West and
Southwest, states with above average AFOC per capita
caseload growth tended to have above-average increases in the number of unemployed. 59 Among these
states, California experienced the highest increase in
the number of unemployed during 1990. Moreover,
recent caseload growth has been disproportionately in
the AFOC-U component, which is generally more
sensitive to unemployment levels.
The relationship between unemployment and the
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For these, and other reasons discussed by the LAO,
it would be expected that the participation rate would
be higher in California than in most other states,
regardless of benefit levels. This is not to say that
benefit rates have no importance. Most studies conclude that they can have a small impact. But little
change in the participation rate can be expected from
the proposed cuts.

Table 14

Benefit levels in States with Highest Percent
Population Receiving AFDC More Than Two
Years (1989-90)

It actually is possible that the entire package of
proposals contained in the Initiative and the accompanying waivers recently granted by the federal government will increase caseloads or participation rates.
Whde lowering cash grants, these proposals also
change two other elements of the welfare system's
economic structure: the amount a recipient can earn
before having her or his family's cash grant reduced,
and the total amount a recipient can earn and still
retam eligibility for some benefits. While these changes
will certamly help some poor children whose parents
are able to work, it also will make eligible some people
who are currently ineligible to receive benefits. 0 l Thus,
cosr-savmg claims may be constderablv overstated.

Cash
Benefit

More Than
2 Years

State

Rank

llinois

I

$343

Michigan

2

465

57.3

Pennsylvania

3

374

55.5

Ohio

4

325

55.3

Mississippi

5

121

55.0

57.7%

Kentucky

6

225

53.2

Connecticut

7

570

52.2

California

8

637

51.9

Rhode Island

9

498

51.6

New jersey

10

263

50.9

Source: Characteristics and Financ1al Circumstances of
AFDC Recipients, FY 1990, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services.

Reducmg Length Of Stay. As with the goal of
reduc mg caseloads, it seems very unlikely that the
approach taken in the Initiative will increase the rate
at which parents now leave the welfare system or
enable those who now remain m the system for many
years to become self-sufficient, as desirable as this goal
may be. Once again, this is recognized in the
Governor's budget estimates, which forecast only a 4%
reduction in long-terrn participants if the Initiative is
passed. The research indicates that this is the most that
might be expected. A number of studies have examined
the relationship between benefit levels and duration of
partiCipation m AFOC. While most studies find that
higher benefits are associatt:d with longer duration,
these studies also find that the tmpact of grant amounts
is verv sma!l. 64 In fact, California has exactly the same
percentage of current recipients who have been on
welfare for two or more years, 4 7%, as the nation as a
whole. 6 ' Moreover, as shown in Table 14, the states
with the greatest percentage of long-terrn recipients do
not have especially high benefits.

It must be remembered that the majority ot all new
AFDC recipients already leave rhe system w1rhin a
year, although many need more than six months
the
point at which the Initiatiw would reduce benefits for
most recipients- before they are able to find, or take.
a job. Another group of recipients, many of whom are
participating in education or JOb training programs,
need support for longer, but they generally remam in
the system for only 1 to 3 years. (Some of these are
teenagers who will be excluded from the cuts if they are
in school.) While some of these recipients mtght
abandon their education or training and take a lowpaying job because of the impact of the cuts - which
may not be desirable from anyone's perspective
th{'V
often will remain eligible for support because the
they can get pay so lmle.
For those recipients who now require longer
periods of support, cuts in benefits will not push them
out of the system for the simple reason that most longterm recipients do not have the skills or job prospects
that would enable them to earn enough to leave the
system. A very different approach is needed to deal
with this fact -one that emphasizes education and
job-skill training- so that partictpants acquire the
skills necessary to earn more than poverty wages. And.
for a proportion of recipients, especially women with
young children, only programs that both increase the
income from work, such as increasing the Earned
Income Tax Credit, and provide childcare, will allow
them to be independent of welfare and still have
enough income to live at a decent level. 66
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The fact that many recipients cannot work their
way off AFOC was spelled out by Robert Moffitt in his
rev1ew of welfare participation studies. He states that
"9 5 percent of those on the AFOC rolls would, if off
the program, retain eligibility for benefits .... Thus the
problem of welfare 'dependency' cannot be ascribed to·
the work disincentives of the program."67 Put differ·
ently, Moffitt is saying that for the vast majority of
current long-term recipients any employment they
might find would not pay enough to make them
ineligible for AFOC.

work be able to replace the lost income? (3) Can
current recipients actually find employment? Are the
jobs available? Is childcare? ( 4) What percentage of
recipients who can find work are likely to do so? This is
critical from a child's perspective. If a parent does not
choose to work, assuming she or he can, it is the child
who gets penalized for the parent's behavior. Is this
sensible? (5) Finally, is it a sound idea to try to make all
parents work more? In particular, do we want to force
mothers of newborns or of children under two to place
their children in childcare? If yes, should this be
contingent on the availability of high-qualiry
childcare? Are there other people who should not be
forced to work- those, for example, whose children
have disabilities?

The end of this report provides abrief discussion of
some policies that can help reduce, and perhaps even
end, long-term welfare use- policies that do not
jeopardize the well-being of children in the process.
But they require investments not only in job-training
and education programs, but i:.1. increased health
coverage, increased child-support enforcement, and
perhaps government-provided jobs. Not only are such
programs altogether absent from the Initiative, many
existing programs are being cut, increasing the likelihood that the Initiative will have many unintended
consequences. Without such policies, there is little
hope of reducing the proportion of long-term recipients.

This section focuses on the first four issues (the last
will be discussed later). To summarize our conclusions,
about half of all recipients who require support for
more than 6 months will not find further employment.
Perhaps a third to a half of current recipients will be
able to find regular part-time work and the childcare
that will enable them to take jobs. Most of these
families will not be better off economically as a result;
they will break-even or will not net enough to replace
the lost income. The great majority of families,
therefore, will be worse off economically.

Increasing Work By Recipients. Perhaps the central
argument of the Initiative's supporters is that, at a
minimum, recipients can make up the lost income with
just a small number of hours of work per week- the
Governor claims that 6 to 10 hours will be needed.
While the number of recipients wouldn't be reduced,
the amount of state payments would be, thereby freeing
funds to reduce the deficit or fund other programs.

The start of any analysis begins with the current
work efforts of recipients. At any point in time,
approximately 7 to 8% of California's recipients report
earnings, mostly from part-time work. 68 This is slightly
above the national average. Since recipients move in
and out of the labor force while receiving support,
between 20 and 30% report earned income at some
point; some recipients have unreported earnings.
Taking this last group into account, it seems likely that
between 40% and 50% of all recipients work at some
point. 69 Many of these parents are undoubtedly among
those recipients who exit AFOC relatively quickly.

Proponents believe that the cuts will push non·
working parents into rhe job-market. Along with this
stick, recipients also will be provided a carrot to induce
more work. As previously mentioned, benefits currently
are reduced one dollar for every dollar earned, after
certain exemptions are counted. One of those exemptions allows the first $30, plus one-third of the remaining earnings, to be disregarded for the first four months
of work. After that, only the $30 exemption is allowed.
As a result, many recipients have little incentive to
combine work and AFOC support.

Most of those who now work do not work regularly. To get a sense of why this is so, it is useful to
think about the situation of many recipients. As noted
earlier, women generally earn considerably less than
men, regardless of the women's level of education.
Women on AFOC are even more restricted with
respect to the types of jobs for which they are qualified.

In compliance with legislation passed last year, the
stare has received permission from the federal government, which sets the requirements, to apply the full
$30 and a third disregard for as long as the recipient
has earnings, if the Initiative passes. Since working
recipients will be able to retain more of their earnings,
they will have more incentive to work.

Childcare responsibilities further limit the types of
jobs single mothers can take. Unless they have help
from family members or friends, they face both the
necessity of finding affordable childcare and the need
to work relatively close to be available in emergencies.
If they do find work, it usually is at the low end of the
employment structure. This makes them particularly
vulnerable to changes in unemployment levels. In
addition, family crises, health problems and other
factors can force many of these mothers in and out of
the labor market. Some parents need to stay home to

There are five issues raised by the claim that
recipients can work to make up the lost income: ( 1) Is
the claim correct? How much incentive for additional
work does the proposal create? (2) Will those who find

•

1 (•'"";
.• I

care for a child with disabilities. Finally, a portion of
AFDC mothers suffer from physical or emotional
problems that impair their ability to work, let alone
earn enough to exit the welfare system. The children of
this last group will be especially harmed by cuts in
family income.
While families receiving AFOC-U, which have
two parents available, do not face the childcare
problems confronting single mothers, most of these
parents have less than high school education and a
large percentage do not speak English. When these
parents work, it usually is in the secondary labor
market, where the wages remain low.
Will the carrots and sticks in the Initiative change
this pattern? Determining whether these parents can or
will stay in the labor force and predicting whether
those with no work history will begin working, or work
enough to replace the lost income, is very difficult.
Some inferences can be drawn from evidence regarding
the impact of previous changes in the 30 and a third
rule. Prior to 1982. the disregard applied to all recipients, nationally, for one year. At that time, the rule was
changed to the present four months. Before 1982, an
average of 14% of recipients reported earned income
each year. Following the change, that figure dropped to
the current 8%. Judging by that shift, just changing the
disregard will influence only a small percentage of
recipients.
If the Initiative passes, both the benefit level and
the disregard will change, so evidence from changes in
the disregard alone provides only partial insight.
Directly relevant, however, are the findings of economist Gary Burtless. After reviewing the research
examining the relationship between grant levels, the
amount of earnings recipients may retain, and work by
AFOC recip1ents he concluded: "A reform that reduced
tax rates and reduced support levels simultaneously
would undoubtedly raise work effort among the poor, at
least slightly, but it also would harm the living standards of families already at the margin of American
life.'' 70 This is precisely the reform being proposed in
California (tax rates is a term for the disregard rule and
support levels a term for the cash grant). According to
Burtless, somewhat more work can be expected, but on
average poor children and parents will have less money
as a result of the changes.
Why will recipients be worse off economically on
average? To begin with, while the change in the 30 and
a third rule will enable some currently working
recipients to retain enough of their earnings so that
they are hetter off even with the reduced grant, most
currently working recipients will find themselves worse
increase their hours of work. Otherwise,
off unless
the reductton in the grant level will exceed the extra
amount they can keep from their earnings.

For those not currently working, who comprise
over 90% of recipients, there is a question whether
there are jobs available for workers with their job
qualifications, especially during this time of recession.
Experts offer different conclusions. 71 Research is onlv
partially helpful; most studies do not match the
available jobs with the places where recipients live,
either with regard to counties or, in larger counties,
location within the county. Even if jobs were avatlable,
many mothers will be unable to find childcare, especially mothers with infants. The lack of "off-hour" care
may also prevent recipients from taking some existing
jobs.
Finally, many recipients who find work will not be
able to replace the income lost due to the cuts. The
Governor's claim that a recipient would onlv need to
work 10 hours per week to hreak-even assumes no
childcare costs. A rectpienr with childcare needs would
have to work at least 20 hours a week at $5 an hour JUSt
to come out even. And w1th this combination of w,;rk
and welfare they would soli be livmg below the poverrv
line.
A small percentage of parents may not work due rn
personal problems, such as depression or substance
abuse, or because thev prefer not wnrkmg to rhe extn
income, or because thev have so lost touch with the
labor market that they cannot imagme working. The
Initiative, however, is not a targeted approach to
dealing with this group. Cutting benefits to "pumsh"
them for nor working is w deprive their children 11t
resources, as well as the children of all those who want
to work but cannot find jobs. It is like blowing up an
entire city to destroy a few buildings; unfortunately, all
of the buildings are occupted.

Summary. In sum, the Initiative will not do much
to prevent initial entry onto AFOC, nor willtt result m
any real increase in the numbers of parents leavmg the
system in less than six months. If our estimates are
correct, and they are consistent wtth the Governor's,
30 to 60% of new recipients will continue to need
support for somewhere between six months and two
years and an additional 20 to 40% wtll be on longer,
even after the changes in benefits and the other
programs.
There may be some increase in the percentage of
recipients who work part-time, but even so most
children will experience a decline in income. While an
unknown proportion of families will replace the lost
income, few families will be better off. That few parents
will be better off economically, even if they work, raises
two concerns. First, as discussed later. requiring parents
of infants and toddlers to work may he quite harmful to
these children. For rhe~e children the Initiative offers
no chance of increased well-being, only the risk of
substantial detriment. Second, except for teenagers,

recipients who want to get more education in order to
improve their long-tern economic prospects will be
unable to do so, unless they are willing to absorb the
entire cut. As a result, many more children will
continue living in poverty, albeit with a working
parent. As we discuss later, it is parental poverty, not
receipt of AFOC, that harms most children.

when they tum 18. More realistically, it seems unlikely
that many 16- and 17 -year-olds are this calculating, so
that the proposal probably will have a minuscule
impact on birthrates.
It is possible, however, that some young mothers
who have a child and want to set up their own household will decide or be required to remain at home as a
result of the proposal. This may have both good and
bad consequences. There is a small body of research
comparing teenagers who live with their parents and
those who live on their own according to a variety of
criteria. These studies suggest that teen mothers who
live with their parents are much more likely to continue their schooling and slightly less likely to have
repeat pregnancies. 75

Cal-Learn and Other Provisions Relating to
Teenagers
For the reasons noted earlier, as well as because
adolescents seem to be less capable as parents, it clearly
is desirable to encourage young women to delay
parenthood. The Initiative seeks to address the issue of
teen parenthood in two ways: first, by provisions that
require younger teens to live with their own parents;
and, second, by provisions designed to encourage teens
who have a child to remain in school. While the goals
are indisputably good, the means chosen in the
Initiative may well do more harm than good. In terms
of improving the life choices of both the teen mother
and her child, other approaches appear to be far
preferable.

All the studies, however, compare teen mothers
who chose to remain in the parental home with those
who chose to leave. The findings from these studies,
therefore, tell us little with respect to teen mothers
required to live in the parental home by the state,
which might yield very different results. There are
several reasons for concluding that negative outcomes
will predominate when teens are forced to live with
their families.

The Co-ResU:lence Requirements. Under the Initiative, teenage mothers younger than 18 would be
eligible for benefits only if they live with a parent or
other relative. Exceptions would be made if the parent
or legal guardian refuses to have the teenager, the
physical or emotional well-being of the teenager would
be threatened by living with her parent, or the teenager
has been living away from the parent for a year. As
previously mentioned, the justification for this provision is that it will discourage some teenagers from
having children and encourage family unity.

A teen mother's place of residence influences the
mother's emotional well-being, her parenting behaviors
and the development of her child. As we shall see more
fully later, the evidence regarding the impact of
residence on parenting behaviors, and on the children
of teen mothers, is inconsistent. But there is reason to
worry that coerced co-residence will be harmful to
many teen mothers themselves. While the teen's
parents may be able to provide needed support, being a
teen mother does not end the normal conflict between
adolescents and their parents. 76 To the contrary, the
presence of a new baby can be a source of constant
conflict, generating hostility about differences m childrearing philosophy, the teen mother's behavior, and
the role and responsibilities of the grandparent. The
teenager may be regularly blamed for having the child.
There may be additional disputes focusing on social
relations. Those teens who chose to stay with their
families may believe that these problems are outweighed by the benefits of parental support. But teens
who wish to be on their own may have concluded that
the added stress will harm them, as well as their child.

Evaluating this provision is difficult. Since no state
has ever mandated co-residence, it is impossible to say
whether the proposal will have any effect on the
number of births by those under 18. It must be recognized, however, that this provision is applicable to a
very small number of cases. There are fewer than 9,000
teen mothers under 18 who receive AFOC; 70% of
these are 17 years old and 20% are 16 years old. 73 We
did n< >t find estimates of how many of these teens live
independently.
Several anthropological studies suggest that some
teenagers become mothers in order to be treated as
adults and to escape from their families.; 4 Even for
those teenagers the co-residence rule may have little
effect. Young teenage girls would have to be aware of
the provision and take it into account when deciding
whether to have sexual relations or to terminate a
pregnancy. lf one wants to assume that 16- and 17year-olds plan ahead to this extent, then one also
should assume that 17 -year-olds who want to become
independent can wait a short reriod and have the child

Most importantly, some teen mothers come from
abusive or otherwise dysfunctional homes. While the
proposal allows teens to request exemption from the
co-residence requirement, it is questionable whether
this will be a very effective remedy. Some teens may be
reluctant to ask. It is unknown whether social workers,
many of whom have minimal training, are capable of
making these judgments. An adequate home evaluation would be time-consuming and costly; what's more,
it is doubtful that such evaluations will take place.
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In sum, there may be both gains and losses from
this provision. The impact on teen births will undoubtedly be negligible. For those who have children, the
benefits to some mothers emanating from parental
support will be balanced by the harms to others
resulting from increased conflict. The administrative
costs will be substantial, or else the exemption provisions will be rendered meaningless. At a minimum, this
provision cannot not be seen as much of a reason to
vote for the Initiative.

Cal-Learn. Under this program, parents 19 and
younger receiving AFOC (including the "parents of
unborn children") will have their AFOC grants
increased or decreased based upon school attendance.
Many people consider this provision to be an especially
desirable feature of the Initiative. Helping teens
complete high school is highly desirable. Because of the
imporrance of this goal, the means selected demand
careful scrutiny. The evidence indicates that the
provision probably will do more harm than good.
As noted. about half of all teen mothers do not
finish hi15h school. The drop-out rate for Hispanic
females is especially high, as is the drop-out rate for all
Hispanics
male and female. In contrast, more than
60% of young black mothers now obtain a degree. As
these differences indicate, dropping out of school is
influenced by a variety of factors.
Not surprisingly, those leaving school tend to be
the students who were doing most poorly to begin with.
Recent findings indicate that as many as 60% of
Hispanics, 52% of whites and 26% of blacks dropped
out before becoming pregnant. 77 Plagued by poor
grades, often behind by a year or more, these adolescents see little to be gained by remaining in school.
Other teens drop out upon becoming pregnant, often
because thev do not want to attend during their
pregnancies. Finally, some leave school after the child
is born. The added responsibilities of childcare, along
with any other disincentives they may have, make
school attendance too difficult.
Many different approaches are being tried within
California and throughout the country to deal with this
problem. The evidence indicates that compared with
other approaches the use of financial rewards and
punishments is noi: very
in inducing dropouts
to return to school or in improving attendance among
those who have not completely dropped out. Two
states have recently implemented programs similar to
the Initiative's, Leamfare it) Wisconsin and LEAP in
Ohio. Preliminary studies of these programs - primarily Learnfare - find that: 1) Learnfare does not <.ppear
to improve school attendance; 2) Many teen parents
have been sanctioned (had their grants reduced) under
these programs; and 3) The programs are difficult to
administer economically and fairly.

Wisconsin's Learnfare program has been heavdv
evaluated. In January 1992, the University of
Wisconsin's Employment and Training Institute
released results from a formal, multi-year evaluation of
the Learnfare program. :R They found an extremely
mixed picture regarding attendance. While approximately one-third of the teens
to Learnfare had
improved their school attendance, more than half had
actually attended less after one year of the program.
Moreover, in statistical analyses
data from six
school districts, researchers found that even the
improvement in attendance could not actually be
attributed to Learnfare. Another review of Wisconsm
data, by the Center for Law and Social Policy
(CLASP), found that the number of Learnfare teens
who dropped out of school actually increased during a
two-year period under the Leamfare program.
The failure of Leamfare to increase attendance ts
not the result of an absence of sanctions. During the
first year of the program, hetween 'i.Z% and l0.6'Ytl ()t
all Leamfare teens were sanctioned each month.
Twenty percent of those sancnoned were sancnnned
for dropping out of school. SO'XJ fqr tailing to complv
with monthly attendance n.:quirements, and the
remaining students were 'ianctioned for <lther reason-,
(e.g. failure to verifv statu:,). Simdar results were iound
in a preliminary review of LEAP. In four of ftve Ohiu
counties for which data were ;lVadahle, sancnons were
requested for 20% of teen rarenrs subject to LEAP.
Roughly two-thirds of those
were sanctioned for their failure to he enrolled in school.
The research in Ohio and Wisconsin also makes it
clear that implementing a sanction program is costly
both in dollars and administrative time. The acttvitie~
of state and county soc tal services agencies, public
schools, private schools and independent service
agencies all must be coordinated. Establishing umform
procedures throughout the state has proven especially
difficult, raising issues of fairness for Learnfare teens.
Perhaps most importantly, the Umversity of Wisconsm
study found more than 16,000 errors in Learnfare
records (including inaccurate ages, faulty attendance
records, etc.). A state audit in Milwaukee Counrv
alone found improper reductions of welfare benefits for
more than 1,100 families, reductions
families
could ill afford. Developing procedures to carefully
monitor school attendance will be qutte costly for
California's school districts, which already have
funding problems.
These programs
result in the imposition
of financial penalties on teen parents, many of whom
have already dropped out uf :ichool. Yet the pt>nalties
often do not generate the desired behavior. The net
effect is to punish mothers and their children without
achieving many positive outcomes. In light of the
LJUestionable value of these penalnes, and the

harm that can be done to children, it would seem that

desirable, viewed solely from the perspective of
children.

more positive approaches should be utilized. A major
barrier for many teens is the absence of chtldcare and
traf1SPOrtation. The Initiative makes no provision for
childcare; the Governor's budget proposals do request
additional funds. While this certainly is desirable, extra
funds are already needed for the many teens who now
want to return to school but lack childcare. Such
expenditures need not tum on passage of the Initiative.

The critical question is how much of a deterrent a
denial of benefits will be. If additional births still occur,
all family members will be poorer. For this provision to
be effective, the threat of lower benefits would have to
induce a large number of women to cease having sexual
relations or to use contraceptives or to have abortions.
During the early 1980's, a number of commentators argued that the availability of welfare benefits
served as an inducement for poor women to have
children. In order to test these claims, researchers
began to examine the relationship between benefit
levels and family size. As even the critics of the current
welfare system recognized, these studies showed that
the possibility of obtaining additional benefits did not
motivate parents to have additional children.ti 2 Fertility
rates of recipients appear to be lower than those in the
general population and, as previously pointed out, most
families on welfare are small, with an average of less
than two children.

Given the educational difficulties confronting
these teens, moreover, just getting them to school is
not enough. Many need special programs to help them
overcome academic deficiencies, and to become better
parents. A number of California school districts have
special programs that already have long waiting lists. 80
Other teen mothers receive special attention in GAIN
programs. If the Initiative passes, its focus on financial
rewards and penalties may supplant these more
promising approaches.
In sum, the harms from the proposed approach
seem to clearly outweigh any potential gains. There is
little reason to believe that financial incentive will
influence the behavior of many teens. The administrative costs may be substantial. Most importantly, the
money spent trying to implement this approach could
be utilized for programs that already have demonstrated
their effectiveness.

Possibly, the absence of additional support will
serve as a deterrent, even if grant increases do not
create incentives. But the data do not seem to support
this hypothesis. Throughout the country, the number
of children in families receiving welfare is unrelated to
benefit levels. In very low-benefit states, where the
birth of an additional child leads to virtually no
increase in benefits, recipients have as many children
as those in higher-benefit states. 83

Denial of Benefits for Additional Children

Under current law, the total grant amount is
linked to family size. Upon the birth of another child, a
family receiving support gets an additional $97 to $128
per month, depending upon the number of recipients
already in the family. The Initiative would discontinue
these increases for families in which the new child is
conceived while the family is receiving AFDC.

It seems extremely unlikely that passage of the
proposal will cause recipients to stop all sexual activity.
The provision applies to married couples, as well as
single women. Conceivably contraceptive use will
increase, although there is no evidence to this effect.
Moreover, failure rates for the most reliable forms of
contraceptives- the pill, condoms, and diaphragms
-range from 6 to 16% a year. If the provision has any
impact, it probably will be through pushing women
into unwanted abortions.

We have not found data regarding the percentage
of families receiving support that actually have additional children; the state has not previously gathered
this information on a systematic basis. Some recent
surveys in California and other states indicate that
perhaps 20 to 30% of recipients who remain in the
system longer than two years will give birth to another
child."i

We cannot reliably estimate the number of
prevented births versus the number of families that will
loose benefits as a result of this provision. Certainly
some families will have additional children; the degree
of deterrence is speculative. It is with this framework in
mind that voters should weigh the likely impact of this
provision on children.

While opinions differ about whether it is irresponsible or inappropriate for poor families to have additional children, value judgments of this kind are not
the tocus of this report. From the perspective of
children already in AFOC families, discouraging
additional births might be beneficial in some ways.
Thev would receive more parental attention; more
importantly, the birth of another child lowers the
probability that the parent wtll be able to able earn a
reasonable income. If the penalties for additional births
served as a total deterrent the proposal might be

Eliminating Benefits to Pregnant Women

The provision to eliminate AFDC grants to
pregnant women has received little attention. This
provision applies only to first- time mothers, since
pregnant recipients already receiving support are not
currently eligible for increased benefits until the child
is born, except for a $70 per month supplement during
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the pregnancy, which also is eliminated by the Initiative. Approximately 14,000 women without children
receive benefits under this provision at any point in
time; a greater number receive benefits during the
course of a year.
The underlying assumption behind this proposal
appears to be that most pregnant women who receive
benefits are in the labor force when they become
pregnant
that
availability of benefits encourages them to stop working. If these benefits are
eliminated, the Governor's budget proposals estimate
savings of $38 million in state funds. Unfortunately,
there are no data available that would enable us to
assess the probable impact of the proposal and the
likelihood that it will achieve its stated goals. It is not
known how many current recipients were in fact
working prior to applying for benefits, how much they
were earning and in what type of jobs, or why they left
work, if they did. Their need for this support therefore
cannot be determined.
There are some possible consequences that should
be of concern, however, although their magnitude
cannot yet be determined. First, as pointed out by the
Leg1slative Analyst, many of these women could apply
for General Assistance (GA). This basically transfers
responsibility from the state to the counties, although
there will be modest savings because GA grants are
lower than AFOC grants. More trnportantly, from the
pregnant women may fail to
take
of other programs, such as Medi-Cal or
the federal Women, Infant and Children program
(WIC), which provides food to pregnant women. Some
mothers may be made aware of these programs by
AFOC workers.
As we discuss later, if mothers fail to get medical
care, to eat nutritiously, and to avoid behaviors that
can
a fetus, the harm to children from this
proposal could be very substantial indeed. And the
public would be hurt as well, since lack of medical care
etc. is
correlated with having a low-birth weight
infant. Medical care for such infants can cost as much
as $
per child. Such costs could tum out to be
an unintended consequence of the Initiative.

f..esidency Requirements
According to polls, one of the most popular
provisions of the Initiative is the restriction on the
amount of benefits available to new applicants who
have not lived in California for 12 months. Such
applicants will receive only the amount they could
have received in the state where they last resided, but
no more than the maximum California benefit. For
those
from Texas, for example, the maximum
benefit would be $184.
The

is based on t!:te assumption that some

people from other states move to California because of
California's comparatively high cash grants. Presumably, these families either were receiving AFOC in
another state and wanted higher benefits or were
willing to quit a
and seek better work
that if they did not find work
for AFOC.
of Social Services
The California
estimates that 7% of those who received benefits last
year lived in another state within the previous 12
rnonths. 84 Estimating how many of them fall into either
of the categories just mentioned is not possible. It
seems likely that at least some portion of new recipients from out-of-state carne to California to take a job,
to find a job, or to join relatives without any thought
that they might have to apply for welfare.
The question of whether welfare benefit levels
serve to attract potential reopients to a state has been
the subject of a fair amount of research during the past
10 years. Because there are enormously difficult barriers
to studying the question in a methodologically adequate way, debate continues. The general conclusion
from this research, however. is that benefit levels
appear to have little, if any, tmpact on decisions to
move from state to state. although two experts take
somewhat different view, claiming that benefit levels
have a small but consequential impact.
All of these studies fincl that families move for a
variety of reasons. The minor importance of benefit
levels is evidenced, in part,
the fact that
numbers people move from high-benefit to low-benefit
states and then end up needing to apply for AFDC. In
fact, a recent study in the state of Washington found
that 20% of new recipients from out of state had come
to Washington from California.t'i\ In addition, when
studies have asked new
moved to
state, the most common answer was to be near familv.
This is hardly surprising; a poor family is
to
move a great distance without the support system
provided by family or a job.
While politicians and researchers seem to be
concerned with the question of whether
states are welfare
" lookin~ at the issue from
the
of children
different ._.u,.Juut
For children, the relevant
is not how many
people are attracted to California because of high
benefits, but how many will not be deterred from moving
to California even though they may receive very small
grants.
To the extent that families are 'i"''"'"r"fi
will have no
on
although some non-California
children- for example, those whose parents
the opportunity to move to California to
better
jobs or to join extended family
may be harmed. On

the other hand, to the extent families continue to
move to California and end up having to apply for
.Af[)C, the impact on children could be extremely
negative. All of the research indicates that there will
be little reduction in the number of new applicants
from other states. Those families who cannot find work
will either have to live on very low incomes here or
move to other states. As we shall see shortly, either
alternative would be bad for children.

more than three-quarters of the adult recipients, face
the additional barrier of needing care for their children
in order to work. This care must be affordable, accessible, and of sufficient quality to protect and promote
children's well-being. At least for mothers of very
young children, and there are approximately 200,000
mothers with children less than a year old currently
receiving support, adequate care is not available.
Most of these parents cannot change their situation in response to financial penalties or even rewards.
They need help in acquiring job skills and provision for
their children's care. Among single mothers, the half
who become single parents as a result of divorce,
separation, or death of a spouse often need time to
adjust to their new economic and personal situation.

Summary

From the previous discussion it is apparent that
little reform of the welfare system can be expected as a
result of the Initiative's proposals. The evidence from
all prior research demonstrates that the goals of
reducing entry into the system, ending long-term
reliance on support, preventing births to teens, and
improving the prospects of teen mothers cannot be
achieved through policies that rely exclusively on
economic penalties and rewards. Rather than reducing
the number of children and parents living in poverty,
the Initiative will push many families into deeper
poverty.

Finally, the data ftom the programs in Wisconsin
and Ohio aimed at teen mothers indicate that financial
penalties and rewards, at least at the levels being
proposed, are not sufficient to make school a viable or
attractive option. The decisions of young women,
including those in their early 20's, with regard to
childbearing, school and work obviously are influenced
by a complex set of factors. Reform efforts that seek to
change these behaviors must be based on an understanding of these factors and be tailored to respond to
them in ways meaningful to these women.

The review of the circumstances that cause parents
and children to rely on AFOC tells why this is so. The
families that must rely on AFOC have no other
options. This is especially true with respect to longterm recipients. The great majority of parents lack the
education, job skills, or language ability that would
enable them to earn enough to provide basic support to
their children; in hard economic times many cannot
find any employment. Single mothers, who comprise

Because recipients will receive less support the
Initiative will have the effect of reducing the budget, at
least in the short-run. Since the majority of recipients
will be unable to replace the lost income, many
children will be poorer. We tum next to examining the
likely effects on children .
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THE EFFECTS ON CHII...OREN
'

We now tum to our major concern, the effects of
the proposal in its entirety on the well-being of
children. In order to understand the potential effects, it
is necessary to understand the aspects of a child's
environment
to successful development. With
those in mind, we can then examine how these aspects
of children's environments are likely to be altered by
the Initiative.
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In addition, poor children often are served
inferior-quality institutions. For
ally attend schools
have fewer resources
schools of non-poor
and their
often
start with low
that students will be

activities.YO f-',.,,,.,,..,.;,.,,.,
mental dangers requires heroic efforts on the part of
parents; poor parents must do more than other parents
just to protect their children from harm. In the face of
rhe stresses of poverty, manv poor parents are not able
to make such efforts~

Among child development experts there is a
considerable degree of consensus regarding the basic
elements needed to insure children's well-being. These
elements were identified by the National Commission
on Children:
The essential ingredients for developing
competence and character cut across culture,
nationality, and class. All children need
loving parents who provide safe, secure homes
and encourage their development. They must
be
sheltered and protected from harm.
Their basic health and nutritional needs must
be met, as must their mothers during pregnancy.
early, children must learn to trust
others. They must possess a secure and
positive sense of their own identity and their
place in the world .... 87

The cumulative impact of all these factors severelv
compromises a poor child's opportumties for normal
fact that
development. They help accoum for
children living in poverty
considerably
higher rates of infant mortalitv, accidents and in Junes,
academic delays and school
and emotional
problems. Any estimates of the
of the lninattve
must start with the
that the children who
will be most affected alreadv are
harmed
in poverty.
The Reductions in Benefits

The Commission identified two factors as especially critical to
a child receives these ingredients- the quality of care provided by parents and by
the child's other
and family income.
that the two factors are
Moreover,
interrelated, since inadequate income often significandv
the quality of care a parent can and
does

A very large percentage of families
recetve less
financial support as a result of the Initiative. The effect
of the Initiative will
parents
income loss.
discussion
respond to
shows, there will be a group of children whose
parent(s) will be able to
lost income
through work, but who will remain poor and on
welfare, even with part or full-time work. There also
will be some families who will be induced to work
the incentives or penalties and
wtll
able to raise
their income above the poverty leveL Finally, there
will be families unable to
some or all of the lost
income. Although
what percentage of
groups, this last group

Inadequate income alters a parent's ability to
provide adequate care in a variety of ways. To begin
with, there are direct consequences of having too little
money. Parents with very low income often cannot
provide children
sufficient nutrition; they may be
forced to live in
or overcrowded housing; even
with Medt·Cal
may not have access to regular
who are
often must
rely on poor childcare.

Our task then is to
from child's perspective, the probable impacts on each of these groups of
children. Obviously,
is concern
the
of
families thar fall

Secondly, living in poverty
a parent's
ability ro
the support, monitoring, and stimulation children need. This is especially true for single
parents without support systems. It is extraordinarily
difficult to manage all of the tasks a single parent must
perform; these problems can become overwhelming in
the face of very limited income, poor housing, dangerous neighborhoods, and a parent's personal problems.
So great is ti11S stress that approximately 30% of AFOC
mothers suffer tmm depression.o,q

situations
parents are
work efforts also must be
some of these children will
family income is increased or
parent is working rather than relying on welfare. On
the other hand, in order to
most
parents
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refer to by the name of its principal author, Nicholas
Zill, compared three groups of children - poor
children in AFOC families, poor children in nonwelfare families, and non-poor children. The study also
examined the effect of poverty itself, separating out by
statistical means differences that might be accounted
for by other factors, such as AFDC receipt, parental
education or family structure. Because it is the most
comprehensive examination of these issues, we present
its findings in some detail.

must find childcare. The impact of the parents' work
on their children is more likely to be determined by the
quality of care these children receive while their parent
is working, than on any increase in income. The effects
of work conditions on the parents' emotional status
also will have an impact on their children.

The Impact on Children Whose Parents Do
Not Replace the Lost Income
We begin by examining the likely impacts on
those children whose parents are unable to replace the
lost income - those parents who cannot or do not find
employment and those who will not net enough to
replace the lost income, even though they are working.
For some children, the reduction will be relatively
short term, from a few months to a year. Others will be
poor for several years. However, perhaps as many as
20% of those children currently receiving support will
live further in poverty for many years.

Physical Health. Fortunately, due to the availability
of Medi-Cal and other public-health services, the
general physical health of most poor children is
reasonably good. But they still are considerably more
likely than non-poor children to suffer from serious
medical conditions. If the Initiative passes, this
situation will worsen.
First, the reduction in benefits is likely to affect
the medical care received by children, particularly with
respect to dental care. Perhaps because dental coverage
under Medicaid and Medi-Cal has a low reimbursement level and does not encourage preventative care,
AFDC children already receive less dental care than
non-poor children.92 In addition, if parents are forced
to move frequently, their ties to their current medical
providers will be disrupted, making it more likely that
they will rely primarily on emergency care rather than
on preventive check-ups.

As a result of the income loss, parents will have to
cut back on the quality of food, housing, or other goods
necessary to their children's welfare. Some will be
forced to move to more dangerous housing or neighborhoods. They will be under more stress, which will lower
the care they can provide.
To what degree will these changes worsen the
condition of poor children? As just indicated, studies
of children show that poor children fare worse than
non-poor children, in terms of academic performance,
school completion, emotional health, and some aspects
of physical health. 91 Knowing that poor children do
worse than non-poor children does not reveal the
impact of the Initiative, however. All of the families on
AFDC already are poor. Their children already are
suffering from the consequences of poverty. The issue is
how much worse off they will be as a result of being
even poorer. In addition, some of the deficits manifested by poor children may not be the direct result of
poverty. Poor parents often differ from non-poor
parents in some important respects; for example, they
generally have less education and more often began
parenthood as teenagers. We need to know how much
income, in and of itself, matters. Finally, it would be
helpful to know whether there are differences in the
development between poor children in families
receiving AFDC and in poor families with a parent
working, since it often is claimed that, even if it is bad
to be poor, it is worse to be poor in a family receiving
welfare.

The health of children will be at further nsk
because, as already mentioned, many parents will be
forced to reduce food purchases as a result of lower
income. Inadequate nutrition and hunger, already
prevalent among poor children, cause dizziness, fatigue,
headaches, ear infections and other persistent medical
problems. Those would only be likely to become more
common under the Initiative.
One of the worst threats to children's health wtll
come from the fact that cuts in income will force
families to find cheaper housing, which generally
means lower-quality housing in less desirable living
areas. This will increase the number of children
harmed by lead poisoning and accidental injuries. For
children younger than five years old, the child's blood
lead concentration increases as his or her poverty level
increases. 93 Even low levels of lead poisoning harm a
child's central nervous system, impairing mental and
physical developmtnt.
As mentioned earlier, many low-income families
already live in housing containing safety hazards. Their
surrounding environment is also more hazardous. Zill
found that, on average, for children ages three to five
years, 17% of the play environments of AFDC children
appeared unsafe compared with 7% of those of nonpoor children.94 Injuries cause almost half the deaths of
children one to four years of age and more than half

There are a limited number of studies that directly
address these issues; we rely primarily on these studies.
In particular, there is a very recent and comprehensive
study of children's well-being conducted by researchers
at Child Trends, one of the ~.:ountry's leading research
groups on children's well-being. The study, which we
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the deaths of those five to 14. Studies have found that
poor children are five times as likely to die as a result of
fire than non-poor children. Both deaths and injuries
will increase tf families become poorer.

for a non-poor child. This is true despite the fact that
poor children whose families receive AFOC have
better access to health care than do other poor children. Given these children's current exposure to
inadequate nutrition and care, !ow-quality housing and
violent neighborhoods, any increased deprivation
would make that care even more inadequate and widen
the existing health gap between poor and non-poor
children.

At the extreme, the cuts will push some families
into homelessness, which dearly impairs children's
physical, mental and educational health. 95 While
precise estimates cannot be made, a study by the Santa
Clara Countv Department of Social Services found
that 3000 current AFOC families in that county will
have their grants reduced to an amount below what
they now pay for rent. 96 While some of these families
may increase their work income, find cheaper housing
or both, it seems certain that some will wind up
homeless.

Academic Perfarmance. The relationship between
family income and academic performance and school
attainment is one of the most highly researched issues
in studies of poverty. A substantial body of evidence
shows that lower income significantly decreases a
child's probability of achieving educational success,
regardless of other characteristics in her or his family.
The evidence further demonstrates that the lower the
family income, the greater the likelihood that a child
will fall behind in school. The basic picture is ret1ecteJ
in Zill's findings. He found that 26% of AFOC children
have repeated a grade, compared with 17% of non-poor
children, and that among children four to seven years
of age, 52% of AFOC children scored below the 30th
percentile on a national vocabulary test compared with
30% of non-poor children. These differences were not
the result of differences in parental education, family
structure, ethnicity or geographicallocatton.

As noted earlier, the elimination of AFOC support
to pregnant women from the time of conception could
have extremely detrimental effects on the children
born to these women, if the lack of support results in
pregnant women obtaining less medical care or causes
them to eat less nutritiously or denies them the support
they need to refrain from behaviors that might harm
the fetus, such as drug use. Stress, inadequate medical
care, poor nutrition and health behavior all increase
the likelihood of having a low-birth- weight baby or of
injury to the fetus. Low-birth-weight babies in lowincome families are more likely to die, to have frequent
illnesses, to suffer developmental delays and to have
cognitive deficits,
to academic problems. The
lack of medical care may be particularly detrimental for
pregnant teenagers, who often do not get medical care
and have a high proportion of problem pregnancies and
births.

Two other studies show that the degree of povertv
seems to matter. 99 A national study conducted for the
U.S. Department of Education found that the chance
of a child falling behind in school decreases by 4% for
every $1,000 of additional family income. The second
study found that higher AFOC benefits were associated
with small increases in years of schooling completed.

Unfortunately, poor children suffer health hazards
from their family environments as well as their physical
environments. Parents under substantial stress are less
attentive caretakers, contributing to the high rate of
accidental injuries. In addition, although the majority
of poor children are free from abuse and neglect,
children from poor families are subject to significantly
more maltreatment than children from non-poor
families. In general, the rates of physical and sexual
abuse and senous neglect are from four to six times
greater in families below the poverty line. 97 Moreover,
some studies find that the deeper the poverty the
higher the rate of abuse. 98 Particularly in those families
that undergo the 25% income cut, we can expect an
increase in abuse and neglect.

Why does income matter? There are a number of
possible explanations. First. as mentioned above, poor
children suffer more headaches, dental problems, ear
infections and other conditions that cause them to mtss
school or to function badly in schooL
School performance is also influenced by continuity of involvement. Poor children may experience

academic difficulties because they change schools more
frequently. To the degree that families
to move
more frequently to obtain affordable housing children
will loose continuity. When families move into
crowded living situations, perhaps doubling up with
friends or relatives, children will be deprived of space
to study and do homework; in fact, such living conditions may make it impossible for some children to focw·
on schooL

On the positive side, the provision requiring
teenage mothers to continue living with relatives also
might lead to improved health-care for new babies.
The harms associated with the reduction would far
outweigh any benefits. While poverty does not always
pose a health hazard for children, the risk of a poor
child's being unhealthy significantly exceeds the risk

Increased poverty is likely to affect some parents'
ability to help or encourage their children's academic
development. Zill found that young poor children are
less likely to be read to by their parents and own fewer
books. They are more likely than non-poor children to
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live in homes where the television is kept on seven or
more hours per day. While these differences may in
part reflect educational or intellectual differences
between poor and middle-class parents, there also is
reason to believe that, in some poor households, the
parent is too stressed to read to her or his children.
For example, in the year following a divorce, many
mothers dramatically decrease the time they spend
reading and talking with their young children. 100 The
stress of the divorce and the accompanying depression,
in part caused by substantial declines in income
following a divorce, deplete many mothers' energy.
Since many mothers tum to AFDC for support in the
wake of a divorce, it seems likely that the cuts will
further interfere with their ability to remain responsive
to their children.
Finally, as we will see in more detail, poor children
have more behavioral problems, including aggressive
actmg-out and hyperactivity. These behavioral
problems are inextricably linked to academic problems.
Zill found that poor children ages seven to 17 are twice
as hkely as non-poor children to have been suspended
or expelled. Fourteen percent of AFOC children have
been suspended or expelled, compared with 7% of nonpoor children.
As far as academic performance is concerned, the
greatest impact of the cuts will be on the children of
longer-term recipients. Not only does long-term
welfare recetpt expose the child to the negative
conditions longer, but most studies also find that
school problems are cumulative. Zill found that the
longer that families have been on AFOC the more
likely children are to score below the 30th percentile
on national vocabulary exams: 69% in families that
recetved AFOC in more than three ot the previous five
years, 50'% in those that recetved AFOC for three years
or le~s in the previous tive years, 39% in poor families
with no AFDC history and 299\J in families that were
not poor and had no AFOC history.
There are several ways that the Initiative might
lead to tmproved school performance for some children. If more teen mothers participate in special school
programs that focus on parenting, as well as academics,
this should help their children. Similarly, if more teens
graduate high school and thereby increase their longterm economic prospects, the increased income will
benefit their children's education. It is possible that if
the additional child provision discourages some births
the school performance of other children in these
families will be enhanced, since presumably they would
benefit from more parental rime and more available
resources. These gains would he offset, of course, by the
harm to children in families where the mother does
have another child.

Emotional Development. As just pointed out, poor
children tend to have more emotional and behavioral
problems than other children, although the differences
may not be substantial. Zill found that 25% ot AFDC
children were reported to have developmental problems, compared with 19% of non-poor children, and
that on a standardized behavioral test for children ages
four to seven years, poor children were almost twiCe as
likely as non-poor children to score above the 90th
percentile in severity of behavioral problems. ( 36
versus 19%).
For all the same reasons that the proposed cuts
threaten children's physical health and academic
performance, they also are likely to worsen the problems of children already evidencing behavioral problems, as well as to increase the number of children with
these problems.
With regard to all the harms identified above, the
children of long-term rectpients will be most seriouslv
affected, since their parents are least able to replace the
lost income and the impact of living in poverty is
greatest for those who are poor the longest. During
childhood deficits tend to be cumulative. Moreover,
these may be the parents least able to help their
children initially. Less obvious, perhaps, is the potential impact of the Initiative on children of parents who
move to California in hopes of finding a job or reuniting with relatives, but who end up needing to apply for
welfare. Many of these families will be entitled to
extremely small amounts: A family from Texas, for
example, would get $184 a month. While some of these
families may leave California as a resurt, others wtll
inevitably become homeless, be forced to move in wtth
friends or relatives or attempt to survive on extremelv
minimal income, either from work or welfare. As
discussed above, all of these responses entail threats to
children's development.

The Impact on Children Whose Parents Work
to Replace the Lost Support
While the percentage of parents who will be able
to replace the lost support through increased work is
debatable, this certainly will occur in some cases. In
fact, a substantial proportion of recipients will increase
their hours of work regardless of whether or not the
Initiative passes; this is one of the main routes off
welfare. Still, some parents who might not otherwise
have done so will seek work as a direct result of the
Initiative. Included in this group will be mothers who
believe that their children are too young to he left in
childcare or who feel that the available childcare is
inadequate.
The impact on children of the additional work by
parents will depend primarily on three factors: the
quality of care that children receive while their parents

are working; the effect working has on parents functionmg when they are with their children; and whether
entering the workforce leads to a significant increase in
the families long-term economic status. Assessing the
impact of the Initiative on children, therefore, requires
examining three issues:

I.

Is it good for children to force mothers of infants
and very young children to place their children
into childcare?

2.

What will be the quality of childcare most children receive? Will some children be left without
care?

3.

Will some children benefit as a result of their
parents entering the labor force?

Since the answers to these questions may depend
on the age of the child, we examine separately the
likely effects on children under and over two years of
age.

Requmng Work From Mothers Of Children Under
Two. Proposttion 165 is unique among welfare reform
proposals because it does not exclude mothers of very
young children from the work requirement. Reforms in
other states, federal laws, and the GAIN program all
exempt mothers of children under three trom work
mandates. t The 1988 federal Family Support Act does
allow states to require work of rectpients with children
over 1 year old.) In contrast, if the Initiative passes the
mother of a newborn would have to begin work
immediately to compensate for the initial cut. She
could wait only until the child was six months old to
avoid the larger reduction. Currently, more than
200,000 children younger than one (nearly 20%)
receive AFDC support; another 15% are two or three.
These provisions consequentlv will affect large numbers
of children.
The proposal is a 180-degree move from the
origmal purpose of AFDC, which was to allow mothers
to remain at home with their young children. A policy
that effectively requires work when children are
younger than two, and especially younger than one, is
certainly questionable. Although an increasing
percentage of non-AFDC mothers of very young
children now work at least part-time, most expertsand most parents- believe it 1s highly desirable for a
child ro receive full-time
care in the first year
of life. At a minimum, parents should be given this
option. This is the rationale for the widespread support
for adopting a parental leave policy; all other industrialized countries have adopted such leaves.
The first year of life is a crittcal period for parentchild bonding. It is now widely accepted that, in the
absence of sound bonding, children are at much greater
risk for emotional, academic, and social problems. As
the National Commission on Children reports:

In the first few months of life, infants
begin to develop strong attachments to
important caregivers. particularlv their
parents. These attachments ... prov1de children
a fundamental sense of mternal security ....
Secure attachments do not
mstantaneouslv. Thev reqmre the conststem avadabdof one or more adult~ who are affecttonate
and resronsive to a child's
and
emotiOnal needs. ln the absence of strong
attachments, many of these children will
experience later intellectual defiCiencies,
social problems, and emotional difficulties.:.'t
Manv child-development experts believe that,
ideally, all children would have a parent avadable fulltime Juring their first year, smce this is the surest wav
of rrovidim; consistent care and emottonal im·olvement. ''Lonng attachments develop graduallv out ot
the many moments of engagement that occur between
infant and rarent durmg dadv feedtnl!, barhinl!,
diapering, and playmg. Learn tnt! t• 1 >\nchrom:e
interactions also takes ttme 'Pent tcll;ether.
low-income parents to care tor rhetr \'t:fV vount.;
children mav be especiallv JestraHe. The amcltmr <>t
-stress suffered by a parent h , 1ne ut r he ma m
of poor att<Khment. Fc1r AFt K~ lllclther' tu ht: torct:d r. ·
cope with !tlh prnhlt:m'i .md rhe nn·cl w find ch1Lk.Irc·
m additiun w the srress Clu,ed h J, '\' mu;mc :md tht:
difficulties rhey mav han: m gettmc: medicalc.m·,
certainly makes
more ditfictdr for thnc
mothers. If the child has
or was born
low-birth-wetght, condittons far more
poor children, extra attenuun neeJed.
through breast feeding poor mothers can help ensure
adequate nutrition, facilitate
Breast-feeding is more difficult for

Of course, not all parents of newhoms can or
choose to provide full-time care. Under the
conditions, children can do well with alternative
childcare. But, especially for infants and very young
children, this care must be of the highest
it
requires no more than one adult for three children m
order to
attention,
CLmtact and
responsiveness. And the caretakers must be
committed and well-trained.
children (lJ
is
Few low-income mothers will be able to find
standards.
childcare that meets these
High quality infant care can cost
a
year per child, far
the means of poor
Even less-than-high-qualny care ts
AFDC
will need subsidies to obtam
care.
There is not
subsidi:ed care fnr a!l the lowincome families that now request it. A recent study h
the California Department of Educanon found that
there are twice as many AFDC

in the GAIN program desiring placement of their
infants in subsidized care as there are slots. 104 If the
Initwt1ve passes that demand will certainly increase.
ChilJcare also will have to be provided for the children
uf teenagers who attend school; the Initiative makes no
rroviSIOn for these needs.

spend time in good childcare. In any case, if, as a result
of the Initiative, more parents require childcare, thetr
children will find themselves in no worse a situatton
than the millions of children whose working parents
currently place them in vanous forms of childcare.
The key issue is whether mothers forced to go to
work can find good quality care. ln the study by the
California Department of Education, discussed above,
the lack of available care was not limited to families
with very young children; most of the GAIN families
had children older than three, and 60% of the children
on waiting lists were school-aged. Moreover, there were
nearly 200,000 non-welfare children on the waitmg
lists, many with priority status.

Many parents will tum to relatives and neighbors
to fill in. This care will range from good to inadequate;
there 1s substantial reason for concern that relative care
will not provide the majority of infants or toddlers with
the types of continuous and intimate interactions they
require. In the course of their first year of life, many
infants will be exposed to multiple caretakers, the worst
poss1ble situation. It must be recognized that parents
will need to find more than just a few hours of care a
week. Just to replace the income lost after 6 months,
recipients paying $2 an hour for childcare will need to
work at least 20 hours a week, assuming that they earn
around $5 per hour, the average earnings of recipients
now working. 105 The children will be in care longer
than the 20 hours, since the mothers must get to and
from work. It is not possible that adequate care by a
single caretaker can be provided to the more than
200,000 infants affected by the cuts.

Recent studies indicate that many employed
AFOC recipients are dissatisfied with their child care
arrangements. 107 The majority of recipients rely on
relatives and do so to a greater degree than other
working parents. While some do so by preference,
many rely on relatives for reasons of cost or because
they cannot find group care at the times they work,
before 6:00a.m., after 6:00p.m. and on weekends. One
recent survey of AFDC mothers in Boston, Charlotte,
and Denver found that more than two-thirds of the
recipients relying on relatives would have preferred
some other type of care. 10~ The unreliability of relatives, with respect to both availability and quality of
care, is a frequently expressed problem.

There also is reason for concern that working will
impa1r, not improve, the quality of attention that single
mothers of very young children can provide to their
children. Infants need a great deal of attention from
their parents. With the added stress of work, often
under poor working conditions, many mothers simply
will not be able to provide this type of attention to
their newborns. Attention to older children in the
famt!v also w1ll decline. Childcare problems may
negauvely affect the mothers job performance, as welL
Whtle there 1s evidence that the emotional well-being
of mothers sometimes is enhanced by work, the
research mdicates this is true for mothers of older
children who like their work and believe that their
children are receiving good careY16

There is good reason, therefore, for concern that
even older children will not necessarily receive
adequate care. Just recently, the Panel on Child Care
Policy of the National Academy of Sciences concluded
that:
Poor quality care ... threatens children's
development, especially children from poor
and minority families .... Arranging quality
child care can be difficult, stressful, and time
consuming for all famtlies. However, the
problems are inevitably compounded for lowincome families who lack time, information,
and economic resources. For these families,
the choices are often more limited, and the
consequences of inadequate care are likely to
be more severe. 109

Finally, there may well be other unintended
consequences of the proposals. California now provides
higher childcare subsidies for recipients participating in
GAIN education and training programs than for
working recipients. As discussed earlier, the Initiative
would push parents out of such programs and into lowpaymg jobs. AFOC recipients may actually lose
benettts. It also is possible that if more slots are made
avadable, places will be denied to the children of lowincome workers who do not receive AFDC, but are
now eligible for subsidi:ed care. The overall impact on
childcare rates created by the increased demand also
needs consideration.

If children receive adequate care, the picture
would be quite different, at least with respect to
children 3 and older. Children may benefit just from
the fact that the parent is working; if the parent is able
to increase family income there would be further
benefit. Working often ratses mothers' self-esteem and
broadens their social networks, both of which may
enhance their parenting abilities.ll° Furthermore, if
moving into the workforce becomes the first step in a
process ultimately leading to substantial increases in
income, this would clearly benefit children, as long as

Child Older Than Two. In contrast to infant care,
moM experts believe that, in general, children aged two
to ftve are not harmed, and often are benefited if they
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they recetve reasonable quality childcare. The potential
effects on children may depend upon the
of the parents job, however. If the Job is
or overly stressful, this could impair the care
they provide to their children.

and programs that enable poor parents to earn more
than poverty wages, will reduce the
of
children needing support m the future. In contrast, JUSt
moving parents into
poor wtl! have. at
most, only a vety small effect on
children's
welfare use.

Parents Versus Non-working Parents. One
final
is whether children will be better-off
solely because their parents have entered the
workforce, even if the family remains poor? This
question is
by Zill's research. His findings
indicate that in almost aU aspects of development
children of poor working parents are as damaged by
living in poverty as children whose parents rely on
AFDC. These findings indicate that the risks from poor
childcare are not balanced by any advantages that
might come from having a "working poor" parent.

Children of Teen Mothers

teenage mothers
are designed
births to teens. and
to minimize the
that teens who do have
children will become dependent on welfare for
periods of time, both the
and
provisions could affect the children of teenage mothers.
It is not possible to estimate the overall
of
the co-residence
Although many researchers have documented the
faced
children born to teen mothers, few have examined
of residence has an
whether the teen mother's
impact on her children. Those who have have reached
different conclusions. 11 3 A 1982 study of 60 teen
mothers found that those who lived with thetr parents
were likely to be
restnctive and punitive in rhe1r
parenting than teen mothers who
thetr , 1wn
households and a mid-1970s study of first-grade
children found that those living in mother-alone
households were at greater risk for soctal
than those who lived in mother-grandmother famtl!es.
In contrast, one recent study found that co-restdence
was related to
and
of
grandmothering and a second recent
mothers, many of them
found that
mothers
verbal responsiveness and greater involvement with
their infants than mothers who remained in the
parental home. At this
it appears that the
residence
will have both
and
negative
children that mav cancel
each other out.

Although living in a "working poor" family may
not help children in the short-run, perhaps this will
redound to their long-term benefit. A primaty concern
of the Initiative's proponents is the fact that some
children who grow up in families that receive AFDC
become recipients themselves as adults (or as teen
mothers). The Initiative specifically mentions the
problem of "intergenerational dependency."
it would be desirable to protect children
from factors that increase the likelihood that they will
need to rely on AFDC as adults. Research indicates
that
one-third of all children who live
AFOC become recipients themtwo-thirds do not. 111 This research also
finds that the length of time parents receive AFDC
not
the likelihood that their
wdl ever
support, although it is related
of time they may need support.

The fact that in some families several generations
receive support does not mean, however, that the
reliance on AFOC caused the child's later
AFOC use. Other factors, most notably the fact that
families
AFOC are poor, may account for the
child's future use of AFOC. Before "blaming" AFDC
use, it is necessary to know whether children from poor
families
receive AFDC are more likely to require
AFOC adults
children from poor families that
do not receive AFDC.

Many more teen mothers will
Cal-Learn
than
the
ment. Unfortunately, no studies
compare the parenting
and
of teen mothers who have
those who remain in
studies comparing the
two groups. From
parents
parental
would expect
lead to better
pregnant students and for
may lead mothers to get
care during the pregnancy, thus improving chances
that children will be born healthy;
may also
u''""u'""' better parents.
extent the

This
has
studied by a number of
researchers. 111 To simplify a complicated matter, the
studies indicate that children who live in poor families
are far more likely to receive AFDC as adults than
children who never experience poverty. Among those
children who do experience poverty, however, welfare
receipt itself does not substantially increase the
chances that a child will end up requiring support.
Poverty, not AFOC receipt, largely accounts for
"intergenerational dependency." These findings
indicate that
to help all families avoid poverty,

111

Initiative facilitates attendance in such classes, both
the mothers and their children are likely to benefit.
There 1s another side to the picture, however. For
a young mother, school is one more task to cope with.
Especially if she is not a good student, the added
pressure may impinge on her psychological readiness to
focus on her child's needs. 114 lt may be very hard for
these mothers to attend school every day; yet, if they
do not, they will lose critical income. And if the
mother does not have adequate childcare, the requirement of school attendance may result in an extremely
bad environment for the child.
In light of the fact that the majority of teen
mothers already attend school, it is uncertain whether
the potential benefits to children outweigh the
potential harms that could result from forcing teen
mothers into bad living situations, unwelcome school
environments or greater poverty. As noted earlier,
other approaches probably would be far more effective,
albeit more expensive in the short-run.

Children in Families from Other States
As we have shown, even if the Initiative passes
many families still will move to California and wind-up
havmg no job and income. These families will face
three choices. They can move elsewhere in hopes of
finding a job; they can move in with family or friends,
if any are available, and depend on them for support; or
they can apply for AFOC, receiving the amount they
would have received in their previous state of residence. Whatever the choice, the well-being of many
children w1ll suffer.
If parents remain in California and need AFOC
support, the families will be extremely poor. Many will
be t(1fced to live in cars or vans or the worst quality
housing. Some famtlies will become homeless, some
chddren may be placed into foster care, voluntarily or
involuntarily. Others will move in with family or
friends under highly crowded conditions. There is no
way to determine how many children will experience
these various outcomes; as many as 50,000 children are
potentially affected. Their situation must be included
in any calculations.

Summary
The approach taken in the Initiative will harm
chtlJren m three ways. First, many children will live
deeper in poverty, since it is certain that a substantial
proportion of the families will not be able to replace
the lost income. This will impair children's physical
health, academic performance, and emotional wellbemg. The loss of family income will affect children
directly hy depriving them of access to needed services.
Even more importantly, the quality of parental care
will decline, due to the added stress on parents.

Second, because the Initiative fails to assure that
adequate childcare will be made available to working
parents, many children will be left in inadequate homes
or daycare centers. As the National Academy of
Sciences has pointed out, low quality childcare poses a
major threat to the health and development of the
nation's children. Finally, applying the cuts ro mothers
of children under a year of age creates especially great
risks for these children. If these mothers are forced to
work parent-child bonding may be impaired; it any case
most of these children will receive inadequate
childcare. This picture may sound overly bleak, but the
data detailing the developmental deficits among poor
children allow for little optimism.
In assessing the overall consequences of the
proposals, it must be considered that these children
already face numerous obstacles to normal development. First, the children currently live in poverty, wtth
its attendant consequences; negative events have their
greatest impact on those already vulnerable. Second,
almost half of the children are five and under, 200,00
are under 1; young children are the most vulnerable to
inadequate care by their parents or by other caregivers.
Third, the vast majority of these children live with a
single parent, who often is quite young as well; without
the back-up of another parent or adult, many smgle
parents have a difficult time meeting all of the1r
children's needs, especially when the parent is under
stress. Fourth, many of the families enter the welfare
system following a divorce or separation, an event
which itself jeopardizes children's well-being, at least
for a period of time. Finally, many of the families live
in neighborhoods that lack the kinds of serviCes such as high quality childcare and medical services that can enable parents to help their children cope
with all these other problems. Research on chtld
development has shown that, in general, it 1s the
cumulative impact of several factors, not the existence
of any particular problem, that causes developmental
delays and harmful behaviors among children. And
when multiple adverse conditions are present, the
harms children experience increase exponenttally.
These are not inevitable consequences of all
welfare reforms. ln fact, if older children were provided
with good childcare and teen parents were assured
places in high quality school programs designed to meet
their special needs, a policy that encouraged and
helped parents find jobs and brought teen mothers back
to school would benefit both children and parents.
The ends of the Initiative are good for children, it is
the means that are deficient.

CAN SERVICES SUBSTITUTE?
In numerous speeches and in the ballot arguments,
Governor Wilson has expressed the view that the
money now spent on AFDC would be better spent on
other children's services, such as education. One
interpretation of this statement is that the proponents
of the Initiative believe that the money now being
spent on AFOC cash grants would be better spent on
other servtces for poor children, such as Head Start.
This raises two empirical issues: ( 1) Do poor children
benefit more from direct services than from income
support? and ( 2) Can the impact of the grant reductions be neutralized by providing poor children with
other services, including better access to medical care,
preschool, and special educational programs? The
answer to both these questions is no.
We note, to begin with, that poor children clearly
need and benefit from the types of services the Governor supporrs. As a supplement to an adequate income
program they are invaluable. They accomplish things
that income alone cannot guarantee. However, while
these programs are a critical supplement to income
supporr,
are not a substitute. Programs like Head .

,

Start, Healthy Start, and school reform work best when
parents are heavily involved in the program. For many
children, none of these programs are effective if
parents are functioning badly. This has been welldocumented in
Head Start and school reform
efforts.ll5
Since placing parents under enormous financial
strains generates inadequate parenting and prevents
parental involvement in activities with their children,
the cuts will undermine the effectiveness of other
programs. It therefore would be a mistake to treat this
as an either or choice. It makes little sense to
more money on services to poor children while at the
same time undercuttmg the effectiveness of
services. As the National Commission on Children
stated: "If our society is committed to supporting
families as the basic institutton for
children,
and if all children are to have an
to
develop to their full
then it is necessary for
families to be more economtcally secure." 116

ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES?

The analysis in this report focuses on the likely
impacts of the specific provisions in the Initiative. Our
review indicates that these provisions will accomplish
little welfare "reform", yet they will result in substantial
harm to children. As noted throughout the report,
however, the goals of the Initiative' proponents
command widespread support, among recipients as well
as within the general public and those who have
studied the welfare system. While the approach
adopted in the Initiative will harm children, this does
not mean that welfare reform is impossible.

applicants and recipients. In addition to education
and \or job training GAIN recipients may be eligible
for the provision of money for transportation, b(x)ks,
tuition, uniforms and other costs associated with
training and education programs. Although the GAIN
activities have never been fully funded, preliminary
findings from research on the program indicate that it
has increased the hours of work and the income of
recipients. 118
In order to protect the needs of children, GAIN
provides a childcare entitlement. In addition, the
statute authorizes three months of transitional
childcare and four to nine months of Medi-Cal to
participants who become employed through GAIN and
lose their AFOC benefits. Finally, single mothers with
children under 3 are exempted from the mandatory
requirements.

There are many alternatives approaches to welfare
reform, proposed by groups and individuals whose views
span the entire political spectrum. Some envision
changes much more extensive than those found in the
Initiative; the California Legislative Analyst also has
suggested less extensive legislative changes that could
increase work incentives without reducing benefits. 117
All of these proposals recognize that whatever approach is taken avoiding harm to children must be a
central goal. While a full description of these proposals
is beyond the scope of this report, the core of virtually
all other suggested programs is a system that combines
job training, high quality childcare, and some means of
ensuring that parents who work earn enough from that
work to support their families at an adequate level. The
proposals also focus on the need to hold fathers
responsible for child support.

We cannot examine here the merits of GAIN
versus other possible approaches to welfare ret()rm. And
our criticism of the Initiative is not necessarily meant
to be an endorsement of GAIN; a great deal wtll be
learned from the evaluations. We do, however, endorse
its goal of trying to protect the needs of children at the
same time as trying to help recipients obtain jobs. As
stated at the outset, we believe that Californians
should, and do, want to make children's well-being a
top priority. It was this premise that motivated our
efforts to determine how the Initiative would affect
children.

In fact, California already has a program that
incorporates many of these features, the GAIN
program. As noted earlier, California was the first state
to establish a mandatory work-job training program for
AFDC recipients. In order to help recipients become
truly self-sufficient the GAIN legislation requires state
and local welfare agencies to provide a wide array of
employment and support services for all AFOC

It seems clear that the Initiative does not meet this
test. Children will be hurt and the welfare system will
continue to function much as it has in the past. The
negative effects will be greatest for the youngest
children and parents with the least job readiness. These
will be the real, if unintended, consequences of thts
proposal.
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Data Sources

The authors relied on this source for information
about unemployment and
the county
level in California. The
source of the
population data is the U.S. Census Bureau. The
primary source of the
California Employment
Labor Market Information Division. Other sources
included
United States Bureau of Labor
of
Statistics and the California
Industrial Relations.

The
used in this paper were drawn from the
following five primary sources.
I.

Data and Materials Related to Welfare Programs for
Families with Children, Prepared by the Staff for the
Use of Committee on Finance, United States
Senate: Also known as "The Green Book," this
source compiles information on characteristics of
AFDC recipients across all fifty states and U.S.
territories. The information on the states is used to
construct estimates of averages and medians for the
entire U.S. population. The Green Book also
provides information about program benefits for
AFDC, Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax
Credit at the federal level.

4.

These data are compiled from the National
Integrated Quality Control System (QC). The QC
provides data on roughly 75,000 AFDC cases. This
represents a sample drawn from all fifty states and
U.S. territories. Information for each household
member includes age, race, sex, employment
status, income (if any) and relationship to the
household head. For each AFDC unit, the date on
which the unit last began to receive AFDC
-providing information on the
benefits
length of
welfare spells. Program
eligibiliry and benefit levels can be calculated on
the basis of income, assets, and work-related and
child care expenses.

These surveys are
to examine
special interest regardmg welfare
data in them are not
in
that enables one to use them directly in
the various provisions of the Initiative; the survevs
were not designed for
purpose. However. up~n
request the State
Social Services
does special runs for
with research intere'itS
regarding
AFDC svstem.

l. Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFOC

3.

California Statistical Abstract, 1991: A publication
of the California Department of Finance, Financial
and Economic Research Unit, this volume is a
of various government agencies.

Public Welfare in California and AFDC Charactemtics Surveys: A monthly publication of the Data
Processing and Stattsttcal Services Bureau,
Public Welfare
Department of Social
an up-to-date report of the size of the AFDC-FG
and AFDC-U rolls bv county. This publication
also provides information on benefit levels and size
of food stamp and AFDC grants. The authors
relied on this source for county level information
on participation in the AFDC program.
The AFDC Charactenstics
from special surveys taken
of AFDC recipients.
surveys obtain data not
regularly reported in Public Welfare in Califomu.
The most recent survevs were in January 1991 and
April 1990. Because
are relativelv
random
.
entire population. In
or
centages
be four percentage
lower than the
percentage.

These data are probably the best source of information about the characteristics of current AFDC
families nationally, both because the sample is
because information relating to program
rules IS reported. At the same time, because only
households getting AFDC are included, the QC
cannot be used to compare recipients with non-

·An annual publication of the U.S.
Health and Human Services, this
manual compiles
about AFDC
recipients across
states and U.S. territories. The source of the data is the QC, described
above. While some of the information overlaps
with the Green Book, this publication provides
detailed information about individual recipients of
AFDC and therefore permits comparison of the
children, male recipients, and female recipients of
AFDC across the fifty states.

'

'

5.

tion was ~..vttcLLcu
AFDC

Appendix B

State-by-State Comparison of AFDC, Food Stamps & Housing Subsidies

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas

California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Lousisana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsyvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Average

Rank of
State re:
Combined
benefits
less FMR

Monthly
Combined
AFDC&
Food Stamps
( 1992)

Fair
Market Rents
for 2-bedr.
apartment
(1991)

$441
184
620
496

$390
550
570
10

51
634

38
I
39

86

850

750

100

636
862
673
623
595
572
1077
607
649
580
685
697
520
482
703
668
764
708
759
412
584
659
564
667
748
691
613
806
641
647
334
625
744
681
812
502
670
477
476
668
857
634
541
784
748
638

480
680
730
590
520
500
700
540
610
450
470
460
410
470
590
610
780
490
530
430
450
480
440
680
660
650
510
610
420
440
440
440
510
510
610
400
430
430
460
410
640
570
530
450
470
600

156
82
-57
33
75
72
377
67
39
130
215
237
110
12
113
58
-16
218
229
-18
134
179
124
-13
88
41
103
196
221
207
184
185
234
71
202
102
240
7
6
258
217
64
II
334
278
38

32
30
22

666

528

138

Combined
benefits
less FMR

so

19
51
44

33
34
2
35
42
24
13
7
27
46
26
37
49
II
9
50
23
20
25
48
I

41
28
16
10
14
8
17
8
21
15
29
6
40
45
5
12
36
47
3
4
43
26
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Professor Wald has been a major participant m the
drafting of legislation affectmg children, including the
laws establishing California's child abuse and
system, and the federal
Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980. He currently is a member of the
Carnegie
Task Farce on
the Needs
of Children 0 w 3, chaired by former South
Governor Richard Riley, and is
on a
commission, appointed by California's Chief JustiCe
Malcolm Lucas, that is looking at the future of the
California court system. He has been a member of the
National Academy of Sciences Panel on Child
ment Research and Public Policy and a former chairman of the California State
Commmee tm
Child Abuse and Neglect.

MichaelS. Wald, Jackson Eli Reynolds Professor of
Law, has taught at Stanford since 1967. From 1984 to
1987 he served as Director of the Stanford Center for
the Study of Families, Children and Youth. His
research focuses on public policies towards children
and families. Among his numerous publications are
The Conditions of California's Children (1989), for which
he was the general editor, and Protecting Abused and
Neglected Children (with Merrill Carlsmith and P.H.
Leiderman) (1988).
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The statute has been amended many times. The
program is extremely complex. Not only does it
vary from state to state, there are even variations
Within states. We have described the basic
contours of the program that are affected by the
Initiative. The actual impact of the proposals will
vary among families, depending upon family size,
grounds for eligibility, income from other sources
and numerous other factors.
Most of the details and statistics which we
report regarding program operation, participation
rates, etc. come from three sources which are
described in more detail in Appendix A. The State
c)f California publishes a monthly overview of
AFDC expenditures, Public Welfare in California
(referred to as Public Welfare). It also publishes biannual reports providing more in-depth analysis of
the AFOC program and caseloads. These are
entitled Aid to Families wnh Dependent Children,
Characteristics Survey (Characteristics Survey).
Each year the Ways and Means Committee of the
U.S. House of Representatives publishes a volume,
Overview of Entitlement Programs (the Green
Book), describing all soc1al welfare programs
funded under the Social Security Act. It contains
program descriptions, analyses, and interstate
comparisons.

2.
3.

4.

Evaluation, Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation, 1987 (cited as MDRC).
5.

Green Book, 1991, pp. 568, 597.

6.

Public Welfare, Feb. 1992. While virtually all
AFOC recipients are eligible for food stamps, not
all recipients apply for them. One reason 1s that
some recipients consider use of the stamps to be
stigmatizing.

7.

Green Book, 1992, pp. 682-83.

8.

Some commentators argue that the extent of
poverty in the United States is overstated, claiming that the real economic status of families should
be calculated by looking at all of the income and
income substitutes a family receives. See R. Rector
and M. McLaughlin, "A Conservative's Guide to
State Level Welfare Reform," The Heritage
Foundation, Washington, D.C. 1991. Th1s
position has been rev1ewed and rejected by the
great majority of people who study the effects of
income on family well-being. See "Measuring the
Effects of Benefits and Taxes on Income and
Poverty: 1990," U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Current Population Reports, Aug. 1991; P.
Ruggles, Drawing the Lme: Alternative Pot1erry

Measures and Their Implications for Public Policy,
Urban Institute Press, 1990.

Welfare and Institutions Code 11450.

9.

The formula for calculatmg the cash grant to
v.:hich a family is entitled when the family has
earned income is quite Cclmplex. In addition to the
childcare, work expense and the 30 and a third
disregards, an additional proportion of earnings
may be disregarded, based on the gap between the
maximum grant available to the family and an
amount called the "need" standard. Due to space
limitations, we will not elaborate on the formula.
However, if the Initiative is passed and the
maximum grant reduced. this will have the effect
of increasing the amount disregarded due to the
gap between the maximum grant and the need
standard. As a result, recipients with earnings will
be able to retain an even greater proportion of
their earnings than would be the case from the
extension of the 30 and a third rule alone. This
fact is relevant in assessing the probable impact of
rhe Initiative on both participation rates and work
by recipients. For a full dtscussion of these points
seeM. Wiseman, "The New State Welfare
Initiatives" (forthcoming).

10. There is, of course, no way of knowing for certain
what percentage of current children may ultimately receive AFOC. The best that can he done
is to make estimates based on studies of participation rates of earlier samples of children. There are
several studies that analyze of longitudinal data
gathered on cohorts of children born in the late
1960's and early 1970's. These studies all have
methodological problems. More importantly, as
economic conditions and other factors change,especially the percentage of divorces and children
born to never-married mothers- so will poverty
rates, since they are heavily intluenced by these
factors. We base our estimates on a review of the
various studies, especially G. Duncan and W.
Rodgers, "Longitudinal Aspects of Childhood
Poverty,"]. of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 50,
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For a full description of the GAIN program, see J.
Wallace and D. Lmg, GAIN: Planning and Early

Public Welfare, Feb. 1992.

11. In addition to changes in the 30 and a third rule,
the state has received federal permission to change
other rules pertaining to disregards or eligibility.
The most important is allowing AFDC-U recipients to remain eligible for benefits even if they
work more than 100 hours a month. Economic

modeling of the likely effects of these changes on
caseloads is complex and estimates will vary. There
ts little doubt, however, that these changes will
alter work effort by some recipients and will make
some current non-recipients eligible for benefits.
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lack a
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from United California Tax payers, 1121 "L"
Sacramento, CA 95814.
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Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation,
which already has issued five reports examining
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J. Riccio and D. Friedlander, GAIN: Program

Strategies, Participation Patterns, and First-Year
Impacts m Six Counties, MDRC, May 1992.
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famdv mcome, most families will be eligible for
more food stamps as a result of the cuts in the cash
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impact oi the
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Legislative
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budget proposals. See LAO, The Analysis of the
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